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Abstract 
 
 The rise of political martyrdom in the contemporary world is not a new 
phenomenon but can be traced back to at least the early Twentieth Century with the 
rise of European Fascist movements. Both they, and the fascist-like movements of 
today, share a cluster of characteristics that allow for fruitful comparisons of the ways 
in which martyrdom spectacles are used to communicate with constituent 
populations, facilitate a culture of violence, perpetuate their revolutionary zeal and 
demonstrate the characteristics of the ideal citizen. Examining four major 
movements; Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, the Palestinian Hamas and the modern Iran, 
this dissertation argues that 1) the use of martyrdom by today’s fascist-like 
fundamentalists is not unique, but follows a well-known path taken by the earlier 
fascist movements of the twentieth century; 2) martyrdom spectacles can be used to 
build support within the population and present a narrative of the ideal citizen; 3) 
there are different uses of martyrdom spectacles between the regime phase and the 
movement phase for both fascist and fascist-like movements. By exploring the 
relationship between martyrdom spectacles and their disciplining nature, we can 
iv 
 
better understand the logic of contemporary fundamentalist movements and the 
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Chapter One: The Spectacle of Martyrdom and the Politics of 
Radical Extremism	   
 
The attacks of September 11th dramatically reshaped the debate surrounding 
terrorism in the modern world. Belligerent religious fundamentalists, harboring an 
antipathy for democracy and liberal individualism, transformed the seemingly sacred 
concept of martyrdom into a weapon of war. Yet despite the shocking nature of the 
attacks, there is a resonance in this rhetoric of martyrdom and in the spectacles 
surrounding these events that is reminiscent of earlier illiberal movements. This 
dissertation argues that; 1) the use of martyrdom by today’s fascist-like 
fundamentalists is not unique, but follows a well-known path taken by the earlier 
fascist movements of the twentieth century; 2) martyrdom spectacles can be used to 
build support within the population and present a narrative of the ideal citizen; 3) 
there are different uses of martyrdom spectacles between the regime phase and the 
movement phase for both fascist and fascist-like movements. By exploring the 
relationship between martyrdom spectacles and their disciplining nature, we can 
better understand the logic of contemporary fundamentalist movements and the 
techniques they used to achieve power and maintain control.  
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Mussolini defined fascism as a political synthesis of democracy and monarchy 
in the office of the Duce1 who would represent the interests of the state rather than the 
individual (liberal democracy) or the royal family (monarchy). Economically, fascism 
serves as a synthesis of the prevailing economic systems of capitalism and socialism 
through the corporate syndicalist model.2  Emilio Gentile goes on to define fascism 
as: 
A modern political phenomenon, which is nationalistic and revolutionary, 
anti-liberal and anti-Marxist, organized in the form of a militia party, with a 
totalitarian conception of politics and the State, with an ideology based on 
myth; virile and anti-hedonistic, it is sacralized in a political religion affirming 
the absolute primacy of the nation understood as an ethnically homogeneous 
organic community, hierarchically organized into a corporative State, with a 
bellicose mission to achieve grandeur, power and conquest with the ultimate 
aim of creating a new order and a new civilization.3 
 
Gentile’s definition with a focus on illiberalism, a community and a revolutionary 
desire to create a new national order and a new civilization through a political religion 
are themes similarly observed within the fascist-like Islamic fundamentalist 
movements today.  
 Islamism, or the entry of Islam into the political realm, has its modern 
ideological roots in the 1960’s with the writings of Sayyed Qutb, Abu al-Ala 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Leader. 
 
2 Corporate Syndicalism is a hierarchical economic system in which private property is allowed to exist 
but decisions about the direction of manufacturing, labor issues, etc. is left largely to the state. In 
Mussolini’s words: “But brought within the orbit of the state, Fascism recognizes the real need which 
gave rise to socialism and trade-unionism, giving them due weight in the guild or corporative system in 
which divergent interests are coordinated and harmonized in the unity of the state.” Benito Mussolini, 
The doctrine of fascism (Firenze: Vallecchi, 1935), 11. 
 
3 Emilio Gentile, “Fascism, totalitarianism and political religion: definitions and critical reflections on 




Maududi and Ruhollah Khomeini. These three activists argue that a political form of 
Islam, informed through Islamic Sharia law, could address the failures of the Arab 
world by reawakening Muslims to the virtues of the faith and providing them with an 
ideological platform by which to counter the onslaught of neo-Western imperialism.4  
Political Islam became the answer to all of the economic and political ills of the 
community in much the same as fascism did for the Italians and Germans. Couple this 
with the illiberal, anti-Western, revolutionary character of Islamism and we can begin 
to treat belligerent Islamic fundamentalism as fascism-like.  
In making the comparison between fascism and a fascist-like movement such 
as belligerent Islamic, I employ three broad themes. The first is myth construction, 
which explores the importance of what I label first martyrs and the subsequent 
narrative surrounding martyrdom. Second, the disciplining nature of martyrdom and 
how martyrdom serves a disciplining role in society by demonstrating both the 
characteristics of an ideal citizen but also a thinly veiled threat as to the implicit 
power of the movement to any who would challenge the regime. Third, the 
institutionalization of spectacle through exploring the mechanisms by which 
movements once in power have created permanent martyrdom shrines in order to 
symbolize the violence of the act and the power of its disciplining potential. 
 Guy Debord referred to spectacles as a social relationship between people that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Assaf Moghadam, The Globalization of Martyrdom: Al Qaeda, Salafi Jihad, and the Diffusion of 




is mediated by images.”5 In the case of martyrdom, spectacle refers to the creation of 
a narrative of martyrdom that elevates an act of violence to a communal sacrifice for 
the good of the larger society. Narratives, however, are more than words; they are 
symbols, images, sights, sounds, and even smells that can all combine to create a 
transformational experience. The specific forms these spectacles may take can vary 
from movement to movement and country to country, but the intent of the spectacle is 
always the same: to provide a highly orchestrated outlet for political participation in 
which the individual is lost in the rhetoric of the movement.  
For “when man is disdained for his rational idealism, …he is reduced to a 
cellular element of the crowd, and as the crowd, becomes easy to influence not 
through appeal to rational, but solely by means of the instruments of 
psychological manipulation and moral violence imposed through the 
manipulation of conscience.”6  
 
The spectacle of martyrdom becomes an agitational force, orchestrated in such a way 
as to spur the audience into action and instill a sense of holy sacrifice for the 
movement whereby symbolically providing a tangible example of the ideal member 
of the community. 
Fascist Italy’s use of spectacle began early in Mussolini’s reign with his 
program known as the “Battle for Grain” (1925)7 which intended to improve Italian 
agricultural output but also redesigned much of the Italian landscape around Rome by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle (New York: Zone Books, 1995), p. 12. 
 
6 Gentile, Emilio, “Fascism, Totalitarianism and Political Religion: Definitions and Critical Reflections 
on Criticism of an Interpretation,” Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, vol. 5, no. 3, 
Winter 2004, pp. 339-340.   
 
7 This was the same year that Mussolini’s dictatorship was proclaimed—and three years after he 
assumed power in 1922. 
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transforming cropland that had not been tillable into fertile production areas. The 
transformation of the Italian countryside was a permanent demonstration to the Italian 
people of the power of fascist ideology and billed as proof of the power of fascism’s 
ideological and technological superiority. Nevertheless, the remaking of the soil was 
not the same as the remaking of the individual Italian into a fascist ideal. A prolific 
use of spectacle came in Mussolini’s marriage of a martyrdom narrative with Italian 
Catholic traditions. In 1932, Mussolini consecrated the Mostra della Rivoluzione 
Fascista whose centerpiece was a museum to the martyrs that was designed around 
Catholic architecture while using all the lighting, sounds and visual aids of the 
modern era to connect the idea of personal sacrifice to what Mussolini argued was the 
sacredness of the regime.  
Nothing, however, came close to Mussolini’s grandest display of spectacle 
and martyrdom: the epic play 18BL. 18BL was one of the largest theatrical 
productions ever created. Throughout the 1920’s and 1930’s, Mussolini sought to 
build upon cultural affinities for opera and stage productions as a way to connect his 
regime with traditional outlets for entertainment. The idea was to create patriotic 
narratives about the regime and package them in ways that would be inspiring to the 
masses. The Nazis would borrow from this same logic by creating an entire class of 
theatrical performances known as Thingspiel or theater for the masses. These 
productions, much like their Italian counterparts, focused on the national community 
and unity among the citizens. In the Nazi case, the government went so far as to 
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construct over sixty-six Thingspiel theaters, which were dedicated venues for just 
such productions.8  
18BL has, as its hero, a truck to epitomize the ultimate sacrifice of the self 
into a mechanized modern ideal form geared towards the fascist youth. 18BL was the 
model number of the story’s protagonist, a truck. There is a tremendous significance 
in the hero being not a man, or even something identifiable with a name, rather they 
act as part of a greater whole. In being identified solely with a serial number, 18BL 
would serve as the representation of the mass man who finds themselves not in their 
pursuit of individuality but through the glories and emotions of the community. The 
production was so expensive (18BL is “martyred” at the end of the play and actually 
destroyed) and over such an expansive amount of territory that it was produced only 
once.9 However, it integrated three themes within the spectacle of martyrdom that 
will remerge in the contemporary world; the grand displays to monumentalize 
specific martyrdom events, the institutionalization of ritualized practices to allow 
opportunities of communal participation and the celebration of individual sacrifice as 
witness to the greater good of the cause. 
These same themes have spread from their European Fascist roots to 
fundamentalist movements in the modern world. Nearly fifty years after the fascist 
Martyr Museum constructed in 1932 in Rome, Italy, Iran constructed its own 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 H. Eichberg and R. A Jones, “The Nazi Thingspiel: Theater for the Masses in Fascism and 
Proletarian Culture,” New German Critique (1977): 133–136. 
 
9 Not coincidentally, the play was staged in a large swath of land that had been reclaimed with the 
“Battle for Grain.”  
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Martyr’s Museum in Tehran. Unlike Mussolini’s centralized museum in Rome, the 
Tehran Martyr’s Museum was just one link in a long chain of such memorials that 
spread throughout the Iranian countryside to bring the narrative of martyrdom to the 
people and to connect the revolutionary fervor to post-revolutionary generations.10  
The Iranian network of martyrdom memorials includes museums, cemeteries and 
fountains spouting blood red water and an array of propaganda posters officially 
sanctioned by the Martyrdom Foundation (Bonyad-e shahid) which was established 
by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1980 to develop an iconography of martyrdom and 
officially sanctions and celebrates those deemed as martyrs. Would-be martyrs are 
literally given a “seal” of approval in the form of a dove drinking from a tulip along 
with a certificate to the family acknowledging that their death was that of a martyr.11 
This dissertation asks three main questions. First, under what conditions can a 
culture of violence that embraces martyrdom be cultivated? Second, how is the 
spectacle of martyrdom used to consolidate a larger audience or nation? Third, what 
historical lessons can be drawn and then applied to fascist-like movements of today to 
better understand the motivations behind martyrdom spectacles and how to lessen 
their impact? This is not intended to be an exhaustive account of all fascist and 
fascist-like movements. Nor is it intended to imply that martyrdom spectacles are the 
sole territory of fascist movements (memorial cemeteries of national heroes can be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Scott Peterson, “In Tehran’s Martyrs’ Museum, Iran courts new believers,” Christian Science 
Monitor, June 6, 2007, http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0606/p16s01-wome.html, (accessed June 30, 
2012). 
 
11 Marine Fromanger, “Variations in the Martyrs’ Representations in South Tehran’s Private and 
Public Spaces,” Visual Anthropology 25, no. 1–2 (January 2012): 50. 
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found in arguably every nation). Rather, the focus is on the use of the myth of 
martyrdom for political gains both in terms of popular support and strategic military 
goals by fascist and fascist-like movements by elevating it from an act to a spectacle 
through the construction of narratives of sacrifice and disseminating them through the 
use of monuments, plays, media, cultural norms, parades and memorials. 
Contemporary manifestations of the spectacle of martyrdom in the Islamic World are 
similar, though not identical, to historical manifestations within fascist movements. In 
both instances the social spectacle surrounding martyrdom and the symbolism of 
myth, such as self-sacrifice, served as catalysts to galvanize people within 
disenfranchised civil societies.  The spectacle of martyrdom stems from a similar 
reaction to modernity thus leading to its intricate ideological justifications and 
dissemination strategies. Understanding the recurrence of this social phenomenon in 
greater depth enables us to comprehend the use of martyrdom for political strategies.  
1) Under what conditions can a culture of violence that embraces 
martyrdom be cultivated?  
The appeal of martyrdom is most prevalent within gelatinous societies that 
lack autonomous institutions within civil societies—societies which have no real 
democratic traditions and whose political institutions suffer from a crisis of 
legitimacy. These same conditions provide a fertile ground for the rhetoric of 
totalitarian movements, which have historically used an economic or political crisis to 
highlight the system’s vulnerabilities and to offer radicalized political alternatives. 
Without robust civil society institutions, totalitarian movements can offer a credible 
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challenge to the existing weak political systems; they promote the idea of sacrifice 
and shared glory as a way to consolidate the population behind them. Martyrdom can 
then become one tool in the pursuit for social cohesion and the assumption of political 
power.  
The term martyr comes from the Greek µάρτς or “witness.”12 Expanding on 
this original definition, I treat martyrdom as a sacrificial death show cased to a 
broader audience, with witness and society being paramount. Witnessing is an act that 
assumes at least three reference points: the witness, the oppositional force (whom the 
witnessing is directed against), and the society/audience interpreting the act as a 
sacrifice in their name. Society’s perception of the act as indeed a sacrifice is what 
distinguishes a martyr from a murderer or a self-martyr from a suicide. The spectacle 
of martyrdom, thus, can be understood in the context of the religion, history, and 
cultural dynamics and of the audience that perceives it.  
The act of martyrdom may be a single moment and isolated incident. Yet, the 
spectacle of martyrdom is the collective celebration and glorification of the act 
disseminated to or witnessed by the masses. In tracing the process of martyrdom 
within fundamentalist movements I have uncovered the following pattern: In stage 
one, the movements themselves are products of the unique political and cultural 
environments in which they emerge. In each case, there is an inherent myth about 
martyrdom.  These particular cultural myths form the original foundation of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Brettler, Marc. “Is there Martyrdom in the Hebrew Bible?” in Margaret Cormack’s Sacrificing the 
Self: Perspective on Martyrdom and Religion (Oxford: Oxford, 2002), 2. 
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concept and inform the society/audience as to how to interpret an act of martyrdom. 
Stage two of the process occurs when the movement integrates the myth of 
martyrdom into its ideology. It is at this stage that the movement reinterprets13 the 
myth of martyrdom and imbues it with political resonance. Stage three occurs when 
the movement publicly recognizes a particular act as martyrdom and then performs 
acts of celebration to both revere the act and the movement’s ties to its sacrifice. The 
important point is not if an act of martyrdom has occurred but rather that the 
movement publically claims that an act has occurred and presents that act as a means 
for societal celebration. Finally, the society witnesses directly or indirectly the 
spectacle and interprets its value. In this way the societal audience is not a passive 
observer but an actual actor within this process, and society’s response (whether 
positive, negative or neutral) will impact both the way the movement celebrates 
future acts of martyrdom and the degree to which these acts will be publically 
recognized.  
Within this process of politicization, two broad figures of martyrdom 
emerge—the heroic and the transformational. Heroic forms of martyrdom apply to 
movements like Fascists Italy or Nazis Germany. Here the martyr is presented as 
someone to venerate, as an icon or a heroic ideal. Transformational visions of 
martyrdom are different in that they ask the masses not to simply venerate but 
actually to become martyrs. Here the act of martyrdom becomes a purification 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 By reinterpret I mean integrates the original inherent myth into their political narrative/rhetoric. 




process, a mechanism by which individuals sacrifice their individuality to become 
part of—and witness to—the cleansing vision the movement promotes. That sacrifice 
can also serve as a conduit to promote and strengthen linkages between the movement 
and the friends and family the martyr left behind. The utilization of these two forms 
of martyrdom seems to coincide directly with the political position of the movement. 
I argue that we can think of the parties as being in one of two positions: there is the 
movement stage and the regime stage. In the movement stage, groups use heroic 
images of martyrdom and actually call for “blood” martyrs that are deemed as useful 
in justifying the political legitimacy of the movement. In the regime phase, the 
transformational use of martyrdom is prioritized as a way of solidifying the party’s 
grasp on power and to perpetuate the revolutionary fervor for future generations.  
2). On the Role of Myth Construction: How is the spectacle of martyrdom 
used to consolidate a larger community or nation?  
Martyrdom and myth making are endogenous to the investigated movements I 
explore. The relationship between movements and martyrdom hinges on the power of 
myth. A myth is:  
“not a false explanation by means of images and fables, but a traditional 
narration which relates to events that happened at the beginning of time and 
with the purpose of providing grounds for the ritual actions of men today, and, 
in a general manner, establishing all the forms of action and thought by which 
man understands himself in his world.”14  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Paul Ricoeur. The Symbolism of Evil. Translated by Emerson Buchamas. (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1967) p. 5. 
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Myth is essentially the construction of political identity construction, providing at 
varying times something worthy of life or death. The characteristic attributes of 
martyrdom such as sacrifice, witness, selflessness, courage, determination, all done in 
the name of society, is right in line with a fundamentalist conception of a 
revolutionary new civilization. The very image of the martyr is a transitional figure 
that bridges the gap between the old, imperfect conception of man and the idealized. 
Symbolically, as the martyr is separated from their body they simultaneously cast 
away their old self and are reborn. This rebirth through spilt blood is seen as part of 
the foundational narratives for both the Iranian and the Nazi regimes. The Ayatollah 
Khomeini referred to the essential nature of the Black Friday Martyrs15 to the success 
of the revolution. “Our movement is but a fragile plant. It needs the blood of martyrs 
to help it grow into a towering tree.”16 Hitler viewed the deaths at the Beer Hall 
Putsch17 of sixteen Nazis as essential in the rise of Nazism so much so that in the Nazi 
Heilgeseschichte literally translated as “Nazi salvation history,” a song was sung 
annually to remember the fallen and to connect their blood as possessing a 
redemptive quality for Germany. “We feel enriched / By the blood of those who fell / 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 The Black Friday Martyrs are the approximately 88 civilians who were killed on September 8, 1978 
when the they refused to leave Jeleh Square and were fired upon by the Shah’s forces.  Heather Lehr 
Wagner, The Iranian Revolution (Infobase Publishing, 2010), 62–63. This is discussed in more depth 
in chapter three. 
 
16 Elaine Sciolino, Persian Mirrors: The Elusive Face of Iran (New York: Free Press, 2000), 174. 
 
17 The Beer Hall Putsch was Hitler’s unsuccessful 1923 attempt to replicate Mussolini’s March on 
Rome. For two days (November 8-9, 1923) Hitler and around 600 fellow Nazis attempted to take over 
the Bavarian government by holding the Governor hostage in a Beer Hall but unlike Mussolini, the 
reaction from the state was swift and Hitler was quickly arrested and imprisoned. Richard J. Evans. 
The Coming of the Third Reich. (New York: Penguin, 2003) pp. 177-206. 
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So that their banner pure and bright / Shall give us revelation of the Reich / (…) / 
With your flame out life begins.”18 
In Reflections on Violence, Georges Sorel argues that myths serve as a means 
for articulating how one should act in the present. Though they are connected to past 
events and may have a predictive view of the future, their real usefulness lies solely in 
their ability to regulate present behavior. He further argues that these myths are not 
divisible: “It is the myth in its entirety which is alone important: its parts are only of 
interest in so far as they bring out the main idea.”19 Sorel’s particular interest revolves 
around the myth of the general strike for socialism. His concern is that by focusing on 
the feasibility of the general strike one loses the essence of what the representation of 
the general strike means for the proletariat.  
…[T]he myth in which socialism is wholly comprised, i.e. a body of images 
capable of evoking instinctively all the sentiments which correspond to the 
different manifestations of the war undertaken by socialism against modern 
society. Strikes have engendered in the proletariat the noblest, the deepest and 
the most moving sentiments that they possess; the general strike groups them 
all in coordinated picture and, by bringing them together, gives to each one of 
them its maximum intensity; appealing to their painful memories of particular 
conflicts, it colours with an intense life in the details of the composition 
presented to consciousness. We thus obtain that intuition of socialism which 
language cannot give us with perfect clearness—and we obtain it as a whole, 
perceived instantaneously.20 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Herbert Boehme, ‘Kantate zum 9 November,’ in H Boeme, Gesaenge unter der Fahne: Vier 
Kantaten, Munich, 1935, pp. 38, 44. Quoted in Guenter Berghaus’s, The Ritual Core of Fascist 
Theatre: An Anthropological Perspective,” in Roger Griffin and Matthew Feldman, eds. Fascism: 
Critical Concepts in Political Science, Routledge, London, 2004. P. 93. 
 
19 Georges Sorel, Reflections on Violence. (Cambridge, New York: 1999) pp. 116-117. 
 
20 Ibid, 118. 
14 
 
In that sense, the martyr is for fundamentalists what the general strike is for socialist 
anarchism, a highly orchestrated act that would at once capture the imagination, 
inspire the nation and be a symbolic expression for all that was good about the 
revolution. 
 Part of what makes Sorel’s argument attractive is the idea that we cannot 
dissect part of the myth from the meaning of the myth to the broader population. One 
of his examples is the early Christian myth of the imminent second coming of Jesus. 
If we argue against the myth because Christ failed to materialize within an 
‘imminent’ period of time (assuming that 2000 years stretches at least slightly beyond 
the limits of imminence) we fail to grasp how the myth not only played out for First 
Century Christians, but also for Christians today. The reality of the myth is less 
important than the impact the narrative has on the lives of believers. 
Similar to Sorel, Ernst Cassirer argues that myths are best understood not as 
isolated phenomenon but within a larger context, and in particular, with the language 
we use to construct the narratives. This distinction is not one of object versus form 
but of object fusing with form.21 Here, martyrdom may be the object, but the very 
concept is inextricably linked to the process of its construction and how the 
population experiences it. While the idea of martyrdom may have existed in some raw 
form within each culture (we see this most profoundly in the Italian and Iranian cases 
just in different ways), the myth of martyrdom is not an organic evolution; it is an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Ernst Cassirer, The Myth of the State (Yale, New Haven: 1971) pp. 277-296. See also Ernst Cassirer 
Language and Myth (Dover: New York, 1953). 
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artificial creation linked to previous cultural norms. Drawing from this, I explore the 
construction process by focusing on the socio-economic and ideological context of 
fundamentalist movements, on various mechanisms of dissemination (ritual, symbol, 
theatre, art, etc.), and the mass response to these spectacles as a means for gathering 
political support and creating a new man. 
The dissemination presents one of the ironies of political propaganda: images 
are generally read backwards by the viewers (or put differently, reinterpreted for 
political purposes after the fact).22  The perceiver is confronted with the image—in 
this case martyrdom—and then reads the image backwards based on their past 
knowledge. If the image of martyrdom is presented in a way that effectively ties in 
with the inherent cultural myths about martyrdom, then the viewer is more likely to 
respond in a way that is accepting of the act. If, however, the presentation is too far 
removed from the general myth, it will likely be rejected. This is one reason why 
religious fundamentalist groups are limited in their use of martyrdom operations 
because every major world religion argues for the value of life as a core tenet. And 
thus while the destruction of life may be permissible under certain given conditions, it 
cannot be too widespread and will still be limited in terms of which targets are 
appropriate.23 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Raphael Sassower and Louis Cicotello. Political Blind Spots: Reading the Ideology of Images. 
(Boulder: Lexington Books, 2006) p. 25.  
 
23 A reason for Hamas’ self-imposed restraint in suicide campaigns during the Second Intifada after 
they began targeting too many civilians (particularly children) and suffered a significant backlash by 
the Palestinian population.  
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3). What historical lessons can be drawn and applied to current 
martyrdom movements? 
The illiberal substance of fascism’s totalitarian ideology did not die with the 
movement in 1945,24 but echoes in many fundamentalist movements today. 
Throughout the contemporary Muslim world, Islamists movements like Hamas and 
Iran resonate with the totalitarian principles that first emerged in fascist ideology. 
This is not coincidental. Not only do these movements share (in varying degrees) a 
cluster of characteristics but also they emerge under, and actively capitalize upon, 
similar political and socioeconomic conditions that allow for broad comparative 
analysis. This research is concerned with comparing one shared characteristic, the 
construction of a culture of violence and the role martyrdom spectacles play in their 
consolidation of power.  
The scope of potential manifestations of violence is broad. Fascist-like 
movements tend to have a variety of armed militant wings25, paramilitary youth 
groups26, and general campaigns of terror against opposition groups or those deemed 
potential threats of, or traders to, the movement27. Each of these in their own way can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 The Fascist Party with the imminent Allied advance into Italy removes Mussolini from power in 
1943. The German government, which occupied the northern regions of Italy, rescued Mussolini from 
an Italian prison and placed him in charge of a puppet regime known as the Salo Republic until his 
assassination in 1945.  
 
25 Sturmabteilung (SA), Schutzstaffel (SS), Squadristi (Blackshirts), Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, 
and the Nirouye Moqavemate Basij.  
 
26 Hitler Jugend, Opera Nazioale Balilla, Piccole Italiane, Wandervogel, Ausschuss für Schülerfahrten 
and the Nirouye Moqavemate Basij. 
 
27 Kristallnacht, Nacht der langen Messer, Racial Purity Laws, Sharia Law, etc. 
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contribute to, and/or operate from, cultures of violence. Rather than exploring every 
possible contributing factor, the dissertation focuses on the concept of martyrdom as a 
mechanism to construct a generalized account as to how these groups can cultivate a 
culture of violence and the essential aspect that violence plays for extremist 
movements. The focus on martyrdom is useful because it allows description of the 
complex and transformative role that violence serves in bolstering illiberal, extremist 
movements while simultaneously creating support within a broader population. In this 
way, the argument goes beyond a more limited account of acts of martyrdom, fix 
discussions as to who fits the label of martyr or the use of martyrdom as a tactic, and 
instead treats martyrdom conceptually as a nodal link between three different sets of 
actors—the movement, the individual and the audience. 
The argument here differs from prevailing studies of martyrdom that are 
generally divided into two approaches; one is strategic and focuses on martyrdom as a 
political tool for action28 and one is moral, examining its religious significance and 
cultural relevance. While these approaches help to demystify the concept and place it 
outside the context of a solely religious act, neither incorporates a plausible role for 
the community who responds to these acts and perceives them as having some aspect 
of worth or value for the larger community. The argument laid out in the dissertation 
is a societal explanation and arguing that traditional accounts focus on wrongly on 
those that are targeted rather than the society that they are speaking too.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Pape (2005), Bloom (2005). 
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The argument here is not that fascist and Islamist movements are identical, but 
that they share a cluster of characteristics that allow them to be reasonably compared.  
Fascists advocate an ideology that is hyper-nationalist, elitist, revolutionary (in the 
sense that it promotes a rebirth and renewal from what the fascists see as a period of 
political and economic decline), anti-Marxist, anti-conservative and anti-liberal. 
Fascist-like Islamists are revolutionaries, seeking to transform the entire social fabric 
of the community including the political, cultural and economic structures in the 
hopes of creating a world that emulates their conception of a religious utopia. Like 
fascism, fundamentalism is not simply a reaction to modernity: it is a product of it. 
The Islamist’s  
“influences are anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism and anti-Westernism fused 
in symbiotic fashion with Western leftist ideologies and grafted onto a 
radicalized and politicized religious world outlook. Unlike the former they are 
not rejecting the ideas and symbols of modernity, they are adapting and using 
them.29”  
 
Despite their differences, all extremist groups share the following cluster of 
characteristics: they are hyper-nationalist, elitist yet populist,30 promote an ideology 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Michael Whine. Islamism and Totalitarianism: Similarities and Differences. Totalitarian Movements 
and Political Religions, v. 2, N. 2. (Autumn 2001), p. 57. For another take on the similarities between 
Radical Islam and European Fascism see David Goldfischer and Micheline Ishay, “Belligerent Islamic 
fundamentalism and the legacy of European fascism,” The Fletcher Forum of World Politics 32, no. 1 
(Winter 2008): 63–82. 
 
30 A. James Gregor, The Ideology of Fascism (New York: Free Press, 1969). 
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that is revolutionary (in the sense that it promotes a rebirth and renewal from what the 
fascists see as a period of political and economic decline31), anti-conservative and 
anti-liberal.  
1. Anti-liberal 
Fascism is anti-liberal in that it rejects the very notion of individual liberty.32 
Individual interest is sacrificed to the collective fascist will.33 For example, Mussolini 
argued that fascism is  
“anti-individualistic, the fascist conception of life stresses the importance of 
the State and accepts the individual only insofar as his interests coincide with 
those of the state, which stands for the conscience and the universal will of 
man as a historic entity.”34  
 
The illiberal aspect of fascism cannot be underscored enough. Fascism is a direct 
attack on liberalism and human rights, which it sees as eroding the power of the state. 
“Liberalism denied the state in the name of the individual; fascism reasserts the rights 
of the state as expressing the real essence of the individual.”35  
One implication of this is that fascism is inherently anti-democratic. Hitler 
argued that the Nazi Party “…is anti-parliamentarian, …it rejects a principle by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 This conception of “revolutionary” comes from Roger Griffen’s, “The Rise of German Fascism,” in 
Neil Gregor’s Nazism (Oxford: Oxford, 2000). 
 
32 Stephen Holmes, The Anatomy of Anti-Liberalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), 1-
13.  
 
33 Mabel Berezin, Making the Fascist Self (Ithaca: Cornell, 1997). 
 
34 Mussolini, Benito, Fascism: Doctrine and Institutions, (Ardita: Rome, 1935), 10. 
 
35 Ibid., 10-11. 
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majority, by which the leader is degraded to the position of the executive of the will 
and opinion of others.”36 Mussolini described  
“the Fascist conception of the state [as] all-embracing; outside of it no human 
or spiritual values can exist, much less have value.  Thus understood, Fascism, 
is totalitarian, and the Fascist state—a synthesis and a unit inclusive of all 
values—interprets, develops and potentates the whole life of a people.”37  
 
The fascist critique of liberalism thus rests on the rejection of the individual as 
existing as an autonomous political agent outside the state and sets the stage for the 
call to sacrifice through martyrdom. 
Islamist movements revive this same illiberal, anti-democratic trend especially 
when it comes to basic conceptions of state sovereignty and reason. If we take a 
standard definition of Westphalian sovereignty to mean “that states exist in specific 
territories, within which domestic political authorities are the soul arbiters of 
legitimate behavior,38” Islamists argue that this places man and domestic authorities 
as sovereign powers rather than vesting sovereignty in God—otherwise known as a 
state of jahiliyyah. 
Sayyid Qutb, an ideological founder of Islamism, saw modernization as 
beneficial for progress, but negative in terms of the impact it had on society. The 
Enlightenment conception of reason assumes that mankind is God. For Qutb, God and 
the state are fused, man plays a part in the play, but is never author of the script. His 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Adolph Hitler, “Mein Kampf,” in Social and Political Philosophy: Readings from Plato to Gandhi, 
eds. John Somerville and Ronald Santoni (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1963), 457 
 
37 Mussolini, Benito, Fascism: Doctrine and Institutions, (Ardita: Rome, 1935), 11. 
 
38 Steven Krasner. Sovereignty as Organized Hypocrisy. P. 20. 
21 
 
most important contribution was the reformulation of jihad. Qutb saw the world as 
being in a state of jahiliyyah, an Arabic term that roughly translates into an “age of 
ignorance.”39 The term is traditionally applied to the period of history before the 
Prophet Muhammad and his divine revelations. Qutb, however, viewed the Twentieth 
Century with its liberal, capitalist West and atheistic, communist East as returning to 
a state of jahiliyyah. Even countries with Muslim majorities were no longer fulfilling 
their Qur‘anic obligations.  
One of the most prominent characteristics of jahiliyyah is the rejection of 
sovereignty as vested in God for human or popular sovereignty40—a  “rebellion 
against the sovereignty of Allah on earth [which] attempts to transfer to man one of 
the greatest attributes of Allah, namely sovereignty, by making some men lords over 
others.”41 To combat this trend there are essentially three options available, the Hijra 
or a physical migration to remove oneself from a destructive society, educating others 
in order to reform the population to its purist state, or violence as a means to attack 
and deconstruct the old society in the hopes of constructing a new social and political 
order. Hamas followed Qutb’s approach and opted for violence, using “physical 
power and jihad to abolish the organizations and authorities of the jahili system which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 William Shepard, “Sayyid Qutb’s Doctrine of Jahiliyya,” International Journal of Middle East 
Studies 35 (2003), 522. 
 
40 Ibid., 524. 
 
41 Qutb, Sayyid. Translated with a forword by Ahmad Zaki Hammad. Milestons, (Indianapolis: 
American Trust Press, 1990) p. 8. 
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prevent people from reforming their ideas and beliefs, forces them to follow deviant 
ways, and makes them serve other humans instead of their Almighty Lord.”42  
An alternative account comes from Pakistani and Shiite Islamist Abul A ‘al 
Mawdudi (who was the ideological counter-part to Qutb within the Shiite Islamic 
world). Mawdudi argued that the Islamist political system is based on three 
principles, tawhīd (Oneness of God), risāla (Prophethood), khilāfa (Caliphate). 
Tawhid implies that God alone is the ruler of all, organic and inorganic and nothing 
else can control or dictate the limits of God’s power. Risala, the “medium through 
which receive the law of God.43” The two primary sources are the Qur’an and 
Mohammed’s authoritative interpretation. These two, taken together, comprise 
Shari’a law. Finally, Khilafa means representation. Man is God’s regent on earth and 
fulfills or ensures that God’s will is enacted. However, in terms of democratic 
possibilities, because all people are part of the khalafa no one person, group or 
dynasty can claim real power over the khalafa or the people. Everyone is equal 
because everyone in Islamic society (Muslims that is) enjoys the rights of the 
Caliphate. The community of believers will consent to a government formed and that 
government must always act under the will of the Caliphate and the guidance of the 
Shari’a. The government is merely an extension of the powers of the Caliphate. When 
the Caliphate, the people, no longer have confidence in the government they must 
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step down.44 The distinction between Western democracy and an Islamist 
interpretation of democracy lies in the notion of popular will. Western democracy 
assumes that the people share popular sovereignty. Islamist interpretations assume 
that God is sovereign and that the people are his Caliphs, or representatives. In such a 
case, the Umma supersedes the individual under Islamist interpretations, which is in 
contrast, ironically, to the Quran which speaks of the sanctity of human life. Under 
Western democracy, the people actually make law, under Islamic rule the people obey 
and fulfill the law that is already written.   
2. Anti-Conservative 
The fascist model advocates for a new social, economic and political system 
rooted in an idolized mythic past. The literature has been hesitant to use the label 
“anti-conservative” because, on the surface, fascism appears to be both reactionary 
and conservative. Under the Marxist interpretation, fascism is reactionary, serving as 
capitalism’s “last stand.”45 Yet Mussolini and Hitler argued that fascism was 
revolutionary, not conservative. Rather than seeking to preserve the present order, 
both sought to transcend (perhaps even synthesize) the failed economics of capitalism 
and socialism and the politics of constitutional monarchy and democracy.46 Once 
again the individual becomes sacrificed to the larger social and economic revolution 
as citizens are called to unify their will with the will of the state. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Ibid, 10. 
 
45 Robert S. Wistrich. “Leon Trotsky’s Theory of Fascism,” 11 (October 1976), 157-184. 
 
46 Mussolini, Benito, Fascism: Doctrine and Institutions, (Ardita: Rome, 1935), 20-25. 
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Islamists like Ahmed Yassin,47 Abul A ‘al Mawdudi48 and Ruhollah 
Khomeini49 see their movement as one of religious purification.50 Their focus is not a 
return to the past but a reengagement with what they see as the true interpretation of 
Islam and the foundation of an Islamic political project that is at once revolutionary 
and utopian. To achieve this end Islamists hijacked the idea of jihad from an internal 
struggle against the vestiges of sin (quietist interpretations of jihad) to an outward 
battle for social and political purification. Dating back to medieval times, jihad 
simply implied an individual’s “struggle for higher Islamic standards.”51 Quietist 
interpretations of jihad are personal, internal efforts of purification and righteousness, 
with martyrdom—defined as an internal struggle—only one possible outcome of 
jihad. Islamists, both Sunni and Shiite, utilize Qutb’s interpretation emphasizing 
individual jihad nearly as importantly as the five pillars of Islam (of which jihad is 
not a part). Rather than viewing jihad as a struggle of the Islamic people against non-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Ahmed Yassin was a founder and spiritual leader of the Palestinian based Hamas party. Yassin was 
influential in framing the narratives around istishhad, or suicide martyrdom, in order to reconcile the 
act of suicide bombing within Islam. Anat Berko, The Path to Paradise: The Inner World of Suicide 
Bombersand Their Dispatchers (Westport, Conn: Praeger Security International, 2007). 
 
48 Abul A ‘al Mawdudi was a Pakistanian Shiite Islamists who advocated for Pakistan to be an Islamic 
state and not simply a secular state for Muslims. Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, Mawdudi and the making of 
Islamic revivalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
 
49 Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was the spiritual and political head of the Islamic Revolution in Iran 
in 1979. Ruhollah Khomeini, A Clarification of Questions: An Unabridged Translation of Resaleh 
Towzih Al-Masael, A Westview replica ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984). 
 
50 Assaf Moghadam defines Islamists as those who “believe that the Quran, with its universal 
principles, provides a complete system and contains all the answers to life’s pressing questions.” The 
Globalization of Martyrdom: Al Qaeda, Salafi Jihad and the Diffusion of Suicide Attacks. (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins, 2008), p. 115. 
 
51 Armstrong, Karen. Islam. (New York: Modern Library, 2002), p. 36. 
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believers, it is reconceived as an individual duty52, advocating what in Arabic is 
istishhadi53 —one who martyrs himself.  
Suicide in Islam is strictly forbidden, as well as the taking of innocent life, so 
the transition from martyr to self-martyr did require an ideological justification. 
Hamas founder and spiritual icon, Shaykh Ahmad Yassin, distinguishes between 
suicide and martyrdom arguing:  
Suicide means that someone has become tired or despairs of life and takes his 
own life. This is prohibited in Islam. Those who are martyred while defending 
their land, country, and people under occupation, however, know where they 
are going and carry out this because they want to be nearer to God. 
Consequently, what we are talking about here is martyrdom and not suicide 
operations.54 
 
Islamists movements like Hamas reconcile the contradictions of self-martyrdom 
within Islam by positing it as an essential individual sacrifice for the larger will and 
community of God. 
3. Hyper-nationalist 
Extremist movements both past and present use the national card in different 
ways. Codreanu’s Iron Guard movement in Romania fostered national sentiment in 
order to legitimize and preserve Romanian control over Transylvania (hotly contested 
by Hungary).55 Mussolini utilized nationalism as a mantra for imperial expansion, 
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53 Daxie, Joyce. Martyrs: Innocence, Vengeance and Despair in the Middle East. (New York: 
Palgrave, 2003), 6. 
 
54 Document and Source Material. Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Winter, 1998), 151. 
 
55 Zvi Yavetz. “An Eyewitness Note: Reflections on the Rumanian Iron Guard,” Journal of 
Contemporary History 26 (September 1991), 597-610. 
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which he saw as essential for securing Italian economic independence.56 The Iranian 
government promoted nationalism over a pan-Islamic ideology during its war against 
Iraq and continued to fan the flames of nationalism whenever domestic forces 
challenge the regime. Likewise, the idea of Pan-Islamism (the idea of a united Islamic 
population under a single caliphate) as a variant of nationalism focused on religious 
rather than ethnic or linguistic ties is attractive at different historical periods 
whenever the Islamic world is seen as threatened by outside influences.57  
In each case, nationalism serves as a means of unifying people in a way that 
transcends partisan politics. Extremists view problems as national in nature and not 
specific to any class, race or other social cleavage. This implies that every problem 
and action, both public and private, becomes national in nature. A natural extension 
of this notion of nationalism is the fascist rejection of the individual outside the 
context of the state. The nation may be the focal point of extremist rhetoric, but the 
keystone to fundamentalist doctrine is the state itself at the expense of the individual. 
The state is the only absolute; groups, individuals, collectives, they are all merely 
relative.58  
4)      Elitist yet Mass Based (Cult of Personality) 
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Another defining characteristic is elitism and mass appeal. Extremist groups 
are populists in their support, but are highly elitist in their conception of life and the 
state. Fascist leaders see themselves as fulfilling the teleological movement of 
history, and thus wish to build a new state and man to achieve their rightful national 
greatness—greatness not defined by civil liberties or democratic appeal but by the 
megalomaniacal dreams of a leadership elite. Mussolini called for a Risorgimento—a 
rebirth—an attempt to connect the Italian present and future with its Roman past. In 
order to create this ideal man Mussolini had to compete against, and essentially 
counter, the three major sources of the Italian self—the family, regional culture and 
the Catholic Church. The most important of these to counter was the Church, for in 
order to create a new man the state needed to assert itself as the moral and cultural 
arbiter. 59 Ultimately Mussolini was able (at least partially) to mitigate the power of 
the Church by negotiating the Lateran Treaty (1929) with the Vatican and by 
integrating fascist dogma into religious ritual (most notably the “Mass of the Martyrs” 
which required the priests to perform the Roman salute during the Eucharist and 
liturgy).60 
Similarly, Islamists are not immune to the lure of elitism. Maududi favored 
what he called “‘Islamization from above,’ through a state in which sovereignty 
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would be exercised in the name of Allah and the Sharia would be implemented.61” In 
Mawdudi’s conception, an Islamic vanguard was necessary to bring the revolution to 
the people.  Here the people would be brought the ‘true’ interpretation of Islam and 
even though the movement would rest on mass support it would not be open 
alternative to interpretations of Islam which could challenge the dominance or the 
legitimacy of the movement. 
The synergy of these four attributes sets the foundation for fundamentalist 
movements’ calls to sacrifice and why it is essential to focus on the spectacle of 
martyrdom for fundamentalist movements. With their critique of the liberal 
individualism in the spectrum of a mass based, anti-liberal, hyper-nationalism the call 
for sacrifice is elevated to an essential demand. The ideological foundation for 
fundamentalist movements requires that the individual be sacrificed for the collective 
good of the society and that through this sacrifice the individual becomes elevated 
within the mass. This is part of the irony of an elitist mass based movement—while 
within the masses all are essentially equal, by answering the call to sacrifice, the 
martyr distinguishes herself from the faceless masses and in this way achieves 
distinction within the movement.  
Socio-Economic and Political Contexts 
	  
The economic and political systems, if not completely discounted, face major 
credibility issues. Walter Laqueur argues that extremist parties arise in countries 
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suffering from major economic breakdown and in which there is no tradition of 
democracy.62 This is particularly evident when looking at the German example. 
Detlev Penkert identifies three reasons that the Nazis were able to come to power. 
First, Germany was disproportionately devastated economic during the Great 
Depression relative to the other European states. Second, the German people saw 
their economic and political crisis as extending back to 1918 and the Treaty of 
Versailles. Finally, the Weimar Republic (Germany’s first republican form of 
government) was unable to gain legitimacy.63 The combination of extreme economic 
breakdown and fledgling governments without a tradition of democracy helps to 
explain why fascism took hold in Germany and Italy but not the United States or 
Great Britain.64  
While the crisis of modernity may account for the rise of fascism in Italy and 
Germany, it fails to explain its rise in Hungary and Romania in the 1930’s where 
there was no history of democracy. “The crisis of democracy is [even more] irrelevant 
to the rise of radical Islam in Iran, Algeria, and Egypt or to secular totalitarian 
dictatorships such as that as Iraq.”65 Germany suffered the political and economic 
humiliation of defeat and the Treaty of Versailles. Italy believed it suffered a 
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‘humiliated victory’ from its involvement with the Allies in World War I. However 
despite their grievances, Germany and Italy emerged as formidable powers. Romania, 
Afghanistan, Palestine, and Chechnya each deal with the legacy of colonial 
imperialism and its ability to shape their political and economic climates. Extremist 
groups within the former states strive for what they see as their rightful share of 
international prominence; in the latter states, these groups advocate breaking the 
bonds of oppression. For the Islamists and the fascists, it is the fragility of the 
prevailing political system, a gelatinous civil society, the weakness of their economic 
situation and perceptions of national humiliation that fosters a climate in which these 
movements can successfully operate.  
To combat these economic and political crises, fundamentalist movements 
again reiterate their critique of liberal individualism and argue that the sacrifice of 
individual interest to the collective good is the only way to strengthen the community. 
Both the fascist and the belligerent fundamentalist claim that the Western liberal 
model turned their populations away from their traditional values and it is the 
rejection of these values that has led to their economic and political decline. The 
martyr becomes for these movements the physical manifestation of a violent return to 
the traditional values they seek to reinstate and the spectacle of martyrdom affords the 
movements the opportunity to frame the narrative of martyrdom in such a way as to 
ensure that the broader population sees this act as not only a sacrifice but a validation 
that the movement itself is just. 
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On Spectacle, Martyrdom and Fundamentalism: Understanding Terms 
	  
The Power of Spectacle 
 
Guy Debord conceives of spectacle as the primary organizing principle of 
modern society. It is, in his words,  
the “specialization of power… divid[ing] the world into two parts, one of 
which is held up as self-representation to the world, and is superior to the 
world. …Spectators are linked only by a one-way relationship to the very 
center that maintains their isolation from one another. The spectacle thus 
unites what is separate, but it unites it only in its separateness.”66  
 
Debord’s view of spectacle is one where images of happiness, inclusion and success 
mask the realities of material and political alienation in modern society and serve to 
perpetuate the prevailing power dynamics. 
 Contra Debord, Foucault argues that spectacles are actually relegated to a time 
of kings and empires and found its primary example in the “spectacle of the 
scaffold.”67 It was the guillotine and public executions mixed with graphic and 
violent depictions of physical pain that are the cornerstones of Foucault’s conception 
of spectacle. For Foucault, the modern age, however, is the “exact opposite of 
spectacle,”68 as public executions gave way to private and the idea of painful 
punishment was replaced by a modern prison system. Foucault sees the modern world 
as beyond the age of spectacle and into the age of surveillance.  
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 I believe that the spectacle of martyrdom provides a unique opportunity to 
draw from both positions. The spectacle of martyrdom examines the presentation of a 
narrative; the lessons the presentation is intended to teach; and, the unique way in 
which martyrdom reintroduces spectacle back into modern society to serve both as a 
mechanism for inclusion within the community as well as a manifestation of physical 
destruction and discipline. The first of these three attributes speaks to the difference 
between ritual and spectacle. At their core, rituals are about transformation, spectacles 
are about presentation.69 A study on martyrdom would likely focus on the ritualized 
aspects of the act (sacrifice, witnessing, etc.) and its transformative nature, whereas 
this study focuses on the presentation of martyrdom by fundamentalist groups and the 
various techniques employed for dissemination.  
Spectacles are also much more responsive to, and sensitive of, a poor 
reception by their targeted audience. "More so than ritual, spectacle is more 
immediately sensitive to upheavals in social order. Thus, particular spectacles are 
likely to immediately reflect these changes or to fall apart.”70 A case in point is how 
quickly Hamas reacted to the public outcry among Palestinians to their suicide 
campaign targeting busses filled with Israeli school children. The presentation of 
these acts was intended to demonstrate the determination and resolve Hamas had to 
confront Israeli occupation, but the inclusion of children within this narrative was 
seen as so extreme and repugnant that Palestinians rejected it en masse. Hamas 
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quickly abandoned that practice and repackaged their presentation of martyrdom in a 
way that still supported their basic narrative but was more palatable to the population. 
Rituals lack this responsiveness and are generally conceived as seemingly timeless 
behaviors separate from popular norms. 
 The second major element is the lessons conveyed by the spectacles. The 
narrative of these spectacles are intending to portray cannot be so obtuse as to be 
misconstrued by the broader audience. They need to be universally read by their 
constituent populations and immediately understood. The presentations must 
essentially speak to the population and one of the most effective and easiest ways to 
achieve this is by integrating cultural norms that are already prevalent in society as to 
provide familiarity but to alter them in such a way as to make the presentation novel 
and unique. A spectacle has to have a spectacular element, it cannot simply be a 
retelling of traditional narratives in traditional ways or it fails to rise to the level of 
spectacular. These presentations must evolve to take different forms, or at the very 
least, have slightly different ways of executing the original presentation because a 
spectacle is essentially only spectacular in one moment, each attempt at replicating 
the same spectacle, the same presentation, in the same way, is that much less 
spectacular. The same arguably holds true for the narrative conveyed. There is 
fluidity then in both the presentation and the narrative. What does not change, 
however, is the underlying message that the organization and its ideology are the 
salvation of the people and their protector against the enemy. This one underlying 
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theme is the unifying force among all the spectacles of martyrdom across all the 
groups studied here. 
 The final element is perhaps best explained by returning for a moment to 
Foucault’s arguments behind the spectacle of the scaffold. For Foucault, the 
executioner’s scaffold was a spectacle in that it represented two constituent parts: the 
physical harm of the body71 and the power dynamics portrayed by execution as a 
political act.72 The scaffold is his particular focus, but the broader idea of torture and 
the physical desecration of the body publically is what give the act a spectacular 
resonance. An execution or a torture is also a political display portraying to the 
observers two lessons—the state will protect you from those who would do evil, and 
if you do evil the state will physically desecrate you. The transition from physical, 
public torture to private, shame based punishment marks the moment when Foucault 
sees the end of spectacle and the beginning of a surveillance society.73  
 The spectacle of martyrdom, however, has replaced the scaffold and 
transformed the narrative in such a way as to—arguably even by Foucault’s criteria—
reintroduce spectacle back into the modern world. The martyr reintroduces the body, 
the physical back into the equation by creating a public spectacle in which the 
physical destruction of the body serves to discipline and curtail dissent within the 
community and represents the power of the ideology. In the modern manifestation, 
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however, it is the executioner, along with the condemned, who suffer the physical 
repercussions.  
Academic Treatment of Martyrdom	  
 
I divide the academic treatment studies on martyrdom into four camps: 
oppositional, ideological, sociological and strategic. Focusing primarily on the role of 
the individual martyr, oppositional arguments are more likely to arise in the 
immediate aftermath of major terrorist attacks, when a sense of powerlessness and 
confusion are highest. These arguments suggest that attackers operate in a logical 
framework that is outside our traditional conceptions of political discourse—they do 
not adhere to international norms and negotiation would be fruitless as their aims 
ultimately seek the destruction of Western liberalism. Jean Bethke Elshtain (2003) 
presents an argument to outline a ‘just war’ against these kinds of martyrs. She insists 
that they are opposed to our freedoms—our freedom of religion, speech and 
democracy. No matter how we may change our policies as a nation, they will still 
condemn us based on our very founding, constitutional principles.74 This position 
allows Elshtain to describe martyr/terrorists as “…not interested in the subtleties of 
diplomacy or in compromise solutions. …No political solution is possible, …when 
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the terrorism is aimed at the destruction of innocent civilians—when that itself is the 
goal.”75  
Such arguments give voice to a collective frustration for dealing with 
martyrdom terrorism in general by simply labeling them as a foreign ‘other’ that is 
diametrically opposed to politics or civility. Temporarily they may be satisfying, but 
they are simplistic arguments steeped in the rhetoric of good and evil. In the long run, 
such approaches are dangerous because they categorically define such actors as 
outside the realm of dialogue, leaving the only possibility engagement on the 
battlefield.  
Like oppositional studies of martyrdom, ideological treatments also focus on 
the role of the individual martyr. However, arguing that we have to reject fixed 
explanations for particular choices as conceived by procedural frameworks, such as 
realpolitik, rational choice or moralist conceptions, researchers like Frédéric Volpi 
(2000) and Roxanne Euben (2002a) instead advocate exploring individual rationales. 
Unlike the oppositional approach, these studies treat the martyrs as rationally 
motivated political actors and aim to understand the logic behind their views. Both 
Volpi and Euben are interested in understanding the development of a radicalized 
concept of jihad that in turn buttresses a climate conducive to martyrdom. Volpi 
argues that notions of legitimacy, violence, morality and the like cannot be conceived 
of as wholly rooted in philosophical statements or in the actions or sayings of leaders 
(in terms of textual analysis of documents or speeches). Texts and actions are only 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Ibid., p. 19. 
37 
 
meaningful when understood within their social contexts—not outside.76 This 
argument offers two points for the researcher. First, we cannot separate the 
ideological arguments from their social contexts (meaning they will likely not have 
the same resonance across space or time). Second, we cannot presume an adequate 
understanding of the over-arching ideology simply by analyzing the actions/words of 
the leadership elite. While they are no doubt influential, there will also be a process of 
individual digestion in which participants will forge an ideology of their own in 
applying it through the lenses of their own lives. 
Susan Waltz (1995) advocates “an explanation that puts primary emphasis on 
psycho-social alienation is more compelling” than one which emphasizes economic 
or political rationales for the rise of fundamentalism,77 but is such an approach as 
useful in explaining the subsequent willingness to martyrdom and sacrifice tied with 
modern (religious, ethnic, national) fundamentalist movements? This third 
methodological approach is sociological and hinges on the relationship between 
declining economics, a lack of political efficacy and insubstantial education as key 
variables.  
Alan Dershowitz (2002) offers a potential transition between sociologically 
driven approaches and strategic ones. Dershowitz acknowledges that terrorism does 
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have substantive root causes but suggests that addressing them will only embolden 
terrorist leaders and make terrorism more attractive and materially beneficial.78 Such 
arguments focus on organizational leadership rather than individual martyrs. Even 
when strategic approaches are geared to the individual level of analysis their work 
tends to ‘profile’ terrorists rather than explore motivating factors.  
A common case example of the strategic approach is a 2003 study by 
Weinberg (et al.) in which the authors pose three basic questions: who are the 
bombers and why do they do it; how representative is the Israeli population attacked; 
and what is the impact on the Israeli citizenry at large? The study is markedly 
ambitious, but its treatment of homicide martyrdom as a tactical phenomenon limits 
the depth of analysis and renders their findings superficial. The authors conceptualize 
suicide bombing as “an operational method in which the very attack is dependent 
upon the death of the perpetrator.”79 Their basic finding is that suicide bombers tend 
to be members who have a history of terrorist activities and undergo an extensive 
period of socialization. These ‘career terrorists’ generally engaged in earlier, less 
violent forms of terrorism before finally becoming a human bomb.80 What the 
argument lacks is a discussion of the motivation to martyrdom. If the path to 
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homicide martyrdom is a linear progression from rock throwing youth to saboteur to 
human bomber then how does a person first get on that path? And more importantly, 
what accounts for the countless ‘petty’ terrorists, the young rock throwers that will 
never progress to suicide bomber? 
The general weakness of strategic arguments is that they focus solely on 
organizational rather than individual or social motivation (as perceived subjectively 
by perpetrators). The prospect of significant casualties (at least one in terms of the 
bomber) may account for why organizations employ this strategy but is not a 
satisfactory motivator to explain why volunteers offer their lives to kill others. 
Suicide based strategies rest on the voluntary participation of individuals. It seems 
appropriate to at least question if these individuals have their own motivations as 
martyrs. I suspect they do, and their individual rational should be given equal 
attention. Berman and Laitin do this by presuming martyrs as religiously motivated. 
But how do we explain Marxist movements like the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) 
that engaged in two suicide campaigns against Turkey (between July 1996 to October 
1996 and again from March 1999 to August 199981) or the Tamil Tigers of Sri 
Lanka? When the appeal to religious salvation is absent, why would individuals 
knowingly sacrifice themselves? Moreover, strategic arguments do not address why 
groups exhibiting similar characteristics do not employ suicide martyrdom. If suicide 
bombings rationality is facilitated by nationalist aspirations coupled with a weak 
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organization struggling against a strong state how do we account for the ETA Basque 
separatist in Spain or the Irish Republican Army in the United Kingdom? Both 
practice acts of terrorism and yet do not engage in suicide terrorism. 
The preceding section summarized the main ways in which researchers have 
traditionally explored the concept of martyrdom. However, it also introduces a 
significant number of questions as to the limits of these various approaches. While 
exploring the causes and the logic of why individuals may desire to become martyrs 
are interesting questions, my approach is to look at what the nature of martyrdom is 
for the groups that use it and how they go about cultivating martyrdom spectacles to 
disseminating their message to the masses.  
From Martyrdom as Ritual to Martyrdom as Spectacle 	  	  
 
The early Christian Church saw martyrdom as an act of submission and 
victimization, ultimately mimicking Christ’s death on the cross. The reward for 
martyrdom was an immediate joining with Christ in heaven and a witnessing of the 
gospel here on earth.82 Similarly, standard Islam accounts advocate martyrdom both 
in the text of the Koran and in the hadīth.83 Martyrdom in Islam is rooted in the same 
tradition as the Roman/Greco conception. Romans believed, like the Greeks, that one 
can only possess what they can freely give away. By volunteering one’s life, the 
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Roman was not a victim but an empowered soldier proving his own authenticity.84 
Islamic revivalists, both Sunni and Shiite, borrow from this tradition by emphasizing 
individual jihad. Rather than viewing jihad as a struggle of the Islamic people against 
non-believers, it is reconceived as an individual duty85 for Islamists, advocating what 
in Arabic is istishhadi86 —one who martyrs themselves.  
 Here lies the tension between martyrdom as ritual and martyrdom as 
spectacle. The ritualized martyr is rooted in a logic of victimization resting on the 
relative weakness of the movement and the need for witness thus highlighting one’s 
willingness to die for it. Whereas the later may appear on the surface as resting on a 
position of weakness because they are losing their lives, however the underlying 
narrative is one of empowerment because rather than live under a regime they find 
unjust, the spectacle martyr is actively pursuing death. The following section 
examines four different narratives of martyrdom—two rooted in what I call 
victimization rituals and two rooted in empowerment spectacles and concludes with 
an account of the implications of viewing the fascist martyr as spectacle not ritual. 
In my research, I review two strands of victim-martyrdom (Spartan and 
Christian) and two strands of self-martyrdom (Homicidal and Suicidal). A victim-
martyr is one whose death comes at the hands of another while witnessing for their 
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cause. The martyr either is a victim on the battlefield, or is victimized and humiliated 
(as in the example of Christ). This strand has two variations: the Spartan and the 
Christian. The Christian martyr is arguably the more familiar of the two and is best 
illustrated by Biblical examples like Peter and Paul who are both crucified for 
refusing to renounce their belief in the Christian faith. The notion of ‘carrying one’s 
cross’ is illustrative of the burden one carries on their path as witness with the 
knowledge that her witnessing will likely lead them to scorn and ridicule at the hands 
of another.  
The Medieval Crusaders or Husain ibn Ali, the grandson of the Prophet 
Muhammad, if they are to be conceptualized as martyrs, more appropriately fall under 
the Spartan category. A Spartan martyr is one who dies during battle in a struggle 
they cannot win, an individual so devoted to their cause that they would rather 
embrace death than surrender. The landscape of warfare is littered with such 
individuals. King Leonidas I of Sparta exemplified this spirit of defiance even at the 
face of death when he led his vastly outnumbered troops against the Persian army of 
Xerxes at Thermopylae.87 Husain ibn Ali, revered by Shiite Muslims as their Third 
Imam and as a martyr who died while battling Caliph Yazid I’s Umayyad troops,88 is 
another example. Unlike the Christian martyr whose refusal to resist death is 
tantamount to passively embracing it, the Spartan martyr distinguishes himself in his 
active and ferocious battle against the odds.  
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There is something that resonates about a Spartan or Christian martyr that 
makes their death easier to accept or understand. Perhaps we find comfort and dignity 
in one’s ability to publicly maintain her beliefs, or are inspired by heroism and valor. 
There is arguably a resonance about a victim that makes it easier to identify; what 
becomes more difficult to understand is the transition from victim-martyr to self-
martyr. The inherent difference between the two is the transference from victimhood 
to empowerment.  
By taking his own life, the self-martyr rejects the power of the ‘Other’ 
(however this cohort is defined) to choose his destiny, leaving the matter of life and 
death to his choosing. There are two variations within this strand; suicidal and 
homicidal. The historical record of the suicidal martyr dates back at least to the 
Roman soldier Vulteius who, speaking to his troops during a battle they were 
incapable of winning, argues that suicide (as opposed to surrender and capture) was 
desirable: “But at least our suicide will demonstrate to the witnesses that we are 
unconquered, indomiti.”89 The unconquerable spirit is the rhetorical foundation of 
suicidal martyrdom—by taking their own blood they deny their enemies victory 
(rather than being defeated, they defeat themselves). Yet suicidal martyrdom is not 
always conceived militarily. Tibetan monks who burned themselves in protest90 of the 
Chinese policy in Tibet (1959) may arguably be labeled suicide martyrs because they 
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perceived this extreme sacrifice as their only form of witness against Chinese 
aggression to their homeland and culture.  
The final strand of self-martyrdom is the homicidal martyr. Journalistic, 
popular, even academic literatures generally label these combatants as ‘suicide 
terrorists’ or ‘suicide bombers’91 yet this erroneously places the emphasis on the act 
of suicide. Advocates of this narrative of martyrdom often wish to define the term in 
such a way as to highlight the element of sacrifice and selflessness of the participant 
while failing to acknowledge that the act of murdering others is the primary goal with 
their death only secondary. Perhaps it is because the act of self-murder seems so 
against the grain of logic that the academic community privileges this aspect over the 
murder of others. I believe, however, it is important to clarify that there are really two 
analytically distinct strands of martyrdom at play—suicidal and homicidal.  
The Biblical account of Samson is the prototypical example of homicidal 
martyr. After being imprisoned, blinded, and humiliated by the Philistines, Samson 
clearly had one objective in mind—revenge—even if it cost him his own life.  
 When they stood him among the pillars, Samson said to the servant who held 
 his hand, “put me where I can feel the pillars that support the temple, so that I 
 may lean against them.” Now the temple was crowded with men and women; 
 all the rulers of the Philistines were there, and on the roof there were 
 about three thousand men and women watching Samson perform. Then 
 Samson prayed to the Lord, “O Sovereign Lord, remember me. O God, please 
 strengthen me just once more, and let me with one blow get my revenge on 
 the Philistines for my two eyes.” Then Samson reached toward the two pillars 
 on which the temple stood. Bracing himself against them, his right hand on 
 the one and his left hand on the other, Samson said, “Let me die with the 
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 Philistines!” Then he pushed with all his might, and down came the temple on 
 the rulers and all the people in it. Thus he killed many more people when he 
 died than while he lived.92 
 
This image of Samson eerily echoes contemporary cases of homicide martyrs and 
hints at the logic behind their acts of violence—through their death they can wage a 
mightier vengeance than if they lived.93 Offered as a public good, homicide-
martyrdom is the hardest to sell, but if implemented effectively it can have a powerful 
political payout, demonstrating arguably the highest level of commitment while 
providing an aura of the ‘rightness’ for a cause secured through the ultimate sacrifice. 
 Earlier I argued that martyrdom has replaced Foucault’s scaffold to 
reintroduce spectacle back into political society but I have yet to account for why that 
matters. As long as martyrdom is conceived as a ritualistic practice, then it is 
something that becomes exceptionally difficult to prevent because the groups who 
engage in martyrdom are portrayed as unyielding zealots and the individual martyrs 
as irrational fanatics. However, in conceiving of martyrdom as spectacle and in 
focusing on the narrative of martyrdom as a presentation rather than as a ritual, we 
can construct policies based on denying opportunities for spectacular events, rob 
fundamentalist movements of the power to disseminate the spectacles and ultimately 
understand that spectacles are themselves self-limiting.  
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 The real power of Foucault’s scaffold, of the guillotine, was not in the single 
head that it could swiftly dispatch, but in the egalitarian nature of its implied threat—
that the next head could easily be yours. The spectacle of martyrdom is only 
successful when the events are indeed spectacular, and every successful narrative 
raises the bar on subsequent events. Moreover, events that are too spectacular, too 
egregious, run the risk of alienating the audience and being more destructive to the 
perpetrators than to their targets. 
Fascism and Fundamentalism in the Literature 
 In an interview to the British press, Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi 
described Mussolini’s rule as a “benign dictatorship,” going so far as to say 
“Mussolini did not murder anyone. Mussolini sent people on holiday to internal 
exile.”94 Berlusconi’s off the cuff remarks are not merely historically inaccurate, they 
are indicative of ongoing efforts to distinguish fascist regimes merely by the degree 
of their brutality, rather than their structure, ideology, programs, etc.95 This confusion 
as to the meaning of fascism demonstrates the degree to which political scientists 
have failed to distinguish what fascism is to the larger public. 
Studies on fascism generally fit into four debates. The first (1945-1950’s) 
generally neglects fascism as a distinct political phenomenon and instead focuses on 
totalitarianism (of which they argue fascism is merely a strand). By the 1970’s the 
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discipline generally derided the notion of fascism as totalitarianism and set about on 
two diverging paths—definitional and causal. Arguably the more familiar of the two, 
the definitional debate attempts to generalize fascism as a movement as it concerns 
itself with finding a fascist minimum. The causal camp, focusing instead on merely 
putative fascist movements, seeks to understand why fascist movements achieve 
power, generally arguing a modernization thesis. Finally, the modern debate (post-
Cold War) argues that a second coming of fascism is imminent and seeks to 
understand how these new movements may look, and what their impact may be. 
 The first post-War attempts to deal with fascism generally misunderstood the 
movement and focused instead on its outcome. The horrors of the Holocaust blocked 
any attempt at creating some generic conception of fascism. Perhaps a reflection of 
Cold War antagonisms and the undeniable atrocities of the two regimes, scholars 
define totalitarianism by comparing Nazism and Stalinism.96 Hanah Arendt, one of 
the first and most influential scholars of totalitarianism, goes so far as to dismiss 
Mussolini’s Italy as an irrelevant, authoritarian regime.97  
 This position gives too little credence to the political, social and economic 
ideology underpinning fascism and privileges too highly the destructive and 
murderous aspects of the Hitler and Stalin regimes. While scholars of fascism tend to 
systematically discount this discussion of “totalitarianism,” they did establish two 
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inter-related concepts of fascism that would arise in the definitional and causal 
debates. First, Arendt rightly argues that leaders rest on mass support—masses, not 
classes are the engine driving fascist movements.98 Second, she argues that a high 
degree of social atomization precedes fascist movements and the subsequent 
alienation leads to the formation of the “mass man,” abandoning their individual self 
to the masses.99 
 This latter point hints at what will be taken up by the causal debate; namely 
that underlying forces promote or at least allow for the rise of fascist movements. The 
first major causal effort is by Barrington Moore who looks at the role of revolution 
and the relationship between the landed upper classes and the peasants. Moore’s 
thesis is that the kind of modernization that occurs is in direct response to the political 
relationship between the classes.100 From this argument, Moore sees three kinds of 
modernization projects: Bourgeois revolutions (England, France, the United States) 
combining capitalism and parliamentary democracy,101 communism (Russia and 
China) which he sees as successful peasant revolutions occurring prior to 
modernization102 and what he labels a “revolution from above,” fascism.  
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For Moore, fascism is a product of modernization movements in which 
capitalism is highly developed but there is no subsequent political or liberal 
revolution.103 Astounding in scope, Moore’s work suffers in terms of generalizability. 
While alluding throughout to Germany, his only example of a “revolution from 
above” is Imperial Japan. This of course begs the question as to whether Japan really 
was fascist,104 something Moore cannot answer because he never defines what 
fascism actually is. With Moore’s conception of fascism as merely modernization in 
the absence of a popular revolution, is this really anything other than traditional 
authoritarianism? If this is the case, then does it make sense to differentiate between 
fascist movements and any other conservative movement? 
Henry Ashby Turner resurrects the idea of modernization theory and fascism 
except that, unlike Moore, he focuses on Germany and Italy. Turner’s concern is on 
the desires of the fascist leadership—do they wish to continue modernizing or to undo 
it?105 For Turner, we must not start a study of fascism with the assumption that there 
certainly is a generic conception of fascism. What we can do is look at putative fascist 
movements from the process of modernization and thus explore their similarities and 
contrasts.106 Accordingly, he argues that Mussolini saw the modernization of Italy as 
an end in itself whereas Hitler viewed it merely as a means of achieving his desired 
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Lebensraum (the policy of retrieving the arable soil in Eastern Europe) and afterwards 
would be abandoned for a return to an agricultural life.107  
 This is the paradox of Turner’s thesis: how can fascism be inherently anti-
modern, as Turner argues, while at the same time desiring economic modernization 
and industrialization? How are we to view two fascist movements, both utilizing 
modernization, one for its own sake, and one merely to gain the means by which to 
turn back to a pre-modern past? If modernization is used as a means on the one hand, 
and as an end on the other, does this alter any of the essential characteristics of 
fascism within either movement? In his critique of Turner’s thesis, A. James Gregor 
argues that modernism may not be the best lens by which to address fascism as it 
suffers from the same intangibility.108 What exactly is meant by “modernization”? Is 
it economic, political, cultural, urbanization or something else? And how does one go 
about measuring modernization and its impact relative to fascism?109  
 Largely in response to the failings of these two preceding debates, an 
emphasis on defining, or at the very least conceptualizing, fascism arose. There are 
two schools within this debate, those that believe that a generally applicable 
definition of fascism is possible (the fascist minimum school) and those who argue 
that fascism is a historical aberration unique to one historic setting. The general 
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debate is best summarized through an exchange between Gilbert Allardyce, Stanley 
Payne and Ernst Nolte in The American Historical Review.  
Rather than creating a definition of what fascism is, Allardyce begins the 
debate by arguing what fascism is not. Fascism is not a generic concept, and it has no 
applicability outside of inter-war Italy.110 Fascism is not an ideology.111 Nor is 
fascism a personality type.112  
With regard to proposition one, Allardyce attacks both the fascist minimum 
and fascism as modernization schools. By arguing that nationalist movements cannot 
share programmatic agendas, there can be no such thing as “unifascism.”113 Similarly, 
examining fascism through the lens of modernization theory is futile as there is no 
theory of modernization (merely modernization theories). And, logically, how can 
modernization theory adequately explain fascism’s advent in one of the world’s most 
modernized countries and in a developing one, but nowhere in-between?114  
 In regards to the second proposition, Allardyce questions whether we can 
really view Mussolini or Hitler as pragmatic men looking for a deeper philosophical 
tradition in which to root their theories. Even if they were, how can we trust either 
man with their record of lying and genocide? The real push towards a fascist ideology 
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only came in the 1930’s, almost as an afterthought by Hitler and Mussolini while both 
attempted to mold fascism into their own visions. 115 The final critique primarily 
responds to the reductionist assertion that fascism is a personality type.116 This 
argument is generally disregarded in the literature. After all, if fascism truly were a 
personality type, why would it be so present in two countries but relatively absent 
after their defeat?  
 In response to Allardyce, Stanley Payne and Ernst Nolte argue that indeed 
there can be such a thing as a fascist minimum—radically national,117 revolutionary 
movements that are at the same time anti-Marxian, anti-liberal and anti-
conservative.118 The concern is not whether these movements shared a common 
program, as Allardyce argues, but whether they share enough characteristics as to 
place them in the same genus. Even when we do see programmatic similarities after 
the formation of the Axis alliance it seems less a shift in the doctrinal aspects of 
fascism but of great-power domination by the Germans.119  
Rooted in this on-going dialogue, the fourth fascism debate argues that one 
can logically speak of such a thing as a fascist minimum and exploring it highlights 
the emergence of modern fascist movements. Two of the most prominent voices in 
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this contemporary debate are Walter Laqueur and A. James Gregor. Laqueur’s fascist 
minimum is defined as being: nationalist; hierarchical party structure; party and, if it 
attains power, the state is run by quasi-religious cult leaders; anti-liberal, anti-
conservative and anti-Marxist; party doctrine as a required statement of faith forced 
on the whole citizenry through constant promoted propaganda; and the threat and use 
of violence against political opponents.120  
From these minimums Laqueur argues that there are two emerging strands of 
fascism in the modern world—neo-fascism and clerical fascism. Like its predecessor, 
neo-fascist movements are still European in their constituency. Where they differ is in 
their abandonment of military aggression with other continental powers and their shift 
in emphasis towards European defense.121 But as I discussed earlier, this category of 
neo-fascism seems redundant in that the movements are simply contemporary 
manifestations of traditional fascism. The more interesting research is on clerical 
fascism, seen is a synthesis between religious fundamentalism122 and fascism. While 
any religion may have its fundamentalists, Laqueur believes that “only in the Muslim 
world have radicals acquired positions of power and are likely to have continued 
successes, from Algeria to Afghanistan, Bangladesh and beyond.”123  
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 Both religion and fascism are ultimately holistic Weltanschauungen, 
demanding of the body and soul either for the state or religion. Islam itself offers a 
bridge between the two, promoting itself as both a political and religious system. But 
it is the radical versions of Islam that truly share characteristics of traditional fascism. 
It is anti-liberal, has an elite leadership structure and governing elite, is resolute in its 
use of widespread propaganda and terror, and is a mass movement. The main 
difference is that a mass community of believers replaces the mass party.124  
 Gregor’s thesis is similar to Laqueur’s except that he offers an element of 
mass psychology to the ascendance of fascism in the developing world. Gregor 
argues that proto-fascism consists of elitism, myths and the masses.125 He further 
contends that fascist movements are not lacking in ideology but directly respond to 
the specific needs and demands of their populations.126 This is a much larger 
argument than it appears on the surface, for myth is defined as any group of ideas that 
creates a hierarchy of values, duties and obligations in society.127 It is elitist, even 
ethnocentric, in that it looks at shared traits as the referent by which to base this myth 
and its subsequent values.128 The role of myth becomes prominent when it is applied 
to the developing world, particularly the Islamic, which feel great despair that their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 Ibid., 149-155. 
 
125 A. James Gregor, The Ideology of Fascism (New York: Free Press, 1969), 3-5. 
 
126 A. James Gregor, Phoenix: Fascism in Our Time (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1999), 
20. 
 
127 A. James Gregor, The Ideology of Fascism (New York: Free Press, 1969), 46. 
 
128 Ibid., 49-50. 
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presumably superior culture is unable to compete with the developed West. 
Ultimately, fascism plays on a people’s feelings of humiliation and failure (which is 
why Gregor believes fascism will become more prominent in the Islamic world and 
Eastern Europe).129  
Chapter Summary 
In tracing the progression of martyrdom spectacles among the fascist and 
belligerent fundamentalist movements, chapter two explores the rise of fascist 
movements between the world wars and the role that martyrdom spectacles played in 
building support. The goal of the chapter is twofold: first, to argue that use and 
purpose of martyrdom spectacles evolve depending on the group’s position of power. 
I label and identify two possibilities—movement phase and regime phase. In the 
movement phase,130 fascist parties rely on actual “blood” martyrs (named, identifiable 
individuals) whose sacrifice the parties portray as essential to the success of the 
movement. For Mussolini these blood martyrs will come from the Avanti! deaths131 
and for Hitler from the sixteen Nazis killed during the Beer Hall Putsch.132 In the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 A. James Gregor, Phoenix: Fascism in Our Time (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1999), 
21-27. 
 
130 The time when the parties are attempting to consolidate power. 
 
131 The Avanti! deaths refer to the killing of two young fascists while they were attacking the offices of 
the socialist newspaper. The attacks were heralded by Mussolini throughout 1922 as the first blood 
spilt by the fascists and as a model for other fascists to follow. “This is the violence of which I approve 
and which I exalt.  …Their violence has been saintly and moral.” Simonetta Falasca-Zamponi, Fascist 
spectacle the aesthetics of power in Mussolini’s Italy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 
35. 
 
132 The Beer Hall Putsch deaths refer to the sixteen Nazis who were killed during Hitler’s failed 
attempt at taking over German in 1923.  
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regime phase,133 on the other hand, there is an institutionalization of martyrdom 
spectacles that memorializes the dead from the movement phase but also expands out 
to include the faceless image of the unknown martyr in the Italian example of the 
Mostra della Rivoluzione Fascista and the Nazi Temple of Honor and the 
Resurrection of the Dead.  
The discussion focuses in part on the movement’s challenge to liberal 
democracies and examines the economic, political and cultural alternatives the 
ideology espoused. The second part of the discussion surrounds the relationship 
between violence, sacrifice and the creation of an idealized conception of citizen to 
symbolize the purity of the movement and the possibility of national rebirth through 
the movement. The use of martyrdom imagery to construct this ideal citizen is 
explored through the example of the play 18BL (Italy) and the blood flag (Germany). 
The Italian example showcases selflessness, solidarity and hard work to the point of 
death as the cornerstone for being an ideal fascist. The Nazi example illustrates the 
essential relationship between patriotism, community and the willingness to die for 
the Nazi citizen. 
Next, the chapter builds on the contextual analysis of fascism’s roots by 
exploring its ideological development with regards to fascist conceptions of sacrifice 
and the spectacle of sacrifice and myth construction. It argues that violence played an 
increasingly relevant role within each movement as their fortunes declined on the 
battlefield and traces the process by which the rhetoric of martyrdom is introduced 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 Once the consolidation of power has occurred and the parties are in control of the state. 
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into each movement as a means for gaining or maintaining public support. The final 
section of the chapter then moves from the rhetoric of martyrdom to the 
dissemination of each movement’s vision of martyrdom and the mechanisms (art, 
theater, cinema) by which they shared these visions with their public. 
 The third chapter argues that the use of martyrdom spectacles in Iran and with 
the Hamas serve the same purpose for the movement as they did in the Italian and 
German cases. The only significant difference between contemporary martyrdom 
spectacles and the historic cases is the use of modern outlets for dissemination (like 
the Internet). Yet the mode of distribution aside, the movements continue to utilize 
the existing social norms to inform their martyrdom narratives and rely on culturally 
appropriate distribution methods connects their distribution methods and their 
patterns follow that of the earlier cases.  
 The connection between the roots of fascism in the early Twentieth Century 
and those of contemporary belligerent fundamentalism are traced with an emphasis 
on how lessons learned from confronting historical fascism can be applied to 
fundamentalists today. The chapter goes on to explore the spectacle of martyrdom as 
it is developing within the modern world particularly in the Middle East. The 
argument is that by building upon their particular cultural norms, they are creating a 
discourse surrounding martyrdom that like the fascist is used for constituency 
building and legitimacy claims, but that their vision of martyrdom and sacrifice is 
much more aggressive, participatory and extreme. I also make the argument that 
martyrdom spectacles in the movement phase continue to be based on actual blood 
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martyrs as in the case of Sheikh Izz ad-Din al-Qassam134 for Hamas and the Black 
Friday Massacres135 for Iran, whereas the regime phase sees an institutionalization of 
martyrdom spectacles that rely less on actual martyrs but moves to memorialization 
efforts spreading messages of ideal citizenship.136 The chapter traces the ideological 
development for the arguments surrounding martyrdom, how the movements are 
modifying it to fit their cultural norms, and then examines the increasingly high-tech 
and orchestrated ways (media, internet, museums, parades, etc.) the movements are 
elevating martyrdom from a specific act into a social spectacle. Finally, chapter four 
examines the disciplining nature of martyrdom spectacles and offers a candid account 
of how to approach martyrdom groups in the future. In this concluding chapter I 
argue that the utilization of new technologies for the distribution of martyrdom 
spectacles may appear more graphic and disturbing than in the past but the important 
concern is which stage the party is in. Parties only seem to rely on physical 
martyrdom during the movement stage, once in power, martyrdom spectacles become 
more about rhetoric than actual blood.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 Sheikh Izz ad-Din al-Qassam was killed by the British during colonial occupation in a battle in 
which he told his men to “die a martyr” than to surrender to the British. Hamas also chose to name 
their military wing, the al-Qassam Brigade, after him. Edmund Burke, Nejde Yaghoubian, and 
Schleifer, Abdullah, “Izz al-Din al-Qassam: Preacher and Mujahid,” in Struggle and survival in the 
modern Middle East (University of California Press, 2006), 137–151. 
 
135 See note 15. 
 
136 Perhaps nowhere is this best demonstrated than in the “martyrdom” of Farfour, a Mickey Mouse 
like character on Hamas TV who is killed at the hands of the Israeli state while trying to defend 
Palestine. This story comes from the children’s television show “Pioneers of Tomorrow” and 
graphically portrays the link between martyrdom, citizenship and nationalism to children. Peter Edidin, 
“A Mouse’s Grisly Demise,” The New York Times, June 30, 2007, sec. Arts, 
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Chapter Two: The Rise of Fascism and the Sanctity of Violence 
Introduction, Foundational Narratives: The March on Rome and the Beer 
Hall Putsch 
 
“That [fascism] is a doctrine of life is shown by the fact that it has resuscitated a faith. 
That this faith has conquered minds is proved by the fact that Fascism has had its 
dead and its martyrs.”137 
 
The following chapter explores the use and evolution of martyrdom spectacles 
within fascist movements. While the phenomenon of martyrdom spectacles may 
appear to be linked more with modern fundamentalist groups, I argue that they are 
surprisingly similar to the spectacles created by fascists between the two world wars. 
Moreover, studying on the use of martyrdom spectacles in these historic groups 
actually sheds light on the utilization of similar spectacles today. One of the key 
findings is that early in the movement’s political campaigns, martyrdom spectacles 
rely on actual (read here as individuals who were actually killed) martyrs as a way of 
portraying devotion to the cause and as a means of showing the party’s sacrifice to 
the population. However, as the party moves into power the scope of martyrdom 
celebrations change and they rely more on symbolic martyrdom through memorials or 
fictionalized accounts of martyrdom that invite everyone to connect to the message of 
sacrifice and model citizenship the group wishes to portray.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 Benito Mussolini, quoted in Carl Cohen, Communism, fascism, and democracy: the theoretical 
foundations (The McGraw-Hill Companies, 1997), 299. 
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I argue that this transformation is best understood if we think about these 
parties as going through phases. The movement phase is when the party is vying for, 
and attempting to, solidifying power. Here martyrdom spectacles overinflate the 
actual sacrifice of the group and connect the image of selflessness by the would-be 
martyr with the group itself. The regime phase occurs once the party has taken power 
and here martyrdom spectacles are used as a way to connect with the broader 
population to perpetuate the revolutionary zeal of the early martyrs and keep the 
memory of the revolution in the mind of the population. Martyrdom spectacles in the 
regime phase are much more symbolic and are often celebrations of faceless martyrs 
where the spectators are invited to envision themselves in the role of martyr and to 
contemplate their sacrifice for the party. At the end of each section I will argue that 
similar conditions are present among today’s fundamentalist movements and that 
exploring these historical cases can shed new light on the underlying rational and 
development of belligerent fundamentalism in the modern world. 
Fascist movements arose throughout Europe shortly after the end of the First 
World War as a reaction to modernity, national humiliation and the economic and 
political movements born of Enlightenment liberalism, but the ‘incubatory period of 
fascism’ can be traced back to the 1890’s.138 The countries where fascist ideology 
was most pervasive were also the latecomers to nation-state consolidation and by the 
time Germany and Italy came into political unification they were the weakest of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 H. R. Trevor-Roper’s “The Phenomenon of Fascism” in S. J. Wolf, Fascism in Europe, Meuthen: 
London, 1981 p. 28. 
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major European powers.139 The desire to leapfrog ahead, or at the very least catch-up, 
to the vast colonial possessions of France, Great Britain and to a lesser extent Russia, 
fostered a political climate in which ideological experimentation was possible. By the 
end of the nineteenth century, the remaining vestiges of aristocratic conservatism was 
being challenged by the emergence of a new economic elite who emboldened by its 
new prosperity challenged the traditional social order. It is within this context that the 
lower middle class, who benefited enough from capitalism to raise it above the 
common working class but not enough to afford them the political privileges of 
fortune. This will turn the “petite bourgeoisie” to fascism as a political force that will 
appeal directly to their economic and political needs as a movement concerned with 
mass not class and national greatness rather than individual.  
The apparent success of Western Democratic Liberalism after the Cold War 
left many in the developing world questioning the viability of Enlightenment 
liberalism within their national contexts. The failures of the post-colonial states to 
deliver on the pledge of civil and political rights along with the promise of economic 
prosperity called into question the very presumption that the democratic, capitalist 
Western state model could work throughout the developing world. Just as fascist 
movements did in the early part of the century, belligerent fundamentalism would 
offer an alternative political ideology that addresses liberalism’s failures while 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 There were a number of nascent fascist movements to arise around the same time including 
Metaxas in Greece, Codreanu in Romania, Horthy in Hungary and Franco in Spain, and while these 
various movements claimed to be fascist, there is significant debate in the field as to whether or not 
they are properly categorized as such. For additional information on this debate please review the 
following two works: Fascism in Europe (London: Methuen, 1981); and International Fascism, 1919-
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incorporating traditional cultural cues that call for a mass man and new political 
identity that will lift the population out of their national humiliation and create a 
strong, viable state.  
 The following chapter has two goals, 1) to explore the roots of fascism, 
outlining the historical conditions that gave rise to the development of the first wave 
of belligerent fundamentalism and providing a framework by which to assess and 
address more recent waves of a similar phenomenon; 2) to examine how the spectacle 
of martyrdom and myth construction were utilized in the Italian and German cases 
during different phases of each movement and the implications this can have on 
contemporary movements. The chapter is divided into four sections; first, a 
socioeconomic discussion that explores the “gelatinous” nature of civil society within 
each context as a partial explanation as to why both were susceptible to extremist 
movements; second, a brief historical survey of Interwar Europe and a discussion of 
Italy and Germany in the aftermath of World War I and the Treaty of Versailles; 
third, an ideological account of how fascism is purported to transform the party, the 
state and the individual; and fourth, an exploration into the spectacle of martyrdom 
and myth construction.  
The Interwar Period: The Economic Context and the Fragmentation of 
Political Legitimacy 
 
The Economic Crisis 
 The Italian Bienno Rosso and State Corporatist Response 
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 Shortly after the end of WWI, Italy underwent the Bienno Rosso or the “Red 
Two Years” which started as a popular onslaught by rural peasants and the working 
class on the state as inspired by the success of the Russian Revolution. These were 
initially economic demands (wage increases, working day limitations, safe working 
conditions) but they later extended into property rights, land reform and a call for the 
alleviation of class distinctions within Italy.140 Mussolini, who had been a socialist 
until 1914 when he broke with the party over Italian intervention in the war, was 
skeptical of the Bienno Rosso movement and saw their class claims as denying the 
primacy of the state. Yet, the conflict during this time did provide an opportunity for 
Mussolini to capitalize on class frustration by allying the Fascist party with the 
capitalists and leading the call for the capitalist to break the socialist stronghold over 
the labor markets and rural areas. In successfully doing so, fascism was able to grow 
a substantial base of support in the agrarian parts of the state (the same is true for 
Romanian fascism) and then use this as a springboard for an urban fascist 
movement.141  
 The Fascist economic model was one that bridged the gap between the 
politicians and the technocrats (who had gained significant standing during the war 
and did not want to lose their status to the politicians after its conclusion) on who 
would run the Italian economy by maintaining the wartime dirigisme. Mussolini rose 
to power advocating for the small, labor-intensive industrialists but soon abandoned 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 Paul Corner’s “State and Society 1901-1922” in Adrian Lyttleton’s, ed., Liberal and Fascist Italy 
1900-1945 Oxford: Oxford, 2002 pp. 37-38. 
 
141 Ibid., pp. 40-43. 
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them for the capital rich major industrialists. During his tenure most of the capital-
intensive markets expanded through a policy of import substitution and 
protectionism.  Additionally, through the appointment of Alberto Beneduce and 
Giuseppe Volpi as his economic advisors, Mussolini was able to successfully 
leverage the economic crisis of the Great Depression to institute long-term financial 
reforms some of which put Italy in competitive standing with capital intensive 
industries all the way up to the early 1970’s.142  
 Beneduce was really the father of the Fascist state corporatist model, but like 
so many aspects of fascism, Mussolini would take the credit. The three most 
significant policies Beneduce produced related to banking, investment and the joint 
public-private ownership of factories. In regards to investment, the ICIPU (1924) and 
the Istituto di Credito Navale (1928) were created as special quasi-banks to finance 
the development of public works projects like dams, roads and electric companies. 
These were needed throughout Italy to fully modernize but up until then, there was 
little investment in these industries, as they were slow to provide returns. The banking 
industry was debilitated under the weight of the Great Depression and in 1931 
required a significant bank bailout. Previously, banks invested heavily into firms who 
simultaneously invested in banks and the lines between the two were so entwined that 
a failure in one economic sector would devastate the other. Beneduce was able to 
limit the role of banks to short-term deposits and loans, effectively taking them out of 
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the investing realm, and then secured individual deposits through government 
backing.143 Finally, the banking law (1936) significantly pushed to the state’s favor 
public control over industry in the major economic sectors, thereby solidifying 
corporatist ambitions and giving public managers a free hand in guiding the economy 
while not directly owning the means of production.144  
 The Labor Charter justifies this relationship between the state, the worker and 
business in arguing, “the Italian Nation …is a moral, political and economic unit 
which finds its integral realization in the Fascist State.”145 Within the Labor Charter, 
work is defined as a social duty and thus protected by the state with the effort of 
production aimed at increasing state power (Article II). For business owners, it 
establishes the right of syndicalists to solely represent their arena of production (III) 
creates a labor court for the state to mediate labor disputes (V) and ensures that the 
state intervention does not occur unless private initiative fails (IX). Workers to have 
rights now guaranteed through the Labor Charter including collective bargaining of 
labor contracts (XI), living wages (XII), right to Sundays off and an annual paid 
holiday (XV and XVI).146  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 If all of this sounds familiar to today it is no coincident, the economic integration of the 1920’s 
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144 Ibid., pp. 75-78 and Simone Selva’s “State and Economy in Italy before the Economic Miracle: 
Economic Policy and International Constraints from the Reconstruction through the Pre-Boom Years,” 
Business and Economic History, Published by the Business History Conference, Vol. 2, 2004, pp. 13-
14.  
 
145 Pitigliani, Fausto. The Italian Corporative State. New York: MacMillan, 1934 p.245. 
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 The Iranian constitution (1979) outlines similar joint economic partnerships 
between the public and the private with an economic model that is resonant of 
Mussolini’s. Article 44 of the Iranian constitution outlines the three economic sectors: 
the state, cooperative and private. The state based sectors focus on large-scale 
production and areas essential to national security. The cooperative sector focuses on 
areas and industries held cooperatively focusing on smaller scale industries, 
production and distribution. The private sector covers largely agriculture, trades and 
crafts.147 Just as the corporate syndicalist model was devised to advance the economic 
interest of the fascist state, the Iranian cooperative model is argued as a necessary 
step in protecting the Islamic nature of the economy and to ensure self-sufficiency.  
The Economic Burden of Versailles and the National Socialist Model 
Germany’s economic system had to contend with the severe economic 
burdens of Versailles as well. There was a palpable dissatisfaction among Germans 
surrounding their treatment at the Paris Peace Conference, yet it was the lower middle 
classes that suffered the most. The wealthy had the money to wade out the economic 
crisis and the lower classes gained in significance both politically and economically 
once their domination under the Kaiser was wiped away with the establishment of the 
republic.148 Nazi economic priorities were quite similar to those of Mussolini except 
that the state is no longer technically the engine for economic growth and instead all 
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148 Erich Fromm, “Psychology of Nazism” and Harold Laski’s, “The Meaning of Fascism” both from 
Neil Gregor’s, ed. Nazism. Oxford: Oxford, 2000 pp 43 and 52-54. 
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is done for the Volksgemeinschaft or the community of the nation. One can argue that 
the difference here is just semantic but I think there is an important distinction to be 
made between Fascism’s preeminence of the state and the Nazi’s with the nation.  In 
theory, anyone could be a ‘good Italian’—including the Libyan or Ethiopian 
(assuming of course neither wanted to still be Libyan or Ethiopian). However, the 
Nazi regime had a clear idea of what were ‘German spaces’ and what parts of Europe 
would be integrated into Germany based on the degree to which they were influenced 
by German blood, language and finally culture.149  
The German economic plan was very clearly concerned primarily with raising 
the raw materials and capital necessary for rearmament and for making Germany self-
sufficient. Broadly speaking, the policy divided into four direct and eight indirect 
measures. The four direct measures included the regulation and reduction of taxes. 
For example, in 1933, to stimulate automobile production, the government repealed 
all taxes on new cars and eventually taxes on all cars. Second was a price policy 
(reduction of cost and increase in price), which was mostly on agriculture where 
production rates and price fluctuations are highly interdependent. Third, tariff policies 
designed to make German goods more marketable when they have to compete 
domestically with foreign imports. The final direct measure eliminated any new 
private businesses in the capital markets. Expansion (plants, etc.) require capital and 
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by limiting capital to only companies and industries that fulfill the goals set up in the 
Four-Year Plan the government can free up capital for use in companies satisfying the 
state’s economic needs. Essentially, this means a planned economy at least as far as 
capital investment is concerned.150 
 The indirect influences on the economy included a capital investment policy 
and subsidies. Profit and sales guarantees also limits the burden and risk to certain 
industries when they are producing something deemed in the interest of the state but 
not necessarily promising in terms of market payoff. Also included was the regulating 
the consumption of raw materials. The regulation of raw materials may serve to some 
degree as a stimulus for industries to ‘make do’ by inventing or using materials that 
under conditions of scarcity they would otherwise not have had to do. In a similar 
fashion as the fascist indirect influences also included the regulation of the labor 
supply. The enormous death toll in the First World War obviously lead to drastic 
changes in the labor supply with part of the void filled by female labor and later 
retirement but the absence of certain levels of unemployment makes economic 
expansion virtually impossible. All available workers were seen as needing regulation 
to fulfill labor demands present in key industries.151  
Perhaps paradoxically there was also an increase in production while 
simultaneously regulating consumption. By requiring a certain amount of maize in 
bread production or a certain amount of synthetic fibers in textiles, consumption 
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quantities can be limited and or, fewer resources can be spread out making greater 
production possibilities and thus greater consumption possibilities. The goal of 
German consumption policy was to actually increase the consumption and raise the 
standard of living for the workers. The final two direct measures were aimed at 
boosting the life of the worker by nutrition regulation. Germany produces certain 
foodstuffs in abundance and certain ones must be imported. The desire is twofold, 
increase consumption of German grown foodstuff and limit consumption of imports 
while simultaneously trying to improve the German diet and make the race stronger 
and healthier. Finally, what the Nazis called organized consumption such as the 
vacation trips regulated and subsidized through the Kraft durch Freude ‘Strength 
through Joy’ program.152 
 Both the Italian and Nazi examples present alternatives to economic liberalism 
when the economic systems in place do not adequately meet the needs of the 
populations. The fundamental issue with these examples is not to demonize 
capitalism but to highlight how illiberal movements can capitalize on collective 
frustration and the societal sense of a broken system in order to advocate for radical 
political, economic and social change. What may at other times seem irrational or 
illogical suddenly become possible, perhaps even desirable, in the face of significant 
social upheaval.  
 In the case of belligerent fundamentalist movements of today we must keep in 
mind that secure, employed, fed, socially integrated populations rarely challenge a 
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governmental structure that they feel it is responsive to their needs. However, when 
states or movements are either unwilling or unable to act on behalf of the welfare of 
its citizens, not only will these institutions lose legitimacy, but somewhere in the 
political spectrum an oppositional movement may already be fomenting the seeds for 
radical social change. The situation in Gaza is a case in point. Under Israeli 
occupation Gaza has suffered from a state of economic de-development a process 
defined as “the deliberate, systematic and progressive dismemberment of an 
indigenous economy by a dominant one, where economic—and by extension, 
societal—potential is not only distorted but denied.”153 The lack of economic and 
social outlets creates a vacuum Hamas attempts to fill by providing real economic 
sustenance as well as an alternative identity based on a sense of empowerment. Just 
as the Nazis created the image of Germans becoming economically, militarily and 
socially strengthened through their challenging of the Versailles treaties, Hamas is 
attempting to replicate a similar effect within Gaza. 
The Fragmentation of Political Legitimacy 
 
Fragmented Civil Society: Italy, Mussolini and D’Annunzio 
Albeit in different ways, Germany and Italy were both losers of World War I and the 
Treaty of Versailles that formally brought the war to its conclusion. Italy was a 
latecomer to the First World War and a second tier power at best, but the experience 
of fighting the war emboldened many Italian soldiers with a heightened sense of 
nationalism, pride and sacrifice. Nowhere was this more palpable than with Gabriele 
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D’Annunzio in the town of Fiume who Michael Arthur Ledeen referred to as the 
“John the Baptist” of fascism.154 Before Mussolini ever addressed a crowd from his 
balcony, D’Annunzio had spoken stridently in reference to Italian nationalism. 
D’Annunzio was a major poet, novelist, dramatist and political figure in Italy before 
WWI and during the war enlisted as a fighter pilot in the Italian air force.155 With 
victory in sight, D’Annunzio was angered by what he saw as Italy missing the 
territorial spoils of war promised in the Treaty of London (1915).  It was here that 
Italy signed with the Entente powers (France, Britain and Russia) and formally 
abandoned the Triple Alliance powers (from 1882-1915 which included Italy, 
Germany and Austria-Hungary until Italy’s desertion). D’Annunzio as well as many 
other Italians saw the treaty as an annexation of most of the Balkans under Italy, the 
establishment of an Italian empire, and the acknowledgment by the larger European 
powers that Italy had finally arrived on the world stage.156   
 With Italian losses at the Paris Peace Conference appearing inevitable, 
D’Annunzio famously labeled the Italian outcome of the war a “mutilated victory” 
and led an army of irregular Italian militiamen into Fiume where D’Annunzio took 
over the city (which had an Italian majority population) and declared it a sovereign 
Italian republic. The seizure of Fiume was a model for Mussolini and symbolized 
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many of the characteristics seen later in the fascist state. The March on Rome was 
akin to the march on Fiume both of which were staged to reclaim the land of Italy157 
and to rescue the state from a perceived decline in Italian culture. D’Annunzio argued 
that the failures of the Italian delegation at the Paris Peace Conference were largely 
traceable to the decline in Italian culture and the adoption of liberal principles by the 
Italian population as a whole. He argued that Italy was essentially divided into two 
different classes of citizen. One that was a corrupted, self-interested, materialist 
liberal who thought only of his individual gain and a second that was a heroic model 
who rejected the Enlightenment conception of man and instead “looks far ahead, 
learning again the Roman art of building roads, of multiplying them, of stretching 
them out toward all the far horizons and the ideal goals.”158 This theme of cultural 
corruption and decline was one that Mussolini would repeat, placing the blame on 
liberal parliamentarianism.  
D’Annuncio was able to hold onto Fiume for fourteen months until in 
December 1920 when, after he declaried war on Italy, the Italian navy blockaded the 
city and forcing D’Annuncio into surrender. Mussolini, however, incorporated much 
of what made D’Annuncio famous directly into his fascist repertoire. “Virtually the 
entire ritual of Fascism came from the ‘Free State of Fiume”: the balcony address, the 
Roman salute, the cries of ‘aia, aia, alala,’ the dramatic dialogues with the crowd, the 
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use of religious symbols in a new secular setting, the eulogies to the ‘martyrs’ of the 
cause and the employment of their ‘relics’ in political ceremonies.”159 The Italian 
frustration surrounding their ‘mutilated victory’ along with the government’s 
handling of Fiume and D’Annuncio provided fodder for collective frustration both 
with the governmental regime and its liberal ideology. Mussolini went so far as to 
argue that Italy’s entrance into World War I and the chain of events that it started 
“…was really the beginning of the Fascist revolution.”160  
Fragmented Civil Society: Germany, Hitler and Weimar 
German losses out of World War I are more obvious. Though an armistice had 
been signed some sixth months earlier, the Treaty of Versailles formally saw the 
surrender of Germany to the Allies and included the controversial War Guilt Clauses 
(articles 231-248) in which Germany took full responsibility for the war, paid 
exorbitant reparations and took significant territorial loses as well as disarmament.161 
In response to a war which Germans had difficulty understanding as a loss (largely 
because it was fought outside of Germany and so the desperation of the German 
military position was less visible), the Germans, reeling from their loss, revolted 
against the Kaiser and formed the Weimar republic, so named after the city in which 
it was founded.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 Michael Arthur Ledeen D’Annunzio: The First Duce. Transaction: Bruswick, 2003 pp. x. 
 
160 Emil Ludwig. Talks with Mussolini. Little, Brown and Company: Boston, 1933 p. 145. 
 
161 Bullitt Lowry. Armistice 1918. Kent State: Kent, 1996 pp 93-94. 
74 
 
The newly formed republic was Germany’s first real attempt at a truly liberal 
form of parliamentary democracy and was burdened by the synergism of the Great 
Depression and the political and financial limitations imposed by the Treaty of 
Versailles. The German economy was more badly damaged by the economic failures 
of the Great Depression and the German people saw this economic crisis as extending 
as far back as 1918 with the armistice (not 1929 when the stock markets fell) which 
instilled a sense of pessimism that the crisis could ever truly be overcome. Likewise, 
there was a breach of political continuity with the end of the Kaiser Reich (1918) and 
the Weimar Republic was never able to achieve real legitimacy on its own. The 
dismantling of Weimar thus came in four successive waves. The first was a 
weakening of the state by the chronic economic and social crises. Second was a loss 
of any sense of political legitimacy. Third came a reversion to authoritarianism by the 
old anti-republican (pro-Kaiser) elites to destroy Weimar’s parliamentary and 
democratic institutions. Finally, the Mactergreifung or ‘seizure of power’ in which 
Hitler is able to achieve power only after he forges an alliance with (or they with him) 
the old Kaiser elite who wanted to revert to authoritarian control. The chronology 
looks something like this: 1918-1930, the fundamental compromises of 1918’s 
Weimar constitution evaporated and a majority of republicans no longer support the 
republic. 1930-1933, the presidential regimes destroyed what was left of the 
republican ideals and provided a power vacuum that moves to authoritarianism were 
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unable to fill. 1933, with no alternative the authoritarian elite/National Socialist 
consortium created the Third Reich.162 
The relevance of this historical foundation is even more compelling when we 
consider the crisis of legitimacy among post-colonial states within the modern Middle 
East. In a similar vein to Weimar, liberal Western institutions replaced traditional 
forms of local rule and have failed to live up to the promise of transparent 
government, political participation and economic growth that modern, liberal 
governments are expected to provide. Moreover, as both historic cases illustrate, great 
powers can renege on their promises of inclusion and can treat weaker powers as 
second class actors in the international system (unless of course they develop the 
ultimate trump card for admission to the great power camp, a nuclear bomb). The 
negative impact of being a late-comer to nation-state status and the failures of 
modern, liberal political institutions will in part influence the belligerent 
fundamentalist movements like Hamas and Iran and how they will utilize the 
spectacle of myth and martyrdom to articulate a new political vision of man and the 
state that would be rooted in the idea of the mass party. 
Fascism as an Antithesis to Liberal Democracy 
S.J. Wolf once argued that “the word [fascism], unfortunately, has certain 
commode-like tendencies—the more you stuff into it, the more it takes.”163 Despite 
the colorful allusion to fascism’s elasticity, both fascism and fundamentalist 
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movements share a similar critique about the misguided nature of liberal democracy. 
The assumption that individual opinion and popular consultation are the appropriate 
foundation for law and politics is wholly discarded. Islamists like Sayyid Qutb argue 
that liberal democracy creates a condition of jahaliyyah, or a condition in which the 
sovereignty rests not with God but with mankind: 
If we look at the sources and foundations of modern modes of living, it   
becomes clear that the whole world is steeped in jahiliyyah. This jahiliyyah   
is based on rebellion against the sovereignty of Allah on earth. It attempts to   
transfer to man one of the greatest attributes of Allah, namely sovereignty, by 
making some men lords over others. It does so not in the simple and primitive 
ways of the anviet jahiliyyah, but in the more subtle form of claiming that the 
right to create values, to legislate rules of collective behavior, and to choose a 
way of life rests with men, without regard to what Allah has prescribed.164 
 
For the Islamists the critique of liberal democracy rests upon their rejection of 
transferring sovereign decision-making power to individuals, for the fascists it will be 
a more pragmatic argument that simply denies the rational capacity of people to 
govern themselves.  
In Mussolini’s political manifesto, The Doctrine of Fascism (which some 
scholars actually attribute to Giovanni Gentile as ghost writer), Mussolini argued, 
“the masses are nothing but a herd of sheep, so long as they are unorganized. I am 
nowise antagonistic to them. All that I deny is that they are capable of ruling 
themselves.”165 In removing the prevailing political cleavages of individual and class 
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as political agents, Mussolini is able to refocus the debate around a mythic conception 
of the Italian state and sets the stage for a call to sacrifice in its name.   
Functionally, the Fascist state lies somewhere between democracy and absolute 
monarchy.  As a synthesis of the two, Fascism “denies the right of numbers to govern 
by means of periodical consultations; it asserts the irremediable and fertile and 
beneficent inequality of men who cannot be leveled by any such mechanical and 
extrinsic device as universal suffrage.”166  The defect of absolute monarchy and of 
popular democracy lies in the conception of sovereignty and within whom it is vested.  
Sovereignty must rest in the state, not the people or king.  To assume either would be 
to assert that the state is merely functionary in nature, rather than acknowledging that 
the state is organic in essence and has its own, reified existence—separate and apart 
from the king or the people.167 
Politically, Fascism argues that the state is supreme.   
“The Fascists conception of the State is all-embracing; outside of it no human 
or spiritual values can exist, much less have value.  Thus understood, Fascism, 
is totalitarian, and the Fascist state—a synthesis, and a unit inclusive of all 
values—interprets, develops, and potentiates the whole life of a people.”168   
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It is only through the state that the individual, social groups, and the nation can gain 
meaning and substance.169  By positing the state as the supreme actor within political 
life, Fascism is by nature anti-internationalist and opposed to any supranational 
efforts.170   
Mussolini warned that “all the States of the world are in a condition of fatal 
interdependence.”171 The revulsion at internationalism fits into Mussolini’s larger 
state centered conception of life. Formal international institutions may serve to limit 
the autonomy of the state and—arguably worse for the fascists—provide an 
alternative political entity by which an individual can swear their allegiance. Nowhere 
would this threat of growing internationalism be more concrete for Mussolini than in 
the emergence of the League of Nations. 
After the end of the First World War, Italy was in a vulnerable position if it 
were to really be a major player on the international stage. Its reward for being on the 
victorious side amounted to little more than token land gains, she lacked colonial 
possessions for trade, wealth or resources and the geographical positioning of Italy 
that helped secure its fortunes in the Ancient world in the very center of the 
Mediterranean now proved a liability as she possessed no outlet to the ocean. Great 
Britain controlled both the Rock of Gibraltar and the Suez Canal, the only two points 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169 “Anti-individualistic, the fascist conception of life stresses the importance of the State and accepts 
the individual only insofar as his interests coincide with those of the state, which stands for the 
conscience and the universal will of man as a historic entity”  Ibid., 10. 
 
170 Ibid., 19. 
 
171 Mussolini, Benito. “Fascism and the Problems of Foreign Policy” given February 6, 1921. In 
Mussolini as Revealed in His Political Speeches. H. Fertig: New York, 1976 p 121. 
79 
 
in or out of the Mediterranean. Without an alternative route to the open ocean, Italy’s 
international trade was essentially in the hands of the British. Mussolini used this 
threat to Italian economic independence as the justification to pursue two goals—to 
challenge the authority of the League of Nations, to create an Italian empire through 
colonial acquisition and to bring war victories to the Italian people to show them the 
power of fascism’s ideology. 
Mussolini began his colonial campaigns with the consolidation of Italian 
possessions in North Africa won after the Italian-Ottoman War (1911-1912). Italy’s 
scant colonial possessions in Northern Africa were largely titular and even liberal 
Italian governments were keen to solidify Italian control, but it was not until 1934 
with an uprising among the Arab population in the territories that Mussolini was 
provided with an opportunity to flex growing Italian military muscle in crushing the 
insurrection. After Italian victories, the colonial possessions in northern Africa were 
subdued under Italian authority and consolidated into what would be called Libya.172  
But the successful Libyan campaigns only solidified what were already Italian 
possessions and still did not provide the country with an ocean port that would allow 
them access to international trade that did not have to go through the British. The next 
target was one of the few remaining independent nations of Africa, Ethiopia. The 
Ethiopian campaign (1936) began immediately following their success in Libya.173 
Unlike their earlier victories in Northern Africa, the colonial possessions forged out 
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of victories in Ethiopia (which became known as Italian East Africa) more blatantly 
challenged the authority and of the League of Nations and the principle of 
international peace. A main tenet of the League was that disputes should be settled 
peacefully and while not legally banning war, any aggressor state would be punished 
collectively by all other member states of the League.174 The lack of a credible 
collective response by the League, in large part because of their fear that Italy may 
form an alliance with Germany, to the Italian declaration of war on Ethiopia 
highlighted its institutional weaknesses175 and the potential weakness of 
internationalism in general when put to the test by a power with strong nationalist 
aspirations.  
 Fascism as a Challenge to Capitalism and Communism 
The international fascist revolution, according to Mussolini, began with the 
First World War and the Great Depression. Mussolini foresaw the emerging 
economic crisis as the catalyst for fascist revolutions throughout Europe. “But the 
time is not yet ripe. The crisis has first to be intensified. New revolutions will come 
and it is their sequel that the type of the European tomorrow will be established.”176 
Like his former socialist comrades, Mussolini saw the economic crisis as a critique of 
the very principles of capitalism itself. The crisis appeared to validate concerns that a 
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focus just on individual economic growth would put the health of the entire system 
into jeopardy, whereas a focus on class interests neglects the common bonds that 
owners and workers share and denies any role for the state.  
Zeev Sternhell’s work offers some insight as to how Mussolini’s economic 
program would find mass appeal. Sternhell provides an historical analysis of 
fascism’s roots, arguing that while its emergence as a regime finds its opportunity in 
the political and economic crisis of the inter-war period; the roots of the ideology can 
be traced back to the 1880’s.  It was during this period that there emerged an anti-
Marxist (and liberal) ideology that aligned itself with the promotion of nationalism 
(Sternhell, 321).177  But Sternhell does more than provide a historical narrative; he 
also gives a framework by which to evaluate political movements in general.  By 
arguing that there is a distinction between regimes and movements, Sternhell reminds 
us that when assessing political regimes and their concurrent logics we must be 
conscious of the political realities which may make the full implementation of the 
ideology’s principles impossible—that even fascist regimes have to succumb, or at 
the least deal with, political pressures. Despite all the rhetoric they may espouse about 
the mythic qualities of the state, even the fascist state is no more immune to economic 
realities than any other state. This explains, in part, why Mussolini’s economic 
arguments for state corporatism could find resonance when placed in the context of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




an economic crisis that appeared to discredit both the capitalist and communist 
alternatives. 
Economically, Fascism rejects both liberalism and Marxian socialism and 
draws on the idea of syndicalism to create what Mussolini will call state corporatism.  
Fascism argues the economic futility of liberalism lies in the sacrificing of the 
supremacy of the state to private interests.178 The main premise underpinning the Law 
of Corporations (1934) is that there is no economic event of an exclusively private or 
individual interest. It is through liberalism that individual self-interest is allowed to 
flourish, ultimately to the detriment of the state.179  As the state is the foundation of 
Fascism, any economic system that privileges the interests of an individual or group 
over that of the state is problematic. The Iranians echo this critique on capitalism 
some fifty years later as a justification for their modified socialist approach—one that 
focuses on a more equitable distribution of wealth but justified in terms of religious 
dictates and piety rather than class solidarity.180  
For this very reason, Fascism also finds fault with the socialist project.  
Socialism assumes the world to be divided among class lines and imbrued in class 
struggle between capital and labor.  Through this perpetual struggle between those 
who own and manage the means of production, and the labor that toils for them, all 
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179 The logic behind this argument lies in a zero-sum mentality towards the individual and the state.  
The assumption is that either the individual or the state must be supreme, that both cannot be valued 
equally.   
 
180 See Articles 43 and 49 of the Iranian Constitution. 
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inequality is formed.  In order to rectify the inherent inequality within the production 
system, socialism argues for the proletariats to join labor unions and ultimately to 
revolt and assume the means of production for themselves. 
Fascism rejects the dogma of socialism on the grounds that economic 
discrepancies alone cannot account for the movement of history or inequality among 
peoples.   
“That the vicissitudes of economic life—discoveries of raw materials, new 
technical processes, scientific inventions—have their importance, no one 
denies; but that they suffice to explain human history to the exclusion of other 
factors is absurd.”181   
 
And to assume that the world is divided among classes, forged through the process of 
production, again relegates the state to a secondary role.  By viewing the world 
through a lens of class, the socialist agenda is international in nature and transcends 
state borders.  And even the rectification of class division only promises the 
advancement of the proletariat cause, not the higher glory of the state. 
“In politics, fascism aims at realism; in practice it desires to deal only with 
those problems which are spontaneous products of historic conditions and which find 
or suggest their own solutions.”182 Taking aspects of both ideologies, fascism 
advocates an economic alternative that addresses the concerns of workers while 
acknowledging private property, competition and the needs of the state.  State 
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182 Ibid., 10. 
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corporatism is a harmonization of “guided” laissez-faire183 with an inclusion of 
worker’s rights, and participation, within the production process.   
“The corporate state considers that private enterprise in the sphere of 
production is the most effective and useful instrument in the interests of the 
nation.  In view of the fact that private organization of production is a function 
of national concern, the organizer of the enterprise is responsible to the State 
for the direction given to production.”184   
 
In other words, Fascists justify their conception of state corporatism on the 
assumption that it is the most efficient way to organize the economy, and that a strong 
economy is the best way to promote and secure the interests of the state.185   
Mussolini argues that capitalism is not to be confused with the bourgeoisie, 
and instead should be seen as a specific mode of production—industrial 
production.186  However, capitalism itself, he argues, has undergone three different 
periods of development: dynamic, static and decline.  The dynamic period is 
distinguished by “free competition” and cycles of economic progress and decline 
which are neither universal nor extended in time. During this dynamic period of 
capitalism the appropriate role of the state is one of liberal non-regulation in which 
the state remains apart from economic affairs.187  At some point within this process 
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186 Mussolini, Benito, Four Speeches on the Corporate State, Laboremus, Rome: 1935, p. 11. 
 
187 Ibid., 12. However, states may enter into short wars in order to spur economic growth, but this 
indirect action is the only way that states may enter into the economic process. 
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cartels begin to form and the principle of free competition is eroded, which leads to 
the static period. The static period forces the state to intervene within the economy in 
terms of customs protection and anti-monopoly policies.188  At this point capitalism 
ceases to be an economic phenomenon and becomes a social one—and by assuming 
this social character it falls completely under the domain of the state.189  Finally, the 
period of capitalist decline ushers in a new phase in the state’s economic role.   
By defining economic history in this way, Mussolini justifies his notion of 
state corporatism, arguing that the social aspect of the economy forces the need for 
state intervention, while at the same time; the output efficiency of private ownership 
of production bolsters the need to leave capital in the hands of individuals.  As an 
answer to these two needs, Mussolini incorporates workers interests within the 
production process (after all, workers are part of the state and the economy is within 
the interests of the state, thus they should have a voice) while at the same time 
instituting a guided laissez faire economic policy.  Guided laissez faire is different 
from the conventional term in that it assumes that the goal of economic activity is not 
to enrich the individual, but to enrich the state.  And of course, the individual will 
prosper as a byproduct of the strength of the state.  Thus, while the state will maintain 
a hands-off approach to the economy in general, it will retain ultimate control over 
the corporations by redirecting policies of the corporations when they are off track 
with the interests of the state.  In other words, there are essentially three aspects of the 
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86 
 
corporate economy: a respect for private property—but a private property which 
facilitates growth not simply lays dormant, respects private initiative, and orders the 
economy by directing it to a definite purpose—the good of the whole population.190  
The “fascist corporate economy is the economy of individuals as well as of associated 
groups and of the state.”191 
Organizationally, the state corporatist model is “opposed to trade-unionism as 
a class weapon.  …Fascism recognizes the real need which gave rise to socialism and 
trade-unionism, which divergent interests are coordinated and harmonized in the 
unity of the state.”192 The economic needs and exploitative potential of unfettered 
capitalism are not neglected under fascism, but they are placed within the fascist 
worldview that real liberation will not come through organization along class lines 
but through the redemptive quality of the state. It is through the state and state guided 
laissez faire economics that both workers, party, state and business leaders will be 
able to achieve mutual gain by answering the call to sacrifice their individual and 
class interest to the needs of the state. The legacy of this sense of collective 
responsibility by the masses will reemerge with the belligerent fundamentalists who 
will make similar calls for personal economic sacrifice in the name of national 
liberation. 
The Totalizing State 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




192 Mussolini [a], Benito, Fascism: Doctrine and Institutions, Ardita: Rome, 1935 p 11. 
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 The ideology of fascism Mussolini constructs is totalitarian in nature and 
based around the supremacy of the state.  Politically, the party as state is all 
encompassing and individual interests are relegated to secondary status.  The Fascist 
regime is neither democratic nor monarchical; instead, it is a dictatorial system with 
sovereignty resting not in the people or the head of state, but in a reified concept of 
the state itself with the party at its head.  Economically, the state functions in a hands 
off approach, leaving capital in the hands of the citizens, but demands that the 
interests of the state be placed above those of the citizens and that wealth generated 
from the economic process by made to enrich the state rather than private interests.   
For Mussolini, Fascism assumes the primacy of the state in all affairs.  As 
such, the only way to maintain the security of the state is to ensure that the state is 
independent, at least to a reasonable degree from other actors.  However, this degree 
of independence comes at high costs both on the domestic and international front.  
Domestically, there can be no opposition parties because opposition parties strive for 
divisions, often times around interests of class (economic or social) and do not 
attempt to unite the people for the betterment of the state.  With the exclusion of 
outlets for opposition, coupled with the inclusivity of the state corporatists system, 
injustice at home will end.193  At least domestically, the security dilemma seems to 
rest in disunity.  The only threat to the state is one of authority.  Should the state lose 
its control over the people or its legitimacy to some other group or institution, then 
the security of the state is undermined.  In this way, there is an intimate relationship 
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between the economic system of the Fascist state and the preservation of domestic 
prosperity. 
Internationally, as well, the security of the state relies heavily on the strength 
of the economy.  In order for the state to have a strong national defense, it needs to 
have an equally strong economy capable of purchasing and maintaining the needs for 
that defense.  However, Mussolini sees economic dependency as just as great a threat 
internationally.  Logically, if the state relies on its economy to provide the means for 
its self-defense, and if its economy is dependent on resources or trade with other 
states, then the entire security of the state is dependent on another.  As such, the 
object of the corporatists system is to provide for the needs of the people while at the 
same time increasing the sum total of national forces.194 
Perpetual War 
During the early stage of the corporate system, there needs to be peace in 
order for the state to fully develop its own economic infrastructure.195  However, this 
time of peace affords the opportunity for the military buildup which will help the state 
during inevitable conflicts and will lay the foundation for an imperialist phase.  The 
fascist ideology does not believe in the utility or potential of the Kantian notion of 
perpetual peace.  War, for the fascist is not only inevitable, but necessary.  “War 
alone keys up all human energies to their maximum tension and sets the seal of 
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nobility on those people who have the courage to face it.”196 But war can also have a 
stimulating economic effect. During what he labels the “dynamic period” of 
economic growth, Mussolini argues that short wars can spur growth without unduly 
burdening the state in long term conflicts197 and the Libyan and Ethiopian campaigns 
would seem to fit this mold.  
Assuming that war is necessary for the glorification and the preservation of 
the state, and realizing that finite natural resources will cause the state to be 
dependent on others if it cannot procure new resources, the state must enter into an 
imperialist phase and secure colonies.  From this follows a five part foreign policy 
agenda for Italian Fascists. The first policy was developing its own economic 
infrastructure in order to gain eventual independence.  The second was to renew 
diplomatic relations with enemy states to foster a climate of peace in order to prepare 
for war.  Third, the intensification of friendly relations with those states with which 
little contact has been established.  The fourth policy was the securing of the rights of 
the state to possess colonies.  The furtherance of colonies abroad “by economic and 
educational means and by rapid communication”198 was the final policy position.  
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But the Italians were not alone in their glorification of violence and perpetual 
war. The Romanian fascists, known as the Legionaries of the Archangel Michael,199 
were even more extreme in their lust for violence than their Italian counterparts. The 
Legionaries, named after the Archangel Michael (the leader of the army of God), 
capitalized on their colonial legacy as an Ottoman vassal in order to forge a new 
Romanian identity that would challenge their perceived historical weakness and 
secure a sense of national pride for another latecomer to the nation-state system. 
Structurally, the Legionaries were comprised mostly of university students who were 
divided into ‘nests’ of no more than thirteen members who each took an oath 
declaring:  
We bind ourselves before God and men to remain closely united around our 
leaders, to obey and carry out orders received, to work for the ever deeper 
popular penetration of the new spirit of Work, Honesty, Sacrifice, and Justice, 
in a world where we want to convert all with whom we come into contact into 
Legionaries, that is sharers in these beliefs. We believe in God and in the 
Legion’s victory. We believe in Jesus Christ and through integral nationalism, 
acting through the country’s Legions.200 
 
Nests each had their own individual leader and were connected to the larger 
movement through an extremely thorough guide book. The book’s rules covered such 
things as: discipline (follow leader through good and evil), labor (work every day), 
silence, (“you act, let others talk”), education (“You must become another. A hero. 
Let the nest provide all your education. Know the Legion well.”), mutual help (do not 
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abandon a fallen brother), honor (“It is better to fall fighting with honor than to win 
through an infamy.”)201  
 Unlike the Italian case, the communal celebration of violence was not largely 
ceremonial. Two key moments in the life of the Legionaries became mythic rallying 
points for the movement and helped to propel them to become one of the main home 
grown fascist movements to assume power during World War II. The first moment 
occurred in the summer of 1936. Mihai Stelescu was a prominent leader within the 
Legionaries movement serving as Lieutenant to the movement’s founder Corneliu 
Codreanu, with whom he would eventually fall into disfavor, and represented the 
party in the Romanian parliament.  By 1935 Stelescu split with the Legionaries and 
formed his own far-right party known as the Crusade of Romanianism.  Codreanu, 
angry with the challenge of splinter party and the threat of defection, formed a death 
squad of young Legionaries with orders to kill Stelescu in a ritualistic fashion. The 
squad found their opportunity while Stelescu was undergoing an appendectomy and 
while in the hospital four of the squads members broke into his room, fired 120 
bullets into his body, chopped his body in a sign of desecration and danced around it 
while kissing each other.202 The extreme brutality of the crime showed not only what 
could happen to those who left the group, but more importantly, it none so subtly 
alluded to the story of the Archangel Michael who struck down with his sword all the 
enemies of the Lord. 
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 The second mythic point for the movement happened between April and 
December 1939 which as known as “The Year of Martyrdom.” By 1939 the threat of 
the Legionary movement coupled with an unstable royal dictatorship by King Carol 
led the King to outlaw the Legionaries and on the Orthodox Palm Sunday Codreanu 
and other leaders of the movement were arrested on charges of libel. Their cases were 
eventually inflated to acts of sedition where they were summarily convicted and—
according to the official statements at the time—upon finding Codreanu and a number 
of his followers attempting to escape the prison they were shot. By the end of the 
summer some 1200 Legionari were arrested and killed by the police and the 
perceived brutality only served to end King Carol’s short dictatorship and cement the 
public’s support for Codreanu and the Legionary as folk heroes thereby catapulting 
the remaining party members to power in 1940. 
 Shortly after WWII, the war to defeat fascism and Nazism, a young Egyptian 
University student will find himself studying abroad in Greeley, Colorado where he 
will see firsthand the victory celebrations, the reunions of homecoming soldiers and 
the excesses of victory, and will begin to formulate in his own mind a challenge to 
modernity and Enlightenment liberalism. Sayyid Qutb, as Mussolini did before him, 
will question how his once great civilization now lags behind a culture that centuries 
ago his civilization helped preserve and define. Qutb and his followers will construct 
their own vision of the past and will reach into their cultural narratives to articulate a 
challenge to modernity for the developing world and the symbolic figure who will 
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head the call of their belligerent fundamentalism is at once newly politicized and yet 
all too historically familiar—the martyr. 
The Spectacle of Martyrdom and Construction of the Fascist Myth 
Fascism and martyrdom are not static concepts and the narrative of 
martyrdom as well as its methods of dissemination evolves over the life of the 
movement. Borrowing the language of Renzo de Felice, we can conceptualize 
fascism in terms of “fascism as movement” and “fascism as regime.”203 There is a 
basic temporal aspect to each of these categories. Fascism as movement refers to the 
period when fascists attempt to build public support as an opposition party to their 
consolidation of power within government. Fascism as regime refers to the period 
after they have assumed power until the regime falls. Exploring the development of 
martyrdom and spectacle in terms of phases within the movement allows us to 
explore the evolution of martyrdom as a political concept and offers insight into the 
nature of these illiberal regimes both in and out of power.  
 In this section, I argue that both the Italian and German strategies behind 
martyrdom spectacles evolved from one of moral justification in the movement phase 
to a mechanism for mass mobilization and disciplining in the regime phase. To 
accomplish this I first; show how the concept of martyrdom evolved through the two 
phases of the German and Italian fascist parties; second, analyze the role martyrdom 
played in the phases of the movements; and third, describe the various forms of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
203 See Renzo de Felice’s Interpretations of Fascism. Cambridge: Harvard, 1977. Other scholars have 
used similar language to illustrate fascism’s two phases such as Emily Braun’s use construction of 
“first hour” and “second hour” fascism. See Braun, Expressionism as Fascist Aesthetic. Journal of 
Contemporary History 1996 31:273-292.  
94 
 
spectacle used to celebrate martyrdom and the role they were intended to serve for the 
party. This section is divided into the following parts: the first part looks at Italian and 
German uses of martyrdom within their movement phase. In this section I argue that 
martyrdom is largely about what I call blood martyrs, or actual deaths, and that the 
early accounts of martyrdom construct the foundation for the legitimacy claims that 
the parties make as they move to the next phase. The second section deals with 
spectacle and the narrative of martyrdom in the regime phase. In this section, through 
three different examples of martyrdom spectacles I argue that martyrdom in the 
movement phase is largely a narrative meant to connect the regime to the people 
through communal ritual. 
Fascism as Movement: On the Historical Significance of the Movements’ 
First Martyrs  
 
 “Upon this rock I will build my church…”204 
 
The Biblical account of the founding of the Catholic Church and the Christian faith 
rests on Peter, one of the Twelve Apostles, who would serve as head and spiritual 
advisor of the faith after Christ’s death. Peter would later die in Rome, and upon the 
literal foundation of his grave, the Holy See would rise and serve as a beacon to the 
faithful throughout the world. Mussolini would steal this page from history and build 
his vision of a faith—a religion of the state—on the same Roman soil that Peter once 
walked. This faith, however, would not be one concerned with Christian salvation but 
one where Mussolini would assume the role of Peter as head and spiritual advisor, 
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sending his armies of faithful to spread his perverse message of fascist superiority. 
The narrative of the March on Rome would serve as the rock on which Mussolini 
built his secular faith just as the failed Beer Hall Putsch would serve a similar role for 
Hitler’s Germany. Mussolini and Hitler will both argue that their rise to power would 
never have been possible if not sanctified by the blood of the movements’ earliest 
martyrs. The image of the martyr will play a pivotal role in the fascism as movement 
phase of the parties and will be used to create a notion of martyrdom that is one of 
supreme sacrifice reserved for an extraordinary few. 
  Avanti! Attack and the Italian March on Rome 
The movement phase of in the Italian case is roughly between 1919 with the 
formal establishment of the fascist party through 1928. Mussolini became Prime 
Minister in October 1922 but it was not until 1928 when the outlawing of all 
oppositional parties destroyed any remaining vestiges of parliamentarianism. During 
the early years of this phase, street violence between different partisan groups was 
rampant throughout Italy, especially in the more heavily industrialized north that had 
strong worker’s movements. Groups of fascist and socialist partisans, largely youth, 
would clash in the streets or attack each other’s various newspapers and printing 
presses. One such significant example was the death of two fascist youth killed while 
attacking the offices of a major socialist newspaper, Avanti!205  Ironically enough, 
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Mussolini had been editor of the newspaper in 1915 while he was still a socialist. The 
two fascist killed in the attack were memorialized in a 1922 speech in which he said:  
The two Fallen that we remember here and all the squads of the Milan Fascio 
assailed the Avanti! as they would assail an Austrian trench. They had to pass 
walls, cut barb wire, break doors down, face red-hot bullets that the assailed 
launched with their arms. This is heroism. This is violence. This is the 
violence of which I approve and which I exalt. This is Milan Fascism’s 
violence. And Italian Fascism—I speak to all Italian fascist—should adopt it. 
Not the little, individual, sporadic, often useless, but the great, beautiful, 
inexorable violence of decisive hours. …Our friends have been heroes! Their 
gesture has been warlike. Their violence has been saintly and moral. We exalt 
them.206 
 
This is one of Mussolini’s earliest speeches in which we can trace the beginnings of a 
fascist concept of martyrdom. The reference to the Austrian trench connects those of 
the 1919 attack with the Italian soldiers of the First World War which imparts and 
idea of national sacrifice while at the same time he describes their actions as 
“saintly,” “moral” and the two men people to be “exalted.” 
 Shortly after this speech, the most significant spectacle of the movement 
phase occurred, the March on Rome. The name might imply that a thunderous march 
to seize power actually did occur, but do despite the name; it was more a march that 
never was. Mussolini came to power in the most benign of ways, through the legal 
and constitutionally mandated mechanisms of being invited by King Victor 
Emmanuel III to form a government on October 29, 1922.  
The March did have a very real potential to become violent. Galvanized by 
Mussolini’s call recent calls to action, fascist partisans had coalesced around the city 
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of Perugia some hundred miles from Rome to begin the (likely) violent March against 
sitting Prime Minister Luigi Facta’s Liberal government.207 Facta served as Italian 
prime minister from February 1922 through July of the same year where he was 
removed from office for not effectively dealing with the rise of the fascists. With no 
other party successfully forming a governing coalition, he was reinstated Prime 
Minister by the King and was determined to deal effectively with the rising fascist 
threat.  
The growing tension that existed between the liberal, fascist and socialist 
camps made full-scale armed conflict between the parties appear inevitable. 
Mussolini tried to capitalize on the growing lack of legitimacy of the Facta 
government organizing a sizeable contingent of fascist partisans (Blackshirts as they 
were known208) to organize around the outskirts of Rome and lead by Mussolini they 
would march into Rome and violently overthrow the Facta regime if he refused to 
surrender power on his own.  
Surprisingly, in terms of the later narrative, Mussolini worked behind the 
scenes to prevent just such a violent confrontation. These backroom negotiations were 
likely because both he, and the Italian military generals, saw a potential fascist 
insurrection as one easily put down. On October 27, Facta declared martial law and 
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use, of violence.  
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ordered in the Italian military to prevent the seize on Rome, yet King Emmanuel 
refused to sign the order and the Facta government dissolved before the march had 
occurred. What was ultimately described as the March on Rome was little more than 
Mussolini and his partisans riding into the city on a train with an invitation from the 
king to form a new government.209  
 During fascism’s movement phase, the deaths of the two squadristi and their 
attack on the Avanti! press came to epitomize martyrdom for the movement. 
However, these were not the only deaths Mussolini described as martyrdom. In a 
speech delivered in Sardinia, Mussolini argued;  
Nobody can ever dream of wrenching from us the fruit of victory that we have 
paid by so much blood generously shed by youths who offered their lives in or 
to crush Italian Bolshevism. Thousands and Thousands of those who suffered 
martyrdom in the trenches, who have resumed their struggle after the war was 
over, who have won—all those have ploughed a furrow between the Italy of 
yesterday, of today and of tomorrow.210 
 
In this early phase, martyrdom served two key roles. The first is linking the post-war 
deaths of the fascists with all Italian deaths in World War I to connect the idea that 
the fascist struggle is really part of Italy’s struggles. And the second, to use these 
deaths, these acts of sacrifice, to justify the legitimacy of the Fascist’s claim to 
government—specifically for their defense of Italian nationalism against the 
socialists. In the Italian movement phase, martyrdom has a more practical function of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
209 Simonetta Falasca-Zamponi. Fascist Spectacle: The Aesthetics of Power in Mussolini’s Italy. 
Berkley: University of California Press, 1997, pp. 1-5. 
 
210 From a Speech entitled “Men Pass Away, Maybe Governments Too, But Italy Lives and Will Never 
Die,” delivered at Cagliari Sardinia on June 12, 1923. Benito Mussolini. Mussolini: As revealed in His 
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demonstrating supreme sacrifice, and a connection to the Italian past, in order to 
validate the legitimacy claims of party. 
  Blood Martyrs and The Beer Hall Putsch 
 The Nazis called their movement phase the Kampfzeit, which roughly 
translates to the “period of struggle” and lasted from 1919-1933. Inspired by 
Mussolini’s success in Italy, Hitler attempted something similar for Germany on 
November 9, 1923 known as the Beer Hall Putsch.211 Hitler galvanized the power of 
the Brownshirts to function as a paramilitary force by which to challenge the German 
army, the socialists and communists. The plan called for the takeover of Munich (and 
by default all of Bavaria) and using it as a launching point for a march on Berlin. 
Unlike his Italian counterpart, the Bavarian Prime Minister Eugene von Knilling, was 
able to successfully declare a state of emergency and appointed Gustav von Karr as 
Bavarian Commissioner (one of three leaders who now effectively served as a 
triumvirate running all of Bavaria). On November 8, 1923 while von Karr was giving 
a political speech at the Bürgerbräukeller, a Beer hall in Munich, Hitler and around 
six hundred Brownshirts stormed the hall declaring that the Nazi revolution had 
begun. The reaction to Hitler’s putsch was swift and decisive. Within two days he 
was arrested and charged with treason.212 Talking about the Putsch some years later 
Hitler claimed, “I was following Mussolini’s example too closely. I had meant the 
Munich Putsch to be the beginning of a ‘March on Berlin’ which would carry us 
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straight to power.”213 After his conviction, Hitler would spend eight months in prison 
constructing his own narrative surrounding the putsch and formulated his political 
ideology in what came to be known as Mein Kampf.  
Hitler argued in the succeeding years that despite the Putsch’s failure it was a 
necessary step in the eventual rise of the Nazis. Unlike Mussolini’s March, real blood 
spilt, and the sixteen Nazis who died in the attempt became the martyrs on whose 
blood Hitler will argue sanctified the movement. In 1924, during the closing 
statement of his trial, Hitler first tried to cast the failed Putsch as divinely inspired 
arguing:  
… from our bones, from our graves will sound the voice of that tribunal which 
alone has the right to sit in judgment upon us. …You may declare us guilty a 
thousand times, but the Goddess who presides over the Eternal Court of 
History will with a smile tear in pieces the charge of the Public Prosecutor and 
the judgment of the Court: for the declares us guiltless.214 
   
The emphasis on the divine nature of the act was further bolstered by Hitler’s 
determination to have his martyrs considered ‘Blood Witnesses.’ In the Nazi 
Heilgeseschichte literally translated as “Nazi salvation history,” a song was sung 
annually to remember the fallen and to connect their blood as possessing a 
redemptive quality for mankind. “We feel enriched / By the blood of those who fell / 
So that their banner pure and bright / Shall give us revelation of the Reich / (…) / 
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With your flame out life begins.215” In another poem to celebrate the Putsch martyrs, 
Boehme wrote: “The earth came to an end with your death, but your Glory our life 
began.”216 True to the concept of Heilgeseschichte, the first martyrs for Nazi 
Germany were seen as offering up their sacrificial blood so that the nation may be 
saved. This created something of a two tier notion of martyrdom in the Nazism as 
regime phase where later martyrs will still be important and revered but only the 
original sixteen opened the way for salvation and they will be held in higher 
regard.217 
The Spectacle of Martyrdom within the Fascism as Regime Phase 
The second phase of fascism is that of regime where the party has now 
solidified their control over the government and lasts until the regime falls. For the 
Italians this phase lasted from 1928-1943218 and for the Nazis it lasted from 1933-
1945. Now that the parties were actually in power and they had the entire apparatus of 
the state at their disposal the spectacle of martyrdom emerged as a powerful way to 
connect the party with the people. With the regime phase, fascist movements also 
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expanded the opportunity of martyrdom to the average person. Martyrdom was 
transformed from an act to a narrative. As a narrative, the martyrdom story I retold 
through celebratory rituals constructed to integrate the participant into the narrative 
itself.  
A simple example is Christian communion. The story is that of the Last 
Supper and the celebratory ritual is the taking of the literal (in the Catholic tradition) 
of the blood and body of Christ. In this way the Christian congregants are being 
indoctrinated into an ideological discourse (Christ died for you) and being invited to 
participate in the process to reaffirm the connection between the sacrifice, the Church 
(who administers the sacrifice) and the congregant. In a very similar way, the 
martyrdom spectacles present narratives designed to both tell the public a story and 
invite them to actively share in the sacrifice. The following are examples of three 
different spectacles and each serving to tell a slightly different martyrdom narrative.  
The first narrative of martyrdom connects the themes of physical 
transformation with extraordinary (supererogatory) sacrifice. These two themes fit 
into fascism’s tenet that violence would produce order and that out of that new order 
men would emerge who would now make sacrifices not out of egoistic interests but 
for the glory of the state. A common thread linking both the historic and 
contemporary examples of martyrdom within totalitarian movements is the evolution 
of martyrdom as a concept borrowed from local traditions but then re-imagined to 
take on characteristics that the totalitarian parties advanced as exemplary. These 
spectacles of martyrdom serve as grand displays to alter the physical makeup of the 
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world, institutionalize ritualized practices to allow opportunities of communal 
participation and as celebrations of individual sacrifice as witness to the greater good 
of the cause.. 
The second narrative is a theatrical performance called 18BL (which refers to 
the model number of the truck that is the main character of the play) and tells a story 
of a how a work truck who diligently performs his duty and works hard give becomes 
an eternal part of the nation itself. The production of 18BL was one of the most 
elaborate theatrical performances ever staged and was an attempt to create a fascist 
theater for the masses rooted in the operatic traditions of Italy’s past. Yet, unlike the 
emotional power of an opera, the production of 18BL was so vast and overwhelming 
that it was impossible to become absorbed in what appeared so distant and left the 
average observer with a sense of cold detachment. Nevertheless, 18BL did have one 
important legacy; it elevated the idea that a life in service to the state, doing one’s 
duty, connected the citizen directly to the greatness of the nation.  
 The third spectacle is that of the Mostra della Rivoluzione Fascista 
(Exhibition of the Fascist Revolution) which exemplifies the sacralization of the state 
and the elevation of the fascist martyr as its disciple. The exhibition came 10 years 
after the March on Rome and was designed to remind the people of the regime’s 
accomplishments. At the center of the exhibition was a sacrarium whose narrative 
story was one of awe and devotion both to the martyrs and to the successes of the 
state that their martyrdom afforded. The sacrarium borrowed heavily from Catholic 
imagery and architecture both in the content and style of its cathedral to the martyrs, 
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but instead of the named or photographed martyrs, the fascist martyrs in the sacrarium 
are faceless, nameless voices inviting all the visitors passing through to join them in 
their call of ‘presente’ with the regime.  
 The final spectacle is the dedication of the Temple of Honor to the Blood-
Witnesses (the sixteen Putsch martyrs) also known as the Resurrection of the Dead. 
The martyrdom narrative here was one of divine fulfillment of the promised salvation 
brought about by the sacrifice of the sixteen martyrs in 1923. One of the first acts 
Hitler did when he became Chancellor was to order the erection of a giant Temple of 
Honor to house the remains of the Putsch martyrs. The construction project took two 
years to complete and was finished in time for the 1935 remembrance. The center of 
this annual celebration was a reenacting of the failed coup with the blood stained 
Blutfahne (blood flag) at the head of the processional for everyone to see the blood 
and sacrifice of the martyrs.219 
Physical transformation and the Battle of the Swamps 
“What more energetic affirmation of the value of life than the voluntary sacrifice of 
the citizen who dies for his country. Fascism has reestablished a love of martyrdom 
for the ideal of our country.”220 
 
French fascist and Sorelian disciple Pierre Andreu in the journal Combat 
argued “violence calls for order like the sublime calls for beauty.”221 Mussolini 
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strived for both order and beauty in one of his government’s first major public works 
project known as the “Battle of the Swamps” or the Bonifica integrale. The Battle of 
the Swamps is arguably one of the few positive developments emerging for the fascist 
era. Prior to the 1928, the Pontine marshes just outside Rome had been a relatively 
poor performing agricultural area that was prone to constant flooding, poor crop 
yields, and more troublesome—malaria.  
The Romans were the first to try to drain the Pontine Marshes but lacked the 
technological resources to successfully reclaim the land. This became a recurrent 
theme throughout the middle ages and well into the Nineteenth century as subsequent 
governments sought to control the marshes as a physical representation of the 
greatness of their regime. Six years after Mussolini came to power he too tried to 
tackle the swamp and his plan called for one of the largest and most ambitious public 
works projects of the time.  
The fascist party faced significant challenges in 1928 on the domestic and 
foreign policy fronts. Six years in power had produced very few tangible economic or 
cultural successes for the fascists and the party that had assumed power on the pretext 
of the March on Rome seemed to have stopped marching once it got there. Economic 
recovery from the First World War was slow and the industrialization of the north had 
yet to trickle down to the southern part of Italy. The northern cities were 
overpopulated and rising unemployment made these centers for communist fervor. In 
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1926 Antonio Gramsci, the head of the Communist Party of Italy, was arrested and 
sentenced to 20 years in prison under emergency laws enacted after a failed 
assassination attempt on Mussolini.222 These laws had the affect of removing the last 
vestiges of parliamentary democracy and allowed a fascist dictatorship to be 
established.  
The regime, now without any real opposition, sought a way to integrate the 
masses into one party under the state. Arguably the most significant accomplishment 
for the fascists—the draining of the Pontine Swamp—creates a narrative arc that links 
directly to one of the largest spectacles of martyrdom even produced, the play entitled 
18BL. But, in order to fully explore the power of the play, the relevance of the 
Pontine Swamps must first be explored. Envisioning the Pontine Swamp as his way to 
create an everlasting monument to fascism that would physically transform the 
countryside, provide jobs for the unemployed, relieve the growing overpopulation in 
the north and accomplish a feat that even the great Roman Empire had failed to do, 
Mussolini established the Battle of the Swamps. In October of 1926 Mussolini 
declared, “It is our task to change beyond all recognition the physical and spiritual 
face of our country within the space of ten years.”223 The project was massive even by 
today’s standards. In 1930 when the reclamation actually began 41,500 workers were 
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employed and that number more than tripled by 1933 with 124,211 workers and took 
over eight years to complete.224  
The selection of the Pontine Marshes had a significant demonstrative aspect to 
it. By being in such close proximity to Rome, it was a concrete and visual indication 
to the entire national population. The urbanites from Rome could physically see the 
draining and construction underway, the rural peasants from the South were part of 
the army of workers, families in the north were being relocated into the former 
swamp land for resettlement and in case there were any Italians who were not aware 
of the project, newsreels, films and even plays were created to broadcast the spectacle 
to the nation. The two most important of these propaganda films were Camicia 
Nera225 (1933) and Dall’ acquitrino alle giornate di Littoria226 (1935). 
Camicia Nera was directed by Givacchino Fozano and is an allegory of the 
ideal worker and fascist. The story’s protagonist is a wounded (and this is key 
because much is made about his physical sacrifice in war and the physical 
transformation it leaves behind) World War I veteran who comes home from war 
only to find himself betrayed by the liberal government of Italy who failed to win 
anything out of her ‘mutilated victory.’ Disgusted by the decadence and individualism 
that he sees pervading Italian society he joins the fascist party and decides to help 
build a new Italy by joining the Bonifica integrale work force. After working to 
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reclaim the swamp he then moves his family to the new city of Littoria which he 
helped to build.227 The message here is anything but subtle, good fascists make 
physical sacrifices for their nation (wounded veteran) and it is those who sacrifice 
who can build the new nation and will reap the rewards of their contribution.  
The symbolic resonance of Littoria cannot be understated for fascist 
propaganda during this period. Littoria was a city literally forged from the marshes. 
Mussolini was not interested in just taming the swamps or controlling malaria, be also 
wanted to forge new cities for the nation that would be built from their very 
foundation on fascist principles, architecture and indeed by self-proclaimed fascists. 
These cities represented a complete break from the past and were grand spectacles to 
the power of the movement to forge something new and deliver to the people. Italy 
was a latecomer to the nation-state system and had missed the window for colonial 
expansion. Yet, the Italian people had the example of the Roman Empire and they too 
sought colonial conquests. With their perceived portrayal at Versailles still fresh in 
their minds, and the failures of the Liberal and Socialist parties to deliver external 
territorial expansion, the reclaiming of the Pontine Swamp offered a literal internal 
colonization. If Italy failed to conquer lands abroad, she could conquer them at home 
and colonize the new parts of Italy on the fascist model from the ground up. This 
principle was affirmed when Mussolini turned the former sparsely inhabited Pontine 
region into a full fledge Italian province.  
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The city of Littoria played a central role in fascist director Alessandro 
Blasetti’s Dall’ acquitrino alle giornate di Littoria. While the Black Shirts presented 
the story of the model fascist and notions of physical transformation and sacrifice, 
Blasetti’s story is one meant to highlight the wonders of the new fascist model for 
life. Gone in the new city plans were the giant cathedrals, bell towers and baptisteries. 
Instead, the center of each town was a large public square more akin to the ancient 
Rome than the medieval models and casting it’s shadow over each public square was 
the municipal office. Surrounding the town centers in neat and orderly grids were row 
after row of simple modern homes for former peasants to dwell surrounded by now 
arable land on which to grow crops and live a life of order.228 The center of the new 
fascist cities, as well as the center for the fascist themselves, would be the state.  
 Journalists at the time hailed Littoria and its surrounding cities a ‘fascist 
utopia.’  
In this kind of reporting, the biblical myth of Genesis was replaced by the 
journey to a Fascist paradise. Littoria was a new Eden…. The rapidity of the 
appearance of the new settlements in Italy struck every visitor as astonishing, 
but, as one commentator observed, Fascism had accustomed Italians to the 
experience of witnessing one miracle after another.229  
 
Indeed the Pontine marsh would be the scene for one of the grandest theatrical 
spectacles the fascists ever conducted and it’s call to martyrdom to the faceless 
masses will evolve from one of sacrifice in the physical transformation of Italy to a 
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supererogatory sacrifice for the state—and all of this emerges out of the story of a 
truck named 18 BL. 
Spectacle as Extraordinary Sacrifice through Theater and Film:  18 BL  
 
The spectacle of 18BL was the first attempt at creating a theater for the people 
in Italy and of bringing the narrative of martyrdom to the masses. 18 BL was one of 
the most expansive, expensive and over the top productions ever to have been staged. 
It was directed by director Alessandro Blasetti the director of Dall’ acquitrino alle 
giornate di Littoria. The play was the central event of the fascism’s youth Olympics 
for culture and theater (only in Italy would an entire Olympics be dedicated to culture 
and theater).  
The collaborative creation of seven young writers and a film director, 18 BL 
brought together two thousand actors, fifty trucks, eight bulldozers, four field 
and machine gun batteries, ten field radio stations, and six photoelectric 
brigades in a stylized Soviet-style representation of fascism’s past, present and 
future.230  
 
With a production of this magnitude, it should come as little surprise that the setting 
for the staging of this mass spectacle had to already embody a sense of sacrifice, 
accomplishment and modernity and Mussolini found just such a spot in the reclaimed 
fields of Pontine just outside its new capital the city of Littoria. 
18 BL was the model number of the story’s protagonist, a Fiat truck. While 
not human, it was in many ways the perfect archetype for the ideal fascist man—
modern, powerful, and most importantly, Italian. There is a tremendous significance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




in the hero being not a man, or even something identifiable with a name, rather they 
act as part of a greater whole. In being identified solely with a serial number, 18 BL 
would serve as the representation of the mass man who finds themselves not in their 
pursuit of individuality but through the glories and emotions of the community. In 
addition, there is perhaps one less obvious and perhaps more sinister reason for the 
hero to be a piece of machinery.231 Trucks are working tools, items to be used and 
driven in the pursuit of a greater good or end. They are note sentient beings and 
blindly follow the will of their master (a narrative aimed squarely at the fascist youth 
who, while they did not know it in 1934, would be fighting for Italy on the fields of 
World War II in just short years).  
The production was intended to be the first real mass theater that would 
connect the audience to the actors, the set and the story in such a way as to “achieve 
an actualized mystical experience closing the gap between representation and reality, 
art and life, actors and audiences.”232 To this end, the theater was a giant open air 
spectacle with 20,000 spectators spread throughout the marshes not facing a clearly 
defined stage but experiencing the action unfold at different vantage points to really 
allow the audience to be enveloped by the story and become one with the drama.233  
The play was conducted in three acts, each representing key aspects of the 
party’s history. Act I opened on the battlefields of World War I. The play is 
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contrived, ironically enough, in the Soviet vein of choppy sequences of event and 
bright flashes of light to portray to the spectators a sense of movement and progress. 
The scene is one of artillery fire all around and soldiers running around barbed wire 
fences storming up a hill. In the distance a caravan of 18 BL model trucks is bringing 
fresh soldiers to the front lines and by the end of the third scene the entire procession 
are climbing up three different hills where in the middle of which the Italian flag rises 
signaling her victorious conquest of the cities of Trento and Trieste.234  
Act II opens in the years immediately after World War I with the audience 
being blanketed by red fireworks overhead to represent the rise of socialism and labor 
disputes in Italy following the war. At the center of the display is no longer the Italian 
flag but instead a large table filled with fat, lazy men, hoarding money and arguing 
furiously with one another. The sign on the table reads “parliament.” One of the men 
at the table gets up to make a speech and representing Prime Minster Facta who lost 
power to Mussolini in 1922 uttered Facta’s words: “But what do these fascists want?” 
Just at that moment one of the 18 BL’s barrels down from the hillside and smashes 
the table marked parliament and a civil war ensues between the socialists and the 
fascists on stage. Scene three opens with a factory on fire and one of the trucks 
charging ahead to help fight the socialists alongside 300 fascists. By the time the 18 
BL arrives the fighting is over, and while victorious, the fascist casualties are so 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




numerous that the truck is now used for a funeral procession to transport the dead. As 
the ascend the hill top again, 
From out of the light, a ‘metallic and clear voice’ (Mussolini’s) interrupts the 
funeral silence and, calling out: “Heroes of the war and martyrs of the 
revolution.”  “Presente,” they answer. “To whom does Italy belong, to whom 
Rome?” “To us,” they answer. But the chorus of voices is no longer isolated. 
Black shirts shout out “to us” from all sides of the auditorium and stage. Led 
by a truck convoy, they parade out across the landscape and converge over the 
horizon line, where their silhouettes vanish into the light. Act 2 has ended; the 
March on Rome has begun.235 
 
This revision of the actual history of the March on Rome aside, the symbolic 
resonance of Act II is clear, even if you were not part of the March on Rome and the 
founding of the fascist revolution you can experience its sense of glory and 
collectively connect to a mythic past. This is the turning point in the spectacle 
narrative in which the audience is not merely invited to join the procession but they 
are literally enveloped by the actors all around them and thus the production itself 
sweeps the audience into the play and connects them with the story. The transition to 
spectacles for mass mobilization for the regime phase is embodied in the play; all that 
is lacking now is a martyr. 
 The play’s final act returns to the scene of its production, the Pontine swamp. 
In this scene ten years have passed since the March on Rome and there are numerous 
allusions to fascism’s progress (school children singing the party’s praises, order in 
the streets, etc.) but most importantly the commander overseeing the land reclamation 
process indicates that the road to the Fascist Italy’s new town Litorria would be built 
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in three days. With these words, he then orders the clearing of the land and the 
carving of the roads. Off to the side of the performance area the old 18 BL that has 
now served through World War I, the March on Rome and now the reclamation 
process dutifully begins to carry its load when the engine suddenly dies in the middle 
of the stage. After frantic attempts to revive it,  18BL is a martyr to the cause and it is 
decided that she will be pushed into the open pit the road will ride over and will 
continue to serve the Italian state even in her grave. As the play is ending 18 BL’s 
driver says to the crowd: “She has fought the war, the revolution and the battle for 
land reclamation. Now she will support the highway to Littoria.  … In three days she 
will return to her duties anew, my old lady. Forever!”236 
 The less than subtle reference in these final lines aimed directly at the legacy 
of Catholic culture within Italy. 18 BL is ultimately a martyrdom narrative about the 
salvation of the mass man through his willingness to do his duty. Just as Christ rose 
three days after his great sacrifice and martyrdom, 18 BL would rise exactly three 
days too.  As Christ’s resurrection would allow him to spend an eternity in heaven 
(except for that brief moment known as the second coming, but that’s always been a 
bit more of a protestant doctrine), 18 BL will spend her eternity in a similar heaven—
not the Garden of Eden, but a fascist utopia in the former Pontine Swamps here on 
earth.  
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Spectacle through the Creation of the Ideal Man and the Sacralization of 
the State: Mostra della Rivoluzione Fascista and the Temple of Honor and 
the Resurrection of the Dead 
 
On October 29, 1932, the tenth anniversary of the Fascist Party’s March on 
Rome, Mussolini marked the occasion with the opening of the elaborate Mostra della 
Rivoluzione Fascista. The Exhibition of the Fascist Revolution was billed as an 
opportunity to showcase to the world a burgeoning fascist generation and to create a 
national shrine, linked to the glories of Imperial Rome and Catholic Church yet a 
distinct political and social identity in its own right. By 1932, there was a significant 
debate within Italy and the party as to what fascist ‘culture’ was, and if it even had 
one. Plays like 18 BL and propaganda films like Camicia Nera were designed to 
develop and display a fascist culture, one that would actually be a third way between 
liberalism and communism. The religious aspect of culture, particularly in the Italian 
context, was a more difficult task for Mussolini to handle. In 1929, he had signed the 
Lateran Accords which gave sovereign power to the Holy See and gave the Pope 
Vatican City and nullifying any residual claim to Rome the Pope may still have had. 
Now Mussolini sought something more, as a totalizing ideology, fascism had little 
room for a religion outside of the state. From this foundation Mussolini would 
absorbs smatterings of Catholic ritual, architecture and symbolism in attempt to create 
a sacralization of politics with a congregation of the masses and a long list of 
martyred saints. 
Mussolini, never known for his subtlety, borrowed heavily from Catholic 
imagery as he stood before the crowd on that October morning flanked by twelve 
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young fascist disciples each singing stanzas of “Giovanezza” (Italian for youth), the 
official song of the Fascist Party. The palace itself was redesigned for the exhibition 
to embody a cathedral with a floor plan carefully constructed to lead visitors through 
a nave (depicting the history of the movement), a crossing (housing relics of fascist 
martyrs) and the climax of the tour—an altar named the Sacrarium of the Martyrs.  
The overall ritual structure closely paralleled the organization of a Mass, with 
an introitus (the hymn sung at the opening ceremony), a credo (the reciting of 
the creed), followed by the symbolic re-enactment of the Passion, which 
sometimes took the form of a procession, and the communion or concluding 
sacrificial rite.237 
 
Upon entering the Sacrarium visitors would be struck by a bath of red light to 
symbolize the blood of the fallen. The large cylindrical room (standing in stark 
contrast to the rectangular rooms throughout the exhibition) was constructed of six 
prominent metal rings running horizontally around the perimeter, each repeatedly 
inscribed with the word “Presente!”  (a fascist phrase that play a similarly important 
role in 18 BL to make the sacrificial martyrdom one in which they can connect to)  
while in the walls recorded voices in every direction repeat the phrase again, 
“Presente!” At the center of the room stands an enormous metal cross with the words 
“For the Fatherland” while surrounding the exterior were pennants displaying squads 
of fascists both marching to victory and in the heat of battle.238 
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The intricate detail of the staging of the Sacrarium (even in choosing to use 
this Latin term) was intended to connect fascism within Italy’s long political and 
cultural legacy. The six circular columns hark back to the Roman Coliseum which 
itself had a large cross at its center to pay homage to the Christian martyrs who died 
there.239 The pennants on the wall are metaphors for the Station of the Cross. The 
circular design of the room gives the visitor the feeling that the fascist revolution has 
no beginning or end but is a constant presence, and the disembodied voices ringing in 
all directions is a reminder that everyone, the faceless masses, are all part of the 
revolution and the revolution is a part of everyone. The martyrdom narrative was one 
of devotion and adoration for faceless, nameless martyred saints allowing the 
individual spectator to wander the halls and contemplate the sacrifices made on their 
behalf.  
The Temple of Honor and the Resurrection of the Dead 
 
The Resurrection of the Dead ceremony was the first major martyrdom 
spectacle for the Nazi party and it would establish themes of salvation, divine calling 
and sacrificial blood that Hitler returned to time and again throughout his 
Chancellorship.  The spectacle itself had three parts: something of a Passion play 
style reenactment of the failed Putsch replete with the blood flag, the internment of 
the Putsch martyrs into the Temple of Honor and the national celebrations and 
parades throughout the rest of the country. The martyrdom narrative also had three 
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purposes: to affirm the necessity of the martyr’s sacrifice, to demonstrate to the 
people that the Third Reich is the fulfillment of that sacrifice, and to bestow salvation 
to the German people through the sacrifice of the dead and the rule of the party.  
Hitler had two years earlier began celebrating the November 9 anniversary of 
the Putsch by starting to espouse his reading of almost Hegelian notion of the 
movement of history in what he labeled the “Holy History.” Germany under the Nazi 
party was the end of this holy history, which consisted of the 1923 Putsch deaths as 
the necessary sacrificial blood, and the 1933 assumption of power as the divine 
manifestation of this historic inevitability.240 He laid the groundwork for this idea in a 
1933 commemorative speech in which he said: 
In very truth , the cerecloths of these sixteen dead have celebrated a 
resurrection which is unique in the history of the world. …[F]rom their 
sacrifice arose this mighty unity in Germany, this victory of a Movement, of 
an idea, and to this the whole people is pledged. … For if at that time I had 
found no one to step forward to champion the cause of the Reich at the cost of 
their bodies and their lives, then in after years, too, this would have become 
impossible. For all those who later sacrificed their blood were inspired by the 
sacrifice of these first men.241 
 
Here for one of the first times Hitler connects their sacrifice as essential to the 
movement’s electoral success.  
 Hitler made the Resurrection of the Dead celebration a dramatically elaborate 
event. The day began with the introduction of the Blood Flag—the actual flag that the 
martyrs marched with during the Putsch. The flag itself was stained with the blood of 
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the dead and the Nazis revered it was such tenacity that Hitler would touch the Blood 
Flag next to new flags at large ceremonies so that the blood would in essence pass 
through and each person who owned the new flag would be connected to the original 
martyrs.242 With the flag at the head of the processional, the marchers in Munich 
would assemble at the beer hall and the march to the ground where Hitler and the 
martyrs were fired upon. After this remembrance of their death, a celebration of their 
resurrection occurred at the Temple of Honor where all sixteen martyrs were laid to 
rest.243  
 The Temple of Honor was a large square open roofed structure that allowed 
light to shine through and had twenty large columns (sixteen—one for each martyr—
and four supporting columns), four flames (one in each corner) and two permanent 
guards. The Temple was filled with Hitler Youth and as part of the ritual all sixteen 
names were read aloud with the Hitler Youth responding “here!” to each name in 
order to symbolize the resurrection of the dead. Afterwards sixteen cannon shots were 
fired and speeches, songs and celebrations for their bestowed salvation occurred 
through Germany.244 In his speech before the crowd at the Temple Hitler said:  
These sixteen men, who twelve years ago gave their lives as a sacrifice for 
their people and their Fuehrer, are today raised from the grave. Who does not 
feel the truth of this resurrection? Who does not see the glint of their eyes in 
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the newly-raised Wehrmacht? And the Reich, which is itself upon this 
consecrated ground, is it not their kingdom? The kingdom of their ‘will’ and 
victory?245 
 
Hitler left little room for subtle interpretations of the meaning behind this spectacle of 
martyrdom, but that is the point. In the regime phase of the movement the martyrdom 
narrative speaks to the entire population and begins the process of connecting the 
individual into the fascist ideology of the state.  
Summary Remarks 
 
This chapter explored the development of martyrdom spectacles among fascist 
movements in the interwar period. In arguing that the use of spectacle changes 
depending on whether the movements were in power or vying for it, I demonstrated 
the essentially political nature that such spectacles play in building popular support. 
The next chapter expands this argument and applies it to contemporary belligerent 
fundamentalist movements today, arguing that rather than seeing any significant 
evolution in martyrdom spectacles over time, today’s groups still rely on the same 
basic narratives of sacrifice for the community and a demonstration of political will 
as is seen in the fascist model. 
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Chapter Three: The Resurgence of Fascism-like Movements: 
Martyrdom in the Contemporary World 
 
The following chapter explores the use of martyrdom spectacles among 
contemporary cases of belligerent fundamentalism—specifically, Hamas and Iran. 
Building from the previous chapter, I argue that the use of spectacle fulfills similar 
political aims as it did historically. Hamas, for example, organized itself in direct 
response to a more secular version of Palestinian nationalism. In order to create a 
movement that would be fundamentally Islamic, they borrowed conceptions of 
martyrdom and social obligation to create a militarized religious nationalism that 
could directly challenge both Fatah and the Israelis. The integration of martyrdom 
spectacles served as a mechanism for demonstrating just how different Hamas was 
from its competition and to demonstrate the degree of devotion its members had to 
the cause of Palestinian liberation. Yet, just like those before them, spectacles based 
on symbolic martyrdom replaced those based on physical martyrs.    
Introduction: The Cases of Iran and Hamas 
On October 23, 1983 a suicide bomber driving a truck laden with explosives 
attacked French and American Marines based in Beirut as part of an international 
peacekeeping force (the Multinational Force in Lebanon). The bombings introduced 
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the American public to both radical Islam (Islamic Jihad laid claim to the acts) and a 
new form of combatant, the suicide martyr. The phenomenon of the suicide martyr is 
an important piece, but only one piece, of an overall story of the secularization246 of 
martyrdom that began with the rise of fascist movements in the 1920’s and has 
continued since as a means for penetrating into the private sphere and creating a new 
image of citizen that ignores the public/private distinction. But are contemporary 
martyrdom movements significantly different than their historical counterparts? And 
do new mechanisms of dissemination allow for a society seemingly saturated by 
martyrdom myths to actually increase the incidents of blood martyrs and 
transformational martyrdom from an aspirational act into a defining element of the 
new body politic? 
This chapter explores the political and economic conditions that allow for the 
resurgence of martyrdom in the contemporary world specifically in the case of Hamas 
and how the use of martyrdom and spectacle have evolved to address the same the 
sorts of legitimacy claims that were faced by earlier historical movements. The 
Iranian Case introduces the contemporary emergence of modern fundamentalist 
movements and the manifestations of martyrdom they use. While the Shah promoted 
rapid modernization and embraced Western cultural and economic norms, Iranian 
Islamists viewed the Shah as little more than a Western puppet regime and looked at 
the decline of the Islamic world vis-à-vis the West trying to understand how the once 
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mighty Persian and Islamic empires could fall so far behind them. Their answer was 
not in the poor adoption of Western models but in the decay of Iranian culture itself, 
which had become decadent and economically divided between the haves and the 
have-nots. The Islamists argue that if Iranian society would return to Islam then it 
would be able to restore itself to its rightful prominence in the world.  
Their advocated return to Islam is one that embraces all the technological and 
military advancements of the West but rejects the notions of individualism, political 
liberalism and the secular state. The movement originally looked to the martyrdom of 
Husayn Ibn Ali, the grandson of Mohammed, and who Shiite Muslims believe is the 
true heir to Islam. His death began the ascendancy of Sunni Islam and the corruption 
of the faith. For Iranian fundamentalist, this marked the turning point in Islam, and 
for them to regain the level of dominance they had historically, they must return to 
the purity of the early faith. This narrative of martyrdom is exacerbated by the 
invasion of Iran by Sunni led Iraq that forced Iranian leaders to create one of the 
bloodiest spectacles of martyrdom. The Basij, a youth comprised martyrdom force, 
walked the front lines detonating landmines with their own footsteps so the Iranian 
military could counter-attack. The Iranian regime conceptually linked the Basij 
directly to the martyrdom of Hussein Ibn Ali by arguing that they too were defending 
the true faith against imposters.  
An important legacy of the Iran-Iraq War was that it solidified the Iranian 
public around the theocracy and as they entered the regime phase the call to 
martyrdom is again transformed into a communal celebration of sacrifice rather than 
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for individual blood martyrs. In a manner similar to Italy, numerous Museums of the 
Martyrs were built around Iran containing fountains with water died red to symbolize 
the martyr’s blood.247 The political leaders continue to use the rhetoric of martyrdom 
but generally did so in a rhetorical way (there are some exceptions when martyrs are 
urged to join international conflict but again this is largely rhetorical). The significant 
differences in the contemporary cases from their historical counterparts is the degree 
of commercialization around martyrdom and the near total saturation of the 
martyrdom myth that permeates in the modern age. In Iran, young entrepreneurs sell 
t-shirts with their favorite martyrs above headings that read “my hero” and in Gaza 
and the West Bank Palestinians children buy and trade martyrdom cards with the 
picture, statistics and death stories of various martyrs along with calendars and DVDs 
showing their last will and testament.248  
The second case in this chapter is that of the Palestinian Hamas. The 
Palestinians are living under an Israeli occupation stemming from 1967 onward (and 
before them the Jordanians, British, Ottomans, etc.). Their sense of national 
humiliation is rooted in a unique blend of occupation by their Israeli neighbors, poor 
treatment by their Arab neighbors, extreme economic hardship in Gaza and a legacy 
of corrupt leadership within Fatah and the PLO. Hamas has been able to capitalize on 
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these frustrations by providing social services or arm supplies (often funded by Iran), 
businesses, education and civic facilities when the Palestinian and Israeli 
governments have been either unwilling or unable to provide them. By developing a 
reputation of honesty and delivering basic goods and services, Hamas has been able 
to challenge the dominance of its chief political rival, Fatah.  
Hamas’ relationship with martyrdom runs deep in its history. As an offshoot 
of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas has largely been concerned with the 
corrupting influence of the West and on the continued occupation. After the failures 
of the First Palestinian Intifada and given the extreme asymmetrical power 
relationship with Israel, Hamas turned to suicide martyrdom tactics against Israeli 
citizens and children. Much like in the Iranian case, these acts of martyrdom were 
self-inflicted (and for Hamas they were also homicidal) and they were portrayed as 
extraordinary acts of sacrifice for the nation and the faith.  
All of the world’s major religions, Islam included, places a premium on the 
preservation of life, so Hamas had to very early on create a language around suicide 
martyrs (bombers) that would frame their acts to fit under the rubric of martyrdom. 
More importantly, they had to rush to create parades, memorials, and celebrations that 
would build public support for their bombings and not have them conceptualized as 
murder. For Hamas, the most important role of martyrdom spectacles was to justify 
the validity of the act rather than connecting it to a historical example. 
Hamas is currently in the regime stage ever since its 2006 electoral victory in 
the Palestinian Legislative Council elections and its assumption of power within 
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Gaza. Ironically enough, even though the Palestinians still lack a sovereign state or 
even a unified occupation territory, Hamas has fit the same general pattern in the use 
of martyrdom that is present in the other cases. The assumption of power deterred 
Hamas’ use of martyrdom operations and they have not engaged in such a campaign 
since gaining power in 2006. They have hinted and even threatened on occasion to 
resume suicide operations against Israel and even Fatah in the West Bank but this has 
been little more than political posturing. What has happened however is that the 
narrative and rhetoric surrounding martyrdom in the Hamas case now permeates at 
almost all levels in Gaza. The local newspapers and Internet sites run stories of that 
day’s martyr. Rap songs describing how to make a dirty bomb play on the radio and 
even popular children shows are filled with Mickey Mouse characters who self-
martyr for Palestine. This is really the commercialization of martyrdom at its most 
extreme going beyond the selling of t-shirts or trading of martyrdom cards and 
bordering on the very sort of Western influence and decadence the movement in the 
beginning tried so desperately to destroy. 
Suicidal Martyrdom and Islamists Movements: A Discussion on Terms 
 
The distinction between a Muslim and an Islamists is that “Islamists seek not merely 
stricter religious observance or a change in political leadership but a revolutionary 
transformation of their societies.”249 Islamists movements have sprung up across the 
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Middle East and with few exceptions they have been unable to successfully assume 
state power.  
In her piece, Islamism, Revolution and Civil Society, Sheri Berman focuses on 
the case of Egypt250 to explore the role of Islamism within Arab countries more 
generally.251 Berman argues that such revolutions are essentially political standoffs 
with the Islamists unable to defeat the political power of the state and the state unable 
to control or define civil society.252 Unlike the revolution from above thesis,253 
Islamist revolutions adopt a bottom-up civil society strategy that first instantiates 
itself among the population, relying on existing religious institutions and networks 
(mosques, religious schools, social networks and the legitimacy of religious leaders).  
Using these preexisting platforms, Islamists move into the political, social and 
economic arenas left behind by a retreating or ineffective state and integrate 
themselves into the lives of the average citizen, especially the poor who are most 
dependent on state resources. By providing these resources, the Islamists have been 
able to foster subtle but important behavioral changes. For example, in the Egyptian 
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case, they provide minibuses to transport female students from home to their 
universities. As the service increased in popularity and demand, they began only 
transporting women who wore the veil, thus they were able to change the behavior of 
female students by providing a desirable service in exchange.254 
An additionally important tool within Islamist rhetoric are martyrdom   myths 
which are “a myth not because [they are] fiction or never occurred, but rather in the 
analytic sense of a heuristic device.”255 These myths are framing devices aimed 
directly at mass mobilization by creating a context through which the larger world 
can be defined. The world that emerges out of these myths is one where those who 
live in the darkness have robbed the people of their true destiny and greatness. 
Islamists argue that through martyrdom they can regain the strength and promise that 
they should possess and that martyrdom can become the means by which this celestial 
imbalance can be set right. Certain conditions, however, must be met for martyrdom 
to have any societal resonance: there must be a historic or religious connection with 
the concept of martyrdom (cultural);256 a profound sense of national defeat or 
vulnerability (asymmetric military position vis-à-vis perceived enemies); and a lack 
of faith in the prevailing political institutions (crisis of legitimacy). In other words, 
martyrdom myths are not an exportable practice without preexisting conditions that 
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make a population more willing to accept it as a practice in the first place. Absent 
these conditions, one would expect to see a decline in the willingness—or outright 
rejection—of the general population to accept martyrdom operations.257  
The role of the martyrdom myth is thus threefold: it serves as a means of 
framing the current order and providing a means of countering it, challenges the 
efficacy of the oppressive state, and provides a means for mass mobilization by 
linking the average citizen to the martyr’s sacrifice (as part of the collective 
population) or more directly through a personal relationship with the martyr or their 
family. Shrouded in religious dogma the martyrdom act obtains a reverential quality 
while simultaneously challenging the inadequacy of the governing institutions to 
strike out against perceived enemies. Even the parades, posters, trading cards, and 
religious celebrations reaffirm the idea that these martyrs really come from the people 
and are a powerful image of the community’s latent strength. 
Martyrdom Spectacles in Iran 
  
The Foundation: Karbala 
 
Like the fascists before them, contemporary Shiite based Islamist movements 
root their narratives of martyrdom in a historical example (the Battle of Karbala 680 
A.D.) that they claim models the characteristics of the “ideal” martyr while at the 
same time providing political justification for their suicide martyrdom operations. 
The tradition of martyrdom within Iran has pre-Islamic roots that directly influence 
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contemporary conceptions of martyrdom and the Battle of Karbala. The first 
influence was that of the Persian prophet Mani (from whose beliefs sprouted the 
Manichaeism) who argued that the way to achieve spiritual purification was through 
an ascetic life and sacrifice. The second major contributor was a political culture of 
tragedy within Iran.258  
A culture whose art, literature, and popular myth are deeply imbued with 
tragedy, perceives martyrdom as dramatic expression of tragedy. In such a 
social context, martyrdom is not an aberration but the manifestation of a 
culture of tragedy personified.259 
  
The legacy of this combination of a celebration of an aesthetic life coupled with a 
culture of tragedy provided the context to read the Battle of Karbala and the death of 
Hussein ibn Ali as the symbolic bridge between pre-Islamic and Islamic 
manifestations of martyrdom. 
After the death of Mohammed in 632 A.D., there was a line of four successors 
each of which were part of Mohammed’s inner circle. These first four Caliphs were 
known by Sunni Muslims as the Rashedin (or righteous) caliphs. However, with the 
assassination of Mohammed’s son-in-law, Ali ibn Abu Talib (656 A.D.-661 A.D.), a 
struggle for who would rule the Islamic world ensued.260 With Ali’s death came the 
leadership division between Sunni and Shiite Islam with each sect claiming their own 
Caliph.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
258 Manochehr Dorraj, “Symbolic and Utilitarian Political Value of a Tradition: Martyrdom in the 








Sunnis supported Caliph Yazid while the Shiite faction believed that Ali’s 
son, and Mohammed’s grandson, Hussein ibn Ali was the rightful heir to the Muslim 
world. The power struggle between them was short lived as Yazid’s forces vastly 
outnumbered Hussein’s. In 680 A.D. the final battle between the two sides occurred 
at Karbala where Hussein and his followers were cut off by Yazid’s army and 
massacred.261  The defeat was brutal with the victors decapitating Hussein, murdering 
most of his family, and taking his severed head back to Yazid as a trophy.262 The 
massacre is the first story of martyrdom for Shiite Muslims and will become the 
rallying point for contemporary Shiite movements as they reference back to the 
shadows of Karbala as the first blood spilt in the effort to restore the “true” leadership 
of the faith to the world. The echoes of Karbala will serve for Shiite fundamentalists 
the same rallying call that the Avanti! deaths and the Beer Hall Putsch served for 
Fascists. 
The following section explores the use of martyrdom spectacles within the 
movement and regime phases of the Iranian Revolution. Recalling from the previous 
chapter, the movement phase refers to the period when fundamentalists attempt to 
build public support as an opposition party to their consolidation of power within 
government. The regime phase refers to the period after the groups have assumed 
power until the regime falls. Exploring the development of martyrdom and spectacle 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
261 Andrew Silke, “The Role of Suicide in Politics, Conflict, and Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political 
Violence 18, no. 1 (March 2006): 41. 
 
262 Syed Akbar Hyder, Reliving Karbala: Martyrdom in South Asian Memory (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006). 
132 
 
in terms of phases within the movement allows us to explore the evolution of 
martyrdom as a political concept and offers insight into the nature of these illiberal 
regimes both in and out of power.  
The First Iranian Blood Martyrs: the Black Friday Massacres 
 
The legacy of Karbala runs deep in the imagery of the first martyrs adopted by 
both the Iranian Revolution and the Hamas. In both instances the groups will argue 
that the martyrs share with ibn Ali the same sort of ferocious dedication to a just 
cause; and as he did that they stood their ground in the face of overwhelming forces. 
For Iran, the foundational martyr spectacles are the Black Friday Massacres that 
contrasts the spirit of the revolution with the oppression of the Shah and the Basij, 
which demonstrates the resolve of the youth to defend the fledgling revolution against 
the Iraqi invasion. Hamas, on the other hand, appropriated the death of Sheik 
Muhammad Izz al-Din al-Qassam in 1935—some fifty years before the group was 
even founded—to connect themselves to a decades old struggle for Palestinian 
liberation against first the British and then later the Israelis. 
The Black Friday Massacre 
	  
As early as 1963, the leader of the Iranian Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, 
had already started laying the foundation for martyrdom within the revolution by 
comparing the Shah of Iran to the Yazid Caliphate and the oppression of the Iranian 
people to that of al Hussein.263 On September 8, 1978, thousands of Iranians filled 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Jeleh Square in Tehran to protest against the Shah’s regime and they would become 
the martyrs that Khomeini alluded to fifteen years earlier. The protestors were met by 
the Shah’s military forces and ordered to disperse. When the crowds refused, the 
military opened fire and at least 88 civilians264 were killed.265   
The Black Friday massacre marked a turning point for the protests in that it 
showed that a peaceful resolution with the regime was not possible while at the same 
time providing a stimulus for mass general strikes to cripple what was left of the 
Shah’s regime. Khomeini used the massacre as a way to sanctify the revolution by 
arguing that “Our movement is but a fragile plant. It needs the blood of martyrs to 
help it grow into a towering tree.”266 He further argued that the Black Friday 
massacre was the “victory of blood over the sword.”267 
Black Friday in Context 
	  
 The relevance of the Black Friday Massacre is perhaps best understood by 
considering the historic relationship between Western nations and the overthrow of 
Iran’s democratically elected government. The roots of the Iranian revolution can be 
traced back at least to the ouster of Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh by 
American forces in what was known as “Operation Ajax.” Mossadegh embodied a 
stringently anti-colonial, anti-Western political rhetoric and went so far as to 
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nationalize the oil fields of Iran then under the control of the British corporations. 
This image of nationalism and of standing up to colonial powers was seen as a 
significant threat to the Western world and British and US forces (specifically the 
MI6 and the CIA) staged a coup against the Mossadegh regime, removing him from 
power and installing a pro-Western Prime Minister in his place.268  
 Operation Ajax’s long-term legacy was to portray, however accurately, the 
degree to which the Shah responded to Western influences for twenty-six years, 
rather than the national sentiments of the Iranian people. This would be the 
foundation upon which Khomeini justified the Islamic revolution (1979)—the 
revolution would present a nationalist, socialist, Islamic model standing in direct 
contradiction to the Western, secular capitalism that dominated the Shah’s regime. 
The Shah’s military response to Iranian protestors on Black Friday only served as a 
reminder of how much power Western powers still wielded over the regime and 
became the turning point for the revolution. 
The Basij  
	  
 By February 1979 the Shah had fled Iran and Khomeini returned from exile in 
Paris. In the early days of the revolution dissatisfaction with the Islamic regime was 
starting to grow as secular Muslims and communists who had joined Khomeini were 
disenchanted with the direction in which the regime was moving. Saddam Hussein, 
who was just elected President of Iraq in July of 1979, saw the Islamic regime as a 
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direct challenge to the Pan-Arabism of the Baathist party. Hussein believed that he 
could capitalize on fledgling nature of the Iranian regime and quickly capture the oil 
rich fields in western Iran. However, rather than a quick victory, the conflict escalated 
into a nearly eight year was of attrition.269 
 The Iraqi army was significantly more advanced and better trained than their 
more numerous Iranian counterparts. But what the Iranians lacked in armaments they 
tried to compensate for in terms of raw manpower. The Basij (meaning 
“mobilization”) is a paramilitary organization created by Khomeini in November 
1979 with a threefold mission of: one, providing an outlet for working class youth to 
join in the revolution; two, securing the revolution’s success domestically by literally 
fighting off opposition groups and taking to the streets in protest; and three, defending 
the revolution international against Western (read Iraqi) forces.270  
 The Basij served an important role on the battlefield serving as an 
expeditionary force for the trained Iranian soldiers who were too valuable to risk 
losing. Recruits for the Basij were divided into groups based on age (14-30) and 
based on what Farhad Khosrokhavar calls “martyropathy.” Martyropathy is a state of 
mind in which the individual sees martyrdom as something desirable that should be 
actively pursued to achieve the dignity and legitimacy that they lack in society.271 In 
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the case of the Basij, the youth groups were sent to the front lines with metal keys 
(and later in the war once metal was scarce, plastic keys from China) around their 
necks that were intended to remind the young person that as a martyr they possessed 
the keys to heaven. The Basij role in the conflict was what became known as “human 
demining” in that they literally walked in front of the Iranian army clearing a path for 
them by physically detonating mines with their own bodies.272 As the war raged on it 
became increasingly difficult to find recruits who possessed a high acceptance of 
martyropathy and the Iranians had to shift their tactics from relying on a desire for 
martyrdom to promising social and economic mobility for any Basij who survived the 
front lines273 while developing a narrative of the Basij that showed them as heroic 
figures willing to embrace martyrdom in the name of the revolution. 
 The Basij were seen as so important, especially in terms of their efforts on the 
front lines in the Iran-Iraq War that two major institutions were develop to oversee 
them. The first is the Pasdaran or the Revolutionary Guard, which was commissioned 
with the job of transforming the Basij into a military worthy fighting force for their 
life and service here on earth. In other words, dealing with the logistical issues of 
organization, war, etc. for those in the present lie. The second body is known as the 
Shahid foundation that is responsible for “providing support and compensation for the 
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Shahid families and managing the affairs of the veterans of the war, now called 
Janbaz, sacrifices to the revolution;”274 thus looking out for those in the afterlife. As 
an effort to symbolize the potential reward for a Basij sacrifice, “these boy soldiers 
would walk through mine fields with a symbolic key around their necks. The key was 
for opening Heaven’s gate, an entry promised to them should they die as martyrs.”275  
The Basij in Context and the legacy of Behesht-e Zahra and the Central 
Martyr’s Museum in Tehran 
 
 The end of the Iran-Iraq War dramatically limited the need for the Basij as a 
relevant fighting force in Iranian society. That was, however, until Iran’s contested 
Presidential election in the summer of 2009. The street demonstrations throughout 
Tehran elevated the role of the Basij again as they were sent into the streets to disrupt 
the protests. Their role is becoming increasingly greater as calls for democratic 
change have spread through the Arab world after the fall of the Tunisian government 
to protestors. The Basij are generally not in uniform and mingle with the protestors 
only to commit acts of violence to break the protests up.276 
 Iran’s involvement in the Iran-Iraq War, rather than leading to a quick 
collapse as Hussein had imaged, actually solidified national sentiment around the 
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leadership and secured the transition from the movement phase to the regime phase of 
the Islamic republic. Today, the government’s focus on martyrdom transitioned to 
transformational symbolic uses in a way parallel to that of Italy and Germany before 
it. The spectacle of martyrdom now surrounds the major memorial sites like the 
Behesht-e Zahra277 and the Central Martyr’s Museum in Tehran. 
 The cemetery is the largest in Tehran and is the burial site of those who died 
in the Black Friday massacre. Tying into the symbolism of martyrdom for the regime, 
one of the significant acts of Khomeini when he returned from exile in Paris was to 
give his first speech to thousands of spectators at the graves of the Black Friday 
martyrs.278 During the war, he then transformed the cemetery into a memorial for 
martyrs constructing giant fountains that flowed blood red water and celebrating the 
example of the sacrifice of the Basij. As the revolution transformed from the 
movement phase to the regime phase, the institutionalization of martyrdom 
spectacles, as seen in the Italian and German cases of the previous chapter, became an 
important tool for galvanizing public support and demonstrating the power of the 
regime.  
 A prominent example is that of Hosein Fahmideh who died at the age of 
thirteen after strapping an explosive belt around his chest and crawling under an Iraqi 
tank. It is said that as he crawled under the tanks to the boy cried out:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
277 This translates roughly to “Paradise of Zahra” named after a nickname of Muhammad’s daughter 
and a venerated female martyr.   
 




Labayka, ya Khu- mayni!’’ (Here I come, O Khomeini!).279 Of Fahmideh’s 
death Khomeini said, “The value of his little heart is greater than could be 
described by hundreds of tongues and hundreds of pens…. He drank the sweet 
elixir of martyrdom.280 
On November 20, 1986, in celebration of the Universal Children’s Day, a 
commemorative stamp of Fahmideh was issued to memorialize his martyrdom.281 
Fahmideh’s relic case at the cemetery actually contains such boyish items as a jump 
rope and children’s clothing; but it contrasts those rather innocent symbols with that 
of a replica of a tank and a hand grenade282 to remind visitors that even a young boy 
can obtain the ultimate reward of martyrdom and demonstrate selfless sacrifice for the 
revolution. The memorial cases like Fahmideh’s are actually more in line with the 
German Temple of Honor that humanizes the individual dead and remember the 
names and actions of each of the dead than it is of the Italian Mostra della 
Rivoluzione Fascista which is filled with faceless voices in the Sacrarium. This may 
be in part reflective of the fact that there were obvious “blood martyrs” in these two 
cases that was a less contrived than the Avanti! attacks for the Italians.  
 Today the cemetery has become one of the central memorial sites and is still 
overseen by the Shahid Foundation.283 A key aspect of the organization’s strategy to 
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keep these acts of martyrdom interesting and believable is to venerate the human 
traits of the dead. By emphasizing the martyrs as real people they invite viewers to 
see aspects of themselves in the lives of the dead. The focus of humanizing the martyr 
is perhaps best expressed in the construction of the memorials themselves. The 
cemetery is filled with glass-enclosed shrines that showing pictures of the martyr both 
in life and at their time of death. Watches, knives, their copies of the Koran or even 
blood soaked clothing often fill these cases which are intended to simultaneously 
demonstrate their humanity and their sacrifice.  
Another example of Iranian regime stage martyrdom spectacles is the Muza-yi 
Shuhada’ or the Central Martyr’s Museum which in many ways replicates the 
purpose and experience of Mussolini’s Sacrarium to the Martyrs though the actual 
execution of the Iranian museum rejects the fascist’s faceless image of martyrdom 
and instead maintains the trend of humanizing martyrs and emphasizing the relevance 
of the actual body in the act. Along the lines of Foucault’s account of the guillotine, 
the physicality of the act is on full display. In addition to the Central Martyr's 
Museum there are also twelve ganjinaha-yi shuhada' or "martyrs' treasuries" 
throughout the country and each of these function as both a memorial and a museum 
many of which constructed on former battle fields from the Iran-Iraq War to serve as 
a physical reminder to the post-revolutionary generations of Iran.284 
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 The museum is strategically, and not perhaps very subtly, across the street 
from the former US embassy infamously known as the setting for the US hostage 
crisis following the revolution. The actual structure of the museum lacks the grandeur 
of Mussolini’s Mostra della Rivoluzione Fascista. The actual structure of the building 
is designed to be very drab, in pale white285 and grey tones in a sepulcher design to 
highlight both the sacredness of the space in comparison to other spaces within 
Tehran but to also mimic a coffin like design to further bolster the idea of sacrifice.286 
The Museum itself has three main groups of martyrs it commemorates and each 
symbolizes a different historical aspect and audience of the Iranian regime. The first 
group continues on the theme of the Black Friday massacre and those martyrs from 
the revolutionary struggle itself. The second group is the largest and includes those 
who died in the Iran-Iraq War. Finally, the newest wing of the library focuses 
exclusively on female martyrs and focuses on granting female martyrs equal status to 
that of their male counterparts. There is, however, an arguably more cynical way to 
look at the women’s wing of the museum. For one, it is exclusive on its own and not 
integrated with earlier male martyrs, even though many of those labeled as martyrs 
actually died in the Iran-Iraq War. Second, the new wing was created in 2006 at the 
same time as the One Million Signatures Campaign (also known as the Campaign for 
Equality) that fought for ending discriminatory laws against women.287 While it is 
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possible that the timing of the events may be purely coincidental it is at the very least 
interesting that at the same time women were pushing for nondiscrimination in 
Iranian society they were, after 16 years of not being included in the Martyr’s 
Museum, finally granted equal representation. Ironically enough, there is equality in 
death in that the inclusion Iranian women were being denied in life were granted, at 
least to a select few, in death.288 
Martyrdom Spectacles in the Internet Age—the Case of Hamas 
	  
The institutionalization of martyrdom operations in the Iranian example 
followed more closely the path of physical memorials seen in Italy and Germany. 
Hamas, however, has utilized a strategy of spectacle that is more widely disseminated 
and receives significantly more attention in the West. By focusing on a strategy of 
parades, television shows (especially those targeting children) as well as public 
celebrations and viewing of the videotapes last will and testament of would be 
martyrs, Hamas is in effect creating “living” martyrs whose voice and stories are not 
told through inscriptions on marble monuments but by their very selves.  
 Hamas’ prolonged engagement in suicide bombings, and its refusal to 
recognize Israeli’s right to exist, has led to its ostracism within the Israeli-Palestinian 
peace process and the international community more broadly. Were their long-term 
goal limited to becoming a legitimate political party within the Palestinian Authority 
then the impact of their bombing strategy would appear self-defeating, but Hamas’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
288 Images of the Martyr Museum are in the appendix. 
143 
 
has a more revolutionary agenda—the transformation of Palestinian society and a 
restructuring of the political order. What then is the relationship between martyrdom 
and Hamas’ long-term objectives in Palestine?  
This section argues that for Hamas martyrdom is a mechanism for mass 
mobilization and that the symbol of the martyr serves as a conduit linking the average 
Palestinian to the party and to its larger vision of Islamic nationalism. The spectacle 
of the martyr is as much a symbol of their idealized conception of man and a 
connection to a mythic past as the Aryan was for Nazi Germany. The section is 
subdivided into three parts: a) Hamas’ “First” Martyr and the spectacle of Sheikh Izz 
ad-Din al-Qassam, b) the social and economic context of Hamas’ formation, and c). 
martyrdom spectacles in the Internet age. 
Hamas’ “First” Martyr: the spectacle of Sheikh Izz ad-Din al-Qassam 
	  
Hamas was a relative latecomer to the drive for Palestinian liberation and 
because of that it had to struggle to justify itself within this broader movement. 
Perhaps not all that ironically given that he died some fifty years before the founding 
of Hamas, they choose to root their claim in the martyrdom of Sheik Izz ad-Din al-
Qassam an early leader in an Islamic based variant of Palestinian nationalism. The 
Inter-War years saw a push against British colonialism and Zionist interest within 
Palestine and al-Qassam rose to relative prominence by advocating for the plight of 
the poor, a return to Islamic tradition and Palestinian independence.289   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




The story of al-Qassam’s martyrdom was rather shocking at the time and took 
on almost mythic proportions as it was told and retold among Palestinians at the time. 
In November, 1935, after leading a group of a dozen followers in the ambush and 
murder of a Jewish soldier with the British forces, al-Qassam and his men fled to the 
mountains near Jenin where they were pursued and surrounded by British forces. 
Seeing that they were surrounded the British demanded their surrender. Rather than 
surrender, however, al-Qassam “told his men to die as martyrs, and he opened fire. 
Al-Qassam’s defiance and the manner of his death (which seemed to stun the 
traditional leadership) electrified the Palestinian people.”290 The al-Qassam model 
(the al-Qassam Brigades was name adopted by Hamas for it’s military wing) is 
foundational with Hamas for three reasons. First, it introduces the idea of jihad and 
martyrdom as a way to confront overwhelming military or political odds. Second, 
while violent, it still maintains core Islamic teachings of charity, honesty, piety and 
morality that Hamas saw lacking in a corrupt Palestinian leadership. Third, 
martyrdom even in the context of suicide operations was another option to continued 
oppression.  
Ironically, the relationship between charity and violence is not as contrived as 
it sounds. Hamas has created an entire network of aid agencies and charity institutions 
that are as relevant for logistics and recruitment purposes as they are for aid. Ahmad 
Saltana is a Jenin bomb maker and used his position on a zakat (charity) committee to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




recruit suicide bombers. Sheikh Yassin even discussed the role that charity plays in 
building support for the group: “We gave them 1,200 shekels ($300). Sometimes it’s 
a sack of flour, or at the very least the taxi fare home.”291 These rather small amounts 
of charity pay huge dividends as Hamas seeks to build support within the broader 
Palestinian population. Moreover, this network of supporters provides ample 
opportunities to hide weapons (sometimes under the playgrounds of schools built and 
funded by Hamas) or smuggle fugitives after an attack.292 
The Social and Economic Context Leading Up to the Adoption of the al-Qassam 
Model: From Israeli Occupation to Semi-Autonomy  
 
Six-Day War 
There is a complex back-story to the Israeli-Palestine conflict that looms in 
the shadows of current events, but this story is about life under the Israeli 
occupation—particularly in Gaza which is the geographical base for Hamas—and so 
my focus will be on four key events: the Six-Day War (1967), the First Intifada 
(1988-1990), the founding of Hamas (1987-1988) and the Oslo Accords (1993). 
Israel’s victory in the Six-Day War dramatically changed the political and economic 
landscape for Palestinians as they assumed a military occupation over Gaza and the 
West Bank. Learning from their brief occupation of Gaza following the Suez War 
(1956), Israel sought to immediately normalize conditions within the occupied 
territories in hopes that this would circumvent the international (particularly on the 
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part of the US) pressure to withdraw from these territories as they had done with 
Gaza and the Suez.293   
The normalization of conditions within Gaza was an attempt by the Israelis to 
demonstrate that they could be adequate stewards of the Palestinians, create economic 
stability and protect their own military interests. Israeli’s first task was to reestablish 
key services including the medical infrastructure, education, commerce and legal 
institutions.294 But the realities of occupation proved to be less tenable and led to a 
growing dissatisfaction with the status quo and ultimately to the tension that led to the 
First Intifada. 
The First Intifada 
The Intifada is one of those rare examples of an essentially spontaneous social 
movement, revolutionary in fervor, which manages to mobilize vast spectrums of the 
Palestinian population. Spearheading the movement was the United National 
Leadership: Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Democratic 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Palestinian Communist Party—just about 
every party except Hamas.295 The political dilemma for the First Intifada was 
maintaining this fragile balance between such widely disparate groups while at the 
same time keeping alive revolutionary fervor.  
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The Intifada developed in six key phases. The first phase, lasting 
approximately three weeks, consisted of spontaneous uprisings within the refugee 
camps. The second phase saw the institutionalization of the movement under the 
command of the United National Leadership (January through March 1988). The 
third phase (February through June 1988) involves a key period of civil disobedience 
aimed at undermining the administration of the Israeli occupation—specifically 
involving the resignation of tax collectors and police officers. The fourth phase 
involved a declaration of Palestinian statehood and the consolidation of all internal 
and external movements (November 1988). The fifth phase (throughout 1989) saw an 
Israeli counter-offensive. Marking the final phase (June 1989-1990) was a Palestinian 
“anti-collaboration campaign.296”  
This brief history of the First Intifada illustrates four key trends. First, there 
was development of a new Palestinian consciousness. Schlomo Brom goes as far as to 
argue that this emerging Palestinian consciousness radically impacted Israel security 
thinking and spawned a realization on the part of the Israelis that even though the 
majority of them had lived their entire lives under Israeli occupation, they were not 
willing to do so indefinitely.297 Second, there was a reinvigoration of Palestinian civil 
society manifesting itself in new communal organizations particularly at the local 
level. Third, there was a sustained movement towards political unification under the 
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secular leadership of Yasir Arafat. And the most important lesson, the realization that 
ending the Israeli occupation through nonviolent means (a key goal of the Intifada298) 
is untenable. It is within this gelatinous political and social context that Hamas begins 
to emerge. In direct response to this secular vision of Palestinian nationalism, Hamas 
initiated a political and social movement that would be fundamentally Islamic in 
nature and would borrow conceptions of martyrdom and social obligation to forge a 
doctrine of a militarized religious nationalism that would directly challenge Fatah and 
the Israeli authorities. In this way, Hamas builds off the religious roots of martyrdom 
and transforms it into part of their narrative of national liberation as a way to solidify 
their power and build popular support both within and without.  
Founding of Hamas 
In the world of Palestinian politics, Harakat Al-Musqawama Al-Islamiya—
Hamas—is a relative newcomer. Based primarily in Gaza, Hamas was formally 
founded on December 14, 1987 by a group of Islamist fundamentalists led by Sheikh 
Ahmad Yassin.299 Yassin envisioned Hamas as a Palestinian offshoot of the Egyptian 
based Muslim Brotherhood—an Islamic fundamentalist organization known for its 
charity and social services. This ideological legacy manifests itself not only in 
Hamas’ continued commitment to social services300 (schools, youth groups, 
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gymnasiums, health care facilities and economic aid) but also in its conceptions of an 
Islamic Palestinian state. 
Prior to its assumption of power, Hamas had four main political goals: 
destruction of the “Zionist entity” (through jihad), the replacement of all of Israel by a 
Palestinian Arab state, Islamic Palestinian nationalism, and a violent opposition to the 
Israeli-Palestinian peace process.301 These latter two positions are what really 
separate the Hamas from its chief political rival, the Fatah (formerly known as the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization or the PLO). Hamas was able to present itself as 
an honest, religious alternative to the corruption and their perceived failures of Fatah 
as leaders and representatives of the Palestinians302—a task made easier with the 
death of long time PLO leader and the first president of the Palestinian Authority, 
Yasser Arafat in 2004. 
Oslo Accords 
By the time the Oslo Accords were signed fundamental shifts had occurred 
within the Palestinian leadership. The dominance of the Palestinian diaspora based in 
Tunis declined relative to the power of the PLO faction internal to the occupied 
territories and Hamas emerged as a major political player (although still far from real 
broad-based support). Despite having limited political possibilities under the Israeli 
occupation following the Six-Day War, the PLO was the dominant group within 
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Palestinian politics and sought to secure their position by actively seeking 
international recognition as the sole, legitimate voice of the Palestinian people. This 
recognition was achieved on a regional level by the 1973 Arab summit in Algiers, and 
at the international level in 1974 when the United Nations granted the PLO 
permanent observer status and invited Arafat to address the General Assembly.303 
Their official position became institutionalized under the Oslo Accords (1993) when 
the Rabin government formally recognized the PLO and their quasi-governmental 
status as head of what would become the Palestinian Authority.304 This was a 
significant blow for the wide-range of opposition groups within Palestine including 
the Communists, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the most potent challenger for 
domestic dominance, the Hamas. Once recognized—and institutionalized—as the 
legitimate voice of the Palestinian people, the PLO was the in group and all other 
parties were out. They now had the task to deliver upon years of promises. 
 Israel’s recognition of the PLO did not come without its price. Four days 
before the more nuanced Declaration of Principles were released, Arafat provided 
Prime Minister Rabin one of the most important diplomatic coups in Israeli history—
recognition by the representative of the Palestinian people of Israel’s legitimate right 
to exist. This pivotal moment elevated Arafat into a partner that Israel could negotiate 
with and it dramatically altered Israel’s standing within the international community 
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whereby after Oslo forty states resumed or established diplomatic relations with Israel 
the most important of which was Jordan the former Arab occupier of the West Bank 
pre-1967.305 The political ramifications of this ‘mutual’ recognition was that Israel 
now had Palestinian approval of their right to exist whereas Israel only recognized 
Arafat and the PLO as the representatives of the Palestinians for limited self-
governance but did not go so far as to recognize or endorse a two state solution. 
 The key organizational document coming out of Oslo was the Declaration of 
Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements 1993 (DoP) which outlined the 
principles for Palestinian self-governance (these would become largely reaffirmed in 
President Bush’s The Roadmap). The main tenet of the DoP was to transfer authority 
for governing the territories from Israeli military administration to a newly formed 
Palestinian Authority (PA) comprised of a President and a Legislative Council. 
However, this transfer of power was not without reservations. The PA did not have 
jurisdiction over Israeli settlements, military bases, or any crime committed by an 
Israeli citizen within the territories. Moreover, the Israeli’s retained the right to secure 
the Palestinians from external threat and to defend Jewish settlements internally, thus 
ensuring at least a limited military presence within the territories.306 
Martyrdom Spectacles in the Internet Age 
Their professed long-term goals as outlined in their Charter are one thing, but 
have these fundamentally changed in light of their electoral victory and de facto civil 
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war with Fatah? In April 2008 talks between Hamas leaders and former President 
Jimmy Carter indicated what—at least Carter—saw as a shift in Hamas’ willingness 
to recognize Israel’s right to exist. According to Carter, Hamas leaders agreed to 
accept the 1967 borders (meaning Gaza and the West Bank) of a Palestinian state if 
the Palestinians through a referendum approved such a decision.307 This position, if 
indeed accurate, is a long way from Arafat’s letter of recognition to Rabin and 
highlights the possibility of a bargaining position that does not seem to accept the 
asymmetrical power relations that Arafat acquiesced to by not securing a mutual 
recognition. 
Hamas’ ideological position is summarized by the organization’s motto: 
“Allah is its Goal. The Messenger is its Leader. The Qur‘an is its Constitution. Jihad 
is its methodology, and Death for the sake of Allah is its most coveted desire.”308 This 
highlights three main ideological precepts of Hamas: 1) the desire for a theocratic 
state, 2) jihad as the means (meaning both violence and education) and 3) martyrdom 
as a desired pursuit in order to fulfill the will of God, which is sovereign over the 
state and mankind.  
 Islamist nationalism is perhaps best summarized by Article 12 of the Charter 
of Hamas which argues that:  
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if other nationalisms have material, humanistic, and geographical ties, then the 
Islamic Resistance Movement’s nationalism has all of that, and, more 
important, divine reasons providing it with life and spirit where it is connected 
with the originator of the spirit and life giver, raising in the heavens the divine 
Banner to connect earth and heavens with a strong bond.309 
  
The explanation here is fairly clear—there is no distinction between the state and 
God, yet their conception of state still incorporates all the familiar material and 
territorial attributes of nationalism. God’s word, delivered divinely through the 
Prophet, is the very foundation for both the state and society with Shari ‘a (or 
religious law based primarily on the Qur‘an) as the fundamental law of the land.310 
The legal structure of a Hamas governed state would probably look something akin to 
the Iranian system in which laws are not made, per se, but interpreted in light of 
existing Shari ‘a law.  
Until 2006, Hamas did not participate in Palestinian Authority elections. This 
is in part because of the legacy of Oslo and the domination of the PA by Arafat and 
the Fatah. Arafat’s death and a decade of ‘autonomous rule’ without independence or 
statehood provided Hamas a rational for standing in elections. But the potential 
democratic nature of Hamas is questionable. Their founder, Ahmad Yasin, argued 
that one cannot divorce the political process from Islam and that within Islam, only 
shura’s, or consultations, are allowed.311 This permits Hamas’ decision making 
bodies to consult with regards to policy formulation, but ultimately this is not a vote, 
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because voting assumes some degree of autonomy for actors within the political 
process—it assumes to one degree or another that the actors are sovereign. Only God 
is sovereign within Islamic political culture so while the people may be consulted the 
ultimate decisions have already been expressed by God through the Prophet, the 
Qur‘an and the Shari ‘a.  
 The second prominent ideological position of Hamas, jihad, is the struggle—
the personal, the psychological, even the physical—individuals engage in to be closer 
in harmony with God.312 Certainly this struggle can be on a grand social scale in 
which it is the active fight against foreign influence and domination, but it can also be 
an individual struggle, a fighting of one’s own demons. For Hamas, jihad comprises 
both dimensions. Again returning to the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas 
believes that education in Islam and jihad is essential to reforming society and 
rejecting Western influence. This is not purely rhetorical; Hamas argues that the 
infidels win only when Muslims lose the ideological battle—when the infidels 
attempt to confuse Muslims about Islam. 313 
Education is only one aspect of jihad. The second, violent struggle, not only 
receives a greater amount of attention, but also confronts us with a new form of 
political and religious engagement—the martyr. Islam advocates martyrdom both in 
the text of the Koran and in the hadīth (the sayings of the Prophet Mohammed). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
312 Ira Zepp, A Muslim Primer: Beginner’s Guide to Islam, (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 
2000), 95. 
 
313 Muhammad Maqdsi, “Charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) of Palestine,” Journal 




Islamic revivalists, both Sunni and Shiite, borrow from this tradition by emphasizing 
individual jihad. Rather than viewing jihad as a struggle of the Islamic people against 
non-believers, it is reconceived as an individual duty314, advocating what in Arabic is 
istishhadi315 —one who martyrs themselves. Martyrdom for religious nationalists 
does not distinguish between the state and the will of God, their sacrifice being in 
deference to both.  
Justifying Martyrdom 
There is of course a glaring theological paradox for religious-oriented group 
like Hamas approving or advocating for self-martyrdom: how can religious ideologies 
that generally promote the sanctity of life be reconciled with a group advocating its 
adherents to destroy it? Aware that their conception of jihad and self-martyrdom runs 
counter to traditional interpretations Hamas developed a fairly advanced theological 
rationale based on the writings of the father of contemporary Islamists ideology 
Sayyid Qutb. Qutb was an Egyptian born Sunni Muslim and early affiliate of the 
Muslim Brotherhood. Somewhere between 1948-1950 during his travels to the United 
States (a nation with a long history of religious conservatism) and seeing what he 
considered extreme decadence his religious views became radicalized.316 He was 
heavily influenced by the French author Alexis Carrel. Themes from Carrel’s Man 
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and the Unknown, are especially visible in Qutb’s Islam and the Problem of 
Civilization and Milestones. Like Carrel, Qutb saw modernization as beneficial for 
progress, but negative in terms of the impact it had on society. Rather than “reason,” 
which they believed robbed man of his soul (through technological rather than 
analytical skills); Qutb and Carrel argued that “mysticism” should “regulate the 
dynamics of civilization building.”317 Reason assumes that mankind is God. For Qutb, 
God and the state are fused, man plays a part in the play, but is never author of the 
script. 
His most important contribution was the reformulation of jihad. Qutb saw the 
world as being in a state of jahiliyyah. Jahiliyyah is an Arabic term that roughly 
translates into an “age of ignorance.”318 The term is traditionally applied to the period 
of history before the Prophet Muhammad and his divine revelations. Qutb, however, 
viewed the Twentieth Century with its liberal, capitalist West and atheistic, 
communist East as returning to a state of jahiliyyah. Even countries with Muslim 
majorities were no longer fulfilling their Qur‘anic obligations. One of the most 
prominent characteristics of jahiliyyah is the rejection of sovereignty as vested in God 
for human or popular sovereignty319—a  “rebellion against the sovereignty of Allah 
on earth [which] attempts to transfer to man one of the greatest attributes of Allah, 
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namely sovereignty, by making some men lords over others.”320 To combat this trend 
there are essentially three options available: the Hijra or a physical migration to 
remove oneself from a destructive society, educating others in order to reform the 
population to its purist state, or violence as a means to attack and deconstruct the old 
society in the hopes of constructing a new social and political order. While the 
Muslim Brotherhood, follows the second of these three options in his later years, 
Qutb rejected such an approach and opted for violence, using  
“physical power and jihad to abolish the organizations and authorities of the 
jahili system which prevent people from reforming their ideas and beliefs, 
forces them to follow deviant ways, and makes them serve other humans 
instead of their Almighty Lord.”321  
 
The nexus for Qutb is the fusing of jihad as a personal duty with physical force in an 
actual fight against jahiliyyah. 
This is a radical departure from quietist interpretations of jihad which were 
(and still are) prevalent in the Muslim world. Dating back to medieval times, jihad 
simply implied an individual’s “struggle for higher Islamic standards.”322 Quietist 
interpretations of jihad are personal, internal efforts of purification and righteousness, 
with martyrdom—defined as an internal struggle—only one possible outcome of 
jihad. The relevance of intention, the spiritual value of an act rather than death was 
the main requirement of martyrdom. At the time, martyrs could include those who 
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testify to the truth of Allah even through written or oral arguments (implying even 
scholars could be seen as martyrs).323 
Islamists, both Sunni and Shiite, utilize Qutb’s interpretation emphasizing 
individual jihad nearly as importantly as the five pillars of Islam (of which jihad is 
not a part). Rather than viewing jihad as a struggle of the Islamic people against non-
believers, it is reconceived as an individual duty324, advocating what in Arabic is 
istishhadi325 —one who martyrs himself. This is the foundation for Hamas’ 
theological justification for self-martyrdom. Dr. Abdul Aziz Rantisi showed just how 
relevant Hamas took not simply justifying the act of self-martyrdom but also the 
connected task of labeling these combatants when he chose the term ‘istishhadi’ 
which from Arabic translates into ‘self-chosen martyr’ to that of a ‘suicide bomber’ 
because it describes the impact of their mission and its specific significance—it was 
self-chosen.326 Hamas founder, and spiritual icon, Shaykh Ahmad Yasin, further 
distinguishes between suicide and martyrdom arguing:  
Suicide means that someone has become tired or despairs of life and takes his 
own life. This is prohibited in Islam. Those who are martyred while defending 
their land, country, and people under occupation, however, know where they 
are going and carry out this because they want to be nearer to God. 
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Consequently, what we are talking about here is martyrdom and not suicide 
operations.327 
 
Through Yasin and Qutb, Hamas reconciles the contradictions of a martyrdom 
discourse with an Islamic discourse in terms of their ultimate goal—the liberation of 
Palestine.  
Framing Martyrdom Spectacles in the Internet Age 
 Hamas’ rise to power as well as its adoption of suicide bombing tactics has to 
be viewed contextually. As a child of the First Intifada, Hamas emerges from a period 
of burgeoning political solidarity and national identity, but the aftermath of the 
Intifada failed to secure this unity and deliver a Palestinian state. Two principle 
outcomes of the Intifada were the Oslo Accords and the subsequent influx of 
international aid into the Occupied Territories. These should have produced a two 
state solution with an economically viable Palestine. Instead, the Palestinians 
continue to live under the yoke of Israeli occupation with only a quasi-independent 
governmental structure and an economically deteriorating situation especially within 
Gaza. Since the beginning of the peace process, despite nine billion investment 
dollars (US)—the highest per capita amount of economic aid anywhere in the 
world—there has actually been a retraction of economic activity within Palestine.328 
This two-fold failure of the Palestinian Authority, led by Fatah, to secure economic 
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stability or peace, provided the political space for Hamas to demonstrate that it could 
be a party above corruption and one able to act forcefully against Israel.329 
 Hamas formed its military wing, the ‘Martyr ‘Izzidin al-Qassam Brigades’ in 
1992 and it became “an important source of mass appeal and political legitimacy.”330 
As I outlined earlier, martyrdom operations are powerful because they actually speak 
to three different audiences simultaneously while requiring little in terms of financial 
and operational resources. For the would-be martyr there is an undeniable sense of 
power regardless of one’s personal motivations (secular or religious). The other two 
reference points are the more interesting. Hamas originally moved to only attack 
‘legitimate’ military targets, but after the Hebron massacre (1994) in which 
Palestinian civilians were targeted; they began attacking Israeli civilians on the 
grounds of reciprocity.331 What they discovered was that their suicide campaigns 
were able to create a “balance of fear” between the average Israeli and Palestinian 
civilian.332  
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This “balance of fear” doctrine is often seen as merely superficial. However, 
the vast majority of Palestinians have never known a life absent the occupation and 
all the economic, political and social detriments that arise from it. How can we 
possibly even begin to imagine what sort of impact that degree of powerlessness can 
have on our individual and communal sense of identity? Moreover, seeing a 
Palestinian based organization able to inflict a similar feeling of insecurity upon the 
Israelis likely provides a measurable sense of empowerment if not satisfaction. My 
earlier definition of martyrdom described the importance of sacrifice and the role of 
the community as the determiner of when a sacrifice has occurred and this becomes 
essential in understanding how martyrdom can be a tool for building political 
support—and ultimately, its own limits.  
For a community to accept an action as a sacrifice it has to first believe that 
the sacrifice was necessary and second that the act itself has value. The nexus 
between necessity and value creates a continuum by which a constituent society will 
judge the value of martyrdom operations. The degree to which a population is 
marginalized will be positively related to its assumption of necessity while the 
aftermath of an operation and its subsequent alleviation of marginal status will 
influence the interpretation of the act’s implicit value. Moreover, the language by 
which these acts are framed will act as a third layer binding the ultimate utilization 
and judgment of martyrdom operations.  
Hamas is keenly aware of the power of framing the language around suicide 
operations and is keen to define acts as “martyrdom” operations and quickly surround 
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the family of bombers providing aid and also ensuring that their reaction is not 
publicly negative. When it finds an eager advocate for its operations it can often 
elevate the person’s profile. For example, while women play a powerful role in the 
grassroots mobilization of Hamas, they are wholly absent within its leadership 
structure with the possible exception of Miriam Farhat (a member of the Palestinian 
Legislative Council from the 2006 elections). Farhat has been used widely by Hamas 
for her support of her three sons being suicide martyrs. In one of her son’s videoed 
will’s she Farhat is shown in the background crying. When he indicates that perhaps 
he should abandon his mission she is heard in the tape stating: “I am your mother! It 
is not easy for me to ask you to leave, I cry for you day and night. Don’t misinterpret 
my tears. …You must obey your orders, and maintain your fight until the moment 
you meet your God.”333  
We can only speculate as to whether these words were truly her own or 
scripted, but they certainly are an effective propaganda tool. The passionate plea of a 
mother imbues the act with a sense of sacrifice especially when she insinuates that it 
is she who asks her son to undertake his mission. And, of course, the invoking of God 
assumes a sense of divine purpose. Ironically, this image of an intimate family 
moment where a son is preparing to sacrifice himself is far from the reality of how 
suicide bombers prepare. Generally, would-be martyrs are removed from their 
families, made to tape their wills in advance to shame them into not backing out of 
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their operations and preventing from seeing their families again so as not to allow 
them the opportunity to change their mind.334  
The relationship between Hamas and martyrdom, however, has up to now 
been that of an oppositional party. Now that they have had their first taste of real 
power the question becomes—will anything change? Hamas is an exceptionally 
shrewd organization that is first and foremost a political organization that has now 
effectively transformed itself into an actual competitive party. This same 
phenomenon is occurring in Egypt in which the Muslim Brotherhood has today 
transformed itself into a political party now in control of the Egyptian government. 
We must not forget that the 2006 elections were the first time that Hamas actually 
entered the electoral process within the Palestinian Authority. In effect, rather than 
continuing to denounce the Palestinian Authority and the Oslo Accords from which it 
emerged, Hamas actually became part of the process—and not only that, it won. The 
sheer fact that they entered the political process is a huge step toward potentially 
moderating their behavior and rather than being isolated they are now opening up to 
the political process and increasing popular support and membership may ultimately 
serve to moderate their behavior. The ultimate reason Hamas won the elections had 
less to do with their political positions than it did with the fact that Palestinians felt 
that they could trust Hamas more than any other party, their belief that ultimately 
corruption would decline, and in part because they provided the social infrastructure 
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in the poorest and most desolate areas that the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli 
state either failed or refused to.335  
The problem with a Hamas led Palestinian Authority is really one of 
recognition (by Israel, the international community and Fatah) and of ends (the 
continuation of the peace process). Israel recognized the PLO as the representative of 
the Palestinian people at Oslo and pushed the peace process further with the creation 
of the Palestinian Authority. The semi-autonomous role of the PA creates a political 
space where the PLO is not the voice of the Palestinian people but whichever party 
the Palestinians actually elect into office as their representatives. The frustration on 
behalf of the US and Israel is that Hamas was able to win democratically and perhaps 
the PLO and the peace process itself did not have the undercurrent of widespread 
support analysts had expected.  
In viewing the future of martyrdom and Hamas, we have to remind ourselves 
that the leaders are exceptionally politically savvy and quite attuned to the pulse of 
Palestinian public opinion. In 1998-1999 when they became acutely aware of the 
backlash surrounding their suicide campaigns they reduced both the number and the 
severity of such attacks336 so they can be known to moderate their behavior to events 
at hand. And it may just be that the very fact that their martyrdom operations are 
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rooted in religious justifications will limit the degree and brutality of its application as 
continued attacks will no doubt at some point appear too far apart from the teachings 
of Islam.  
Martyrdom and the Internet 
 Unlike the Iranian Martyr’s Museum, there is less of an emphasis on brick-
and-mortar institutions in the Palestinian territories. Instead, the Palestinians have 
adopted a sophisticated strategy of creating cyber museums, martyrdom 
commemoration websites, a television station and even a children’s show all rooted in 
the al-Qassam sense of defiance that is at the center of their use of martyrdom.  There 
are two influential martyr cyber museums in the Palestinian territories.  
 The closest thing to the Iranian Martyr’s Museum would be the Abu Jihad 
Museum for the Prisoners Movement Affairs and is affiliated with Al-Quds 
University. With both a physical and cyber presence, the museum attempts  
to reflect the will power and the challenge of the Palestinian people, the 
people who lived and continue to live the suffering and cruelty of the 
occupation that has turned his life into a big prison. This museum is the voice 
and image to tell the whole world about the suffering of Palestinian prisoners 
in Israeli prisons and outside.337  
 
The image of defiance is expressed not just through the pictures and stories of the 
museum but also in its overall structural design. The exterior of the museum is 
surrounded by a partial façade of what they label the “apartheid wall” that the Israelis 
have built to protect Israel from terrorist attacks. The image of the wall is intended to 
highlight that all Palestinians are in essence “prisoners” under Israeli occupation and 
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thus the personal martyrdom among Palestinian prisoners is extended as an image of 
defiance and sacrifice in the name of the Palestinian people as a whole.338  
 The idea of communal sacrifice continues in the Palestinian Holocaust 
Memorial Museum, which is simply a cyber-museum without a physical presence. 
Here the focus shifts away from prisoners to the children killed by Israeli forces and 
testimonials by those who survived such attacks. The webpages are structured more 
like expanded martyr posters. Each entry page begins with a picture and then brief 
biographical information such as name, age, martyrdom date, as well as the place and 
cause of death. Yet unlike posters, the limitless space of the Internet allows for a 
detailed account of the child’s final hours as well as stories from families and friends 
as to the life of the child. And when available, death pictures and videos are also 
streamed on the website.339 The museum’s effort at defiance is two-fold. First, in 
using the name holocaust they are trying to label the Israeli’s as hypocrites. Second, 
by memorializing dead children they are trying to cover over Palestinian suicide 
bombers whose justifications maybe questionable with children that portray the image 
of pure innocence. 
 A third and final example revolves around what could arguably be Hamas’ 
most controversial use of martyrdom spectacles, the Pioneers of Tomorrow television 
show. Another example of child martyrdom spectacles, the Pioneers of Tomorrow is a 
children’s television show broadcast on Hamas’ own Al-Aqsa station. The show is in 
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339 http://palestinianholocaust.net/English/In_Depth/GazaHolocaustMuseum/index.shtml, accessed 
May 10, 2012. 
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many ways reminiscent of Public Broadcasting Shows in the US like Sesame Street 
with a young female host, costumed animal characters, a call-in feature and adults all 
designed to teach lessons to children. What separates it, however, from its more 
benign American counterparts is that the main lesson it portrays is to encourage 
martyrdom and defiance to Israel. The most infamous example of using martyrdom as 
an image of defiance is in the storyline that involved the Mickey Mouse cloned 
character of a Palestinian mouse named Farfour. The Farfour storyline assumes that 
he inherits land from a dying grandfather (who happens to not be a mouse, but putting 
that contradiction aside) and the Israelis want the land. When Farfour stands defiant 
and refuses to hand over the land an Israeli officer beats him to death in a dramatic 
camera scene that cuts back and forth between the death and the young female host 
who witnesses the action, while announcing to the viewers that they have just seen 
Farfour martyred for them.340 Whereas the martyrdom of 18 BL in fascist Italy was 
designed for an adult audience, Farfour speaks to a younger audience but both rely on 
a storyline based on a non-human character sacrificing for their people and provide a 
way for the movements to present their narrative of martyrdom to the masses. Both 
examples show how the transition from the movement phase to the regime phase 
prompted the groups to open up martyrdom to faceless or nonhuman character as an 
invitation for the spectators to be able to relate with the martyr and perhaps even see 
themselves within the story. 
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The martyrdom spectacles for belligerent fundamentalist movements are presented in 
more modern ways but still maintain the same essential narrative and rationale as 
those of the interwar period. There are, however, three important implications that the 
move towards television and Internet based dissemination tactics might produce. 
First, the message can be more directly controlled and produced. This is akin to the 
Nazi production of Triumph of the Will where the entire production can be 
meticulously designed for effect. Second, the preservation of the spectacle in digital 
form allows for the repetition of the spectacle again and again. 18BL is an infamous 
example here of a production so expansive that it could not adequately be filmed and 
too expensive and logistically problematic to ever be reproduced. Third, the audience 
can be much wider than with other dissemination forms and perhaps more 
importantly, the intimacy of being able to disseminate in the confines of a living room 
television or computer places the spectacles, and indeed the movement, into people’s 
homes. The next chapter takes on the impact that the Information Age may have on 







Concluding Chapter: The Spectacle of Violence and the Evolution of 
Martyrdom and Religious Extremism in the Information Age 
  
Guy Debord spoke of man as that “negative being who is solely to the extent 
that he abolishes being.”341 While man’s individuality, for Debord, may have been 
lost in a consumer-based society, his depiction of man has resonance for spectacles of 
martyrdom as well. The martyr is analogous to the Middle Age Pilgrim who by 
removing himself from the larger society, rejects their decadence and claims a purer 
existence. Yet the seemingly altruistic image of the pilgrim or the martyr belies the 
political usefulness they can also represent. Martyrdom spectacles are a potentially 
valuable tool for legitimacy building and constituency solidification if a political 
movement is able to successfully disseminate their narrative of sacrifice and convert 
the act of martyrdom into a societal spectacle that transforms the individual martyr 
into a conduit between the movement and the society.    
The act of martyrdom is a single moment, the particular event itself. However, 
the spectacle of martyrdom is the celebration and glorification of the act through 
mechanisms of mediation disseminated to the masses. In tracing the process of 
martyrdom within fundamentalist movements, I found the following pattern. The 
movements themselves are products of the unique political and cultural environments 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




in which they emerge. In each case, there is an inherent myth about martyrdom.  
These particular cultural myths formed the original foundation of the concept and 
informed the society as to how to interpret an act of martyrdom. The second stage of 
the process occurs when a movement integrates the myth of martyrdom into its 
ideology. It is at this stage that the movement reinterprets342 the myth of martyrdom 
and imbues it with political resonance. The third stage occurs when the movement 
publicly recognizes a particular act as martyrdom and then performs acts of 
celebration to both revere the act and the movement’s ties to its sacrifice. The 
important point is not if an act of martyrdom has occurred but rather that the 
movement publically claims that an act has occurred and presents that act as a means 
for celebration to the society. Finally, the society receives the spectacle and interprets 
the value of the act. In this way the society is not a passive actor but an actual agent 
within this process and society’s response (whether positive, negative or neutral) will 
impact both the way the movement celebrates future acts of martyrdom and which of 
these acts it will publically recognize.  
Within this process of politicization, I see two broad narratives of martyrdom 
emerging the heroic and the transformational. Heroic forms of martyrdom present the 
martyr as something to venerate, as an icon or heroic ideal similar to how the Nazis 
portrayed their members who died in the Beer Hall Putsch. Transformational visions 
of martyrdom are different in that they ask the masses not to simply venerate but 
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actually to become martyrs, exemplified by the Iranian Basij; or to emulate the spirit 
of martyrdom on a much smaller scale by venerating martyrdom through special 
museums and cemeteries to promote and celebrate willing sacrifice for the cause. 
Here the act of martyrdom becomes a purification process, a mechanism by which the 
individual sacrifices their individuality to become part of the utopian vision the 
movement promotes. That sacrifice can also serve as a conduit to promote and 
strengthen linkages between the movement and the friends and family the martyr left 
behind. This final chapter explores two main themes, the impact of technology on the 
dissemination of spectacle and a rereading of martyrdom as spectacle versus ritual, in 
order to present a case for how to end martyrdom and fascism in the modern world.  
The Impact of Technology on the Dissemination and Power of Spectacle 
 
The Information Age has provided new, innovative ways for governments and 
opposition movements to reach into the lives of the modern citizen. Yet the evolution 
of these manifestations of encroachment is arguably no more nefarious than their 
predecessors. The modern age can be read as one in which the tension between the 
individual as an autonomous agent and an exclusive society is eroded as inclusion 
becomes universalized across all social strata. The individual becomes arguably lost 
in a mass society where leaders manipulate cultural norms as a means of forming and 
controlling mass consciousness.343  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





What has changed is not the effort or even the effectiveness of movements to 
enact these controls but that they have followed the people to where they are most 
receptive and approached them there. Rather than spearheading avenues for social 
control, movements have adopted already popular venues and entered into a common 
language with the people. The following section argues that in an attempt to appear 
modern, even revolutionary, fundamentalist movements embrace prevailing 
technologies and cultural norms as platforms for martyrdom spectacles. The 
emergence of modern manifestations of these spectacles may appear novel or even 
linked to a particular religious group or geographic locale, but as demonstrated in 
previous chapters it is a continuation of the same sorts of fundamentalist politics that 
emerged in the first half of the Twentieth Century. What does make these spectacle 
troubling is not the specific act itself but that the manifestations of these spectacles 
are even more isolating, more pervasive, and more totalitarian in nature than their 
historical counterparts. The vision of mass man espoused by Hitler and Mussolini 
becomes ever more possible in the modern world as avenues for escaping a 
spectacle’s encroaching reach continue to whither in the face of mass society.  
Technology and Dissemination 
 
The definition of spectacle is derived from the Latin of “to observe” or “to 
look” and as such spectacles are presentations that traditionally rely on two senses—
sight and sound.344 Just as the image of the scaffold raised high above the heads of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




crowds provided a focal point of the power of the state, and the shrill sounds of agony 
and moaning from torture and death made the public execution real and intimate even 
for those who could not bear to witness it, contemporary martyrdom spectacles have 
harnessed the most modern technologies of the day to both present and disseminate 
the narrative to their constituents. This section will explore three primary examples: 
the martyrdom spectacles of 18BL, Hamas’ Farfour and the Mostra della Rivoluzione 
Fascist’s Sacrarium to the Martyrs in comparison to Iran’s Martyr Museum. These 
three examples are illustrative of the major theme throughout this work; the spectacle 
of martyrdom is about the presentation of a narrative for political power, not the 
specific act of martyrdom. In two of these cases the “act” of martyrdom the spectacles 
revolve around are not only fictionalized but the characters themselves are 
fictionalized non-humans as well. Yet they are both powerful spectacles that each 
incorporates the prevailing technological advances of the day and both build on 
existing cultural norms to create a narrative that is at once spectacular and readily 
identifiable by the population. 
The Spectacle of 18BL  
	  
The spectacle of 18BL was the first attempt at bringing the narrative of 
martyrdom to the Italian masses through theater. 18BL was one of the most 
expansive, expensive and over the top productions ever to be staged. The play was the 
central event of fascism’s Youth Olympics for Culture and Theater (only in Italy 
would an entire Olympics be dedicated to culture and theater).  
174 
 
The collaborative creation of seven young writers and a film director, 18BL 
brought together two thousand actors, fifty trucks, eight bulldozers, four field 
and machine gun batteries, ten field radio stations, and six photoelectric 
brigades in a stylized Soviet-style representation of fascism’s past, present and 
future.345 
 
With a production of this magnitude, it should come as little surprise that the setting 
for the staging of this grand spectacle had to already embody a sense of sacrifice, 
accomplishment and modernity and Mussolini found just such a spot in the reclaimed 
fields of Pontine just outside its new capital the city of Littoria. The goal of the 
production was to illustrate the political and technological sophistication of the Italian 
regime by using the most advanced equipment of the day and to do so in a grand 
spectacle. There are different ways to conceptualize grand, in the case of 18BL grand 
was not simply in the number of participants (thousands) but also in terms of 
audience and stage. Thousands more were expected to attend and the entire Pontine 
Swamp was the setting.  
18BL was the model number of the story’s protagonist, a Fiat truck. While not 
human, it was in many ways the perfect archetype for the ideal fascist man—modern, 
powerful, and most importantly, Italian. There is a tremendous significance in the 
hero note being a man, or even having an identifiable name. In being identified solely 
with a serial number, 18 BL served as the representation of the mass man who finds 
themselves not in their pursuit of individuality but through the glories and emotions 
of the community. In addition, there is perhaps one less obvious and perhaps more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





sinister reason for the hero to be a piece of machinery.346 Trucks are working tools, 
items to be used and driven in the pursuit of a greater good or end. They are not 
sentient beings and blindly follow the will of their master (a narrative aimed squarely 
at the fascist youth who, while they did not know it in 1934, would be fighting for 
Italy on the fields of World War II in just five short years).  
The production was intended to be the first truly mass theater, connecting the 
audience to the actors, the set and the story in such a way as to “achieve an actualized 
mystical experience closing the gap between representation and reality, art and life, 
actors and audiences.”347 To this end, the theater was a giant open air spectacle with 
20,000 spectators spread throughout the marshes not facing a clearly defined stage 
but experiencing the action unfold at different vantage points to really allow the 
audience to be enveloped by the story and become one with the drama.348 Here the 
emphasis was on both the sights and sound of spectacle. The presentation was 
designed in such a way that you would see the unfolding of the play moving before 
you but even once it passed over the horizon you could still hear the movement of the 
play even after you could no longer see it. This was a part of the narrative, that the 
even when you do not see the reach of the fascist party, it is still there and strong. The 
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power of the scaffold for Foucault acted in a similar vein, even when not in use, the 
shadow of the scaffold represented a visual image of the power of the state.  
The play was conducted in three acts, each representing key aspects of the 
party’s history. Act I opened on the battlefields of World War I. The play is 
contrived, ironically enough, in the Soviet vein of choppy sequences of event and 
bright flashes of light to portray to the spectators a sense of movement and progress. 
The scene is one of artillery fire all around and soldiers running around barbed wire 
fences storming up a hill. In the distance a caravan of 18 BL model trucks is bringing 
fresh soldiers to the front lines and by the end of the third scene the entire procession 
are climbing up three different hills where in the middle of which the Italian flag rises 
signaling her victorious conquest of the cities of Trento and Trieste.349  
Act II opens in the years immediately after World War I with the audience 
being blanketed by red fireworks overhead to represent the rise of socialism and labor 
disputes in Italy following the war. At the center of the display is no longer the Italian 
flag but instead a large table filled with fat, lazy men, hoarding money and arguing 
furiously with one another. The sign on the table reads “parliament.” One of the men 
at the table gets up to make a speech and representing Prime Minster Facta who lost 
power to Mussolini in 1922 uttered Facta’s words: “But what do these fascists want?” 
Just at that moment one of the 18 BL’s barrels down from the hillside and smashes 
the table marked parliament and a civil war ensues between the socialists and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





fascists on stage. Scene three opens with a factory on fire and one of the trucks 
charging ahead to help fight the socialists alongside 300 fascists. By the time the 18 
BL arrives the fighting is over, and while victorious, the fascist casualties are so 
numerous that the truck is now used for a funeral procession to transport the dead. As 
they ascend the hill top again, 
From out of the light, a ‘metallic and clear voice’ (Mussolini’s) interrupts the 
funeral silence and, calling out: “Heroes of the war and martyrs of the 
revolution.”  “Presente,” they answer. “To whom does Italy belong, to whom 
Rome?” “To us,” they answer. But the chorus of voices is no longer isolated. 
Black shirts shout out “to us” from all sides of the auditorium and stage. Led 
by a truck convoy, they parade out across the landscape and converge over the 
horizon line, where their silhouettes vanish into the light. Act 2 has ended; the 
March on Rome has begun.350 
 
This revision of the actual history of the March on Rome aside, the symbolic 
resonance of Act II is clear, even if you were not part of the March on Rome and the 
founding of the fascist revolution you can experience its sense of glory and 
collectively connect to a mythic past. 
 The play’s final act returns to the scene of its production, the Pontine swamp. 
In this scene ten years have passed since the March on Rome and there are numerous 
allusions to fascism’s progress (school children singing the party’s praises, order in 
the streets, etc.) but most importantly the commander overseeing the land reclamation 
process indicates that the road to the Fascist Italy’s new town Litorria would be built 
in three days. With these words, he then orders the clearing of the land and the 
carving of the roads. Off to the side of the performance area the old 18BL that has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




now served through World War I, the March on Rome and now the reclamation 
process dutifully begins to carry her load when the engine suddenly dies in the middle 
of the stage. After frantic attempts to revive it 18BL is a martyr to the cause and it is 
decided that she will be pushed into the open pit the road will ride over and will 
continue to serve the Italian state even in her grave. As the play is ending 18BL’s 
driver says to the crowd: “She [18BL] has fought the war, the revolution and the 
battle for land reclamation. Now she will support the highway to Littoria.  … In three 
days she will return to her duties anew, my old lady. Forever!”351 
 The less than subtle reference in these final lines aimed directly at the legacy 
of Catholic culture within Italy. 18BL is ultimately a martyrdom narrative about the 
salvation of the mass man through his willingness to do his duty. Just as Christ rose 
three days after his great sacrifice and martyrdom, 18BL would rise exactly three 
days too.  As Christ’s resurrection would allow him to spend an eternity in heaven 
(except for that brief moment known as the second coming, but that’s always been a 
bit more of a protestant doctrine), 18BL will spend her eternity in a similar heaven—
not the Garden of Eden, but a fascist utopia in the former Pontine Swamps here on 
earth.  
 The spectacle of 18 BL incorporates the most modern means of technology for 
the day and presented a narrative of martyrdom that advocated sacrifice not simply on 
the battlefield, but also in building the fascist economy and state.352 By incorporating 
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352 Images of the 18BL production are in the appendix. 
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the cultural legacy of Roman attempts (and failure) of clearing the Pontine Swamp 
with some of the dogma of the Catholic Church, the complicated spectacle was still 
able to present an easily recognizable narrative that sacrifice for the state may not be 
figurative, but that the protection and perseverance of the state were worth it and that 
the citizen would share in the glory of the state. 
	   	   The Spectacle of Farfour 
	  
 The spectacle of Farfour adopts a strategy similar to 18BL but do so on a 
much smaller scale (though arguably with greater impact). Farfour was the name of 
one of the main characters on a children’s television show called Pioneers of 
Tomorrow broadcast and produced on the Hamas run Al Aqsa television station. The 
show is marketed to children between the ages of roughly nine to thirteen and is 
based on the model of skit children shows like Sesame Street in the United States 
with a mix of interactive talk-show format as well.353  An 11-year-old Palestinian girl 
named Saraa Barhoum along with a fictionalized character known as Farfour hosts 
the show and field questions from callers and through email.  
 The character of Farfour is a large black and white mouse with a high squeaky 
voice and not coincidently appears strikingly similar to Mickey Mouse. Farfour is 
intended to be a character that children will relate to and is simultaneously innocent 
of any wrongdoing because, after all, he is simply a Palestinian mouse. The personal 
history of Farfour is that he inherited a significant amount of land from his 
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grandfather who left him the deed and keys to the property. The grandfather 
abandoned the property when Israel declared independence and left the estates to his 
grandson. The backstory in itself is not spectacular, nor is it intended to be. The 
producers wanted to ensure that the story was common enough that any young viewer 
could relate with the narrative. However, on Friday June 29th, 2007 the event does 
become a spectacle when Farfour is tracked down by Israeli agents (simply “Jews” as 
referred to on the show) and is asked to give Israel his deeds and keys. After repeated 
demands, Farfour continues to refuse and the Israelis beat him to death while the 
camera cuts back and forth between images of violence and the intense stares of Saraa 
Barhoum.354  
 The presentation of this “martyrdom” is packaged specifically in a way to 
attract children in the venues/mediums that children are most likely to be drawn—
television, telephones and the Internet. Though the content is clearly disturbing, the 
visual representation still has an amateurish, cartoon like execution that is intended to 
keep the child engaged (not being so violent as to compel them to turn off the 
television or look away) yet realize that something significant is happening. The 
death of Farfour355 is then reiterated and memorialized by Barhoum’s repeated calls 
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that she wishes one day to be a martyr for Palestine and is ready to embrace her 
fate.356   
 In an interview, Hazim el-Sharawi who played the Farfour character, made it 
clear that the goal of the program and the character was to present to children what he 
argues is the reality of Palestinian life. “We want to connect the child to Palestine, to 
his country, so you know that your original city is Jaffa, your capital is Jerusalem and 
that the Jews took your land and closed your borders and are killing your friends and 
family.” 357 Hamas and its ideology of confrontation with Israel are presented as the 
only hope for the Palestinian people—and one that the youth of Palestine will 
willingly sacrifice themselves for—a message that is aimed both at Israel and at 
Hamas’ primary domestic competition, the Fatah.  
The Sacrarium of Martyrs and the Museum of Martyrs Contrasted 
 
 The Sacrarium of Martyrs was the central piece of Mussolini’s attempt at 
memorializing the tenth anniversary of the fascist assumption of power in Italy. As 
part of the celebrations, the floor plan of a Catholic cathedral was converted to a site 
of worship and reverence for the fascist party and state. The actual design was a 
labyrinth that led visitors through grand rooms with vaulted ceilings and statues of 
faceless soldiers each one depicting traits of strength, yet each generic enough in their 
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composition as to be unidentifiable. The emphasis of the design was to focus on the 
archetypical image of a fascist soldier without actually personifying anyone in 
particular. The stark emptiness of the faces was intended to focus the mind on the 
glories of fascism and not on any specific human weakness. The final room in the 
procession was the Sacrarium of the Martyrs. Here the visitor is presented with 
circular rings representing the glories of the ancient Roman Coliseum and is 
surrounded in darkness with a only a few bright beams of white light as they walk 
through a circular room with cries of  “presente!” echoing repeatedly all around them. 
The imagery is a powerful reminder that the martyrs—again facelessly represented 
with just the simple, undifferentiated word “presente” in a circular room to indicate 
that the revolution itself has no beginning or end and is connected to the glories of 
Italy’s Roman past.358 
 Contrast this spectacle with the presentation of martyrdom at the Martyr’s 
Museum in Iran. Where the fascists constructed a spectacle that highlighted the 
anonymity of the martyrs and used the technology of the day to provide a sense of 
losing the individual self into a mass collective, the Iranians created a museum that 
brings the actual body—sometimes literally—back into the equation and focuses on 
expressing the individuality of each martyr as a way of making the concept more 
accessible. The museum is actually filled with individual artifacts belonging to each 
martyr as well as videos and audio recordings of their voices and pictures of them as 
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they were in life. For Iran, the personification of the martyr is seen as humanizing the 
individual actor and to connect post-revolutionary generations with those that died to 
secure the Islamic regime. The reverence of the individual martyr returns the body to 
the act of martyrdom and elevating it in the terms of Foucault to spectacle once 
again.359  
Some Concluding Thoughts and Analysis: On the End of Martyrdom and 
Fascism in the Modern World  
 
Why this account of martyrdom spectacles? The standard reading of 
martyrdom denotes sacrifice and “sacrifice is a profoundly social action, essentially 
involving a network of relationships, typically …actualized in terms of systems of 
social experience.”360 When I started this work I envisioned a Ford like assembly line 
where young people were recruited, trained, programmed and then sent off to death 
(something akin to mindless robots). In my mind, would-be martyrs must have 
mindlessly embraced and responded to the stimuli presented them—the perfect 
dependent variable that would always detonate the bomb or glide the plane to its 
target. However, this is not the case. Martyrdom is not a sport to be trained for; it is a 
mentality to be embraced—and not just for the would-be martyr, but for the society 
who will interpret the act. Movements cannot make a person willing to die for their 
cause, but they can groom and train likely candidates. Ehud Sprinzak pointed out, 
“the task of recruiters is not to produce but rather to identify this predisposition [the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
359 Images can be found in the appendix. 
 
360 Ivan Strenski, “Sacrifice, gift and the Social Logic of Muslim ‘Human Bombers,’ Terrorism and 




willingness to die] in candidates and to reinforce it.”361 The dilemma for researchers 
is how to separate the martyr as subject and spectacle of martyrdom. 
 The example of Hamas launching a suicide campaign on Israeli school 
children or Italy’s over-the-top portrayal of 18BL each in their own way became 
embarrassing objects of ridicule and forced the hands of the parties to abandon them 
in order to save public face. In this final section I conclude by offering suggestions 
for ending the allure of martyrdom spectacles and fascist movements in the modern 
world. 
The scepter of fascism need not be as haunting a presence in global politics. 
Despite the images of uniformity and solidarity broadcast through martyrdom 
spectacles seem to crumble almost as quickly as they came. After the defeats of the 
Axis powers in World War II, Germany, Italy and Japan were able to transform 
themselves into stable, functioning democracies and eschew their fascist past. To 
conclude this work I would like to offer three interrelated policies positions for 
addressing the martyrdom and fundamentalism. First, deconstructing the monolithic 
approach around martyrdom movements. Second, resurrecting liberal politics and the 
de-radicalization of fascist movements. Third, letting go of martyrdom spectacle.  
 The treatment of fundamentalist movements as if they are all monolithic is a 
post-9/11 phenomenon created by the Bush administration and maintained at least 
thus far through Obama’s term. President Bush’s response to the Al Qaeda attacks 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




was the construction of a rhetoric that espoused: "Either you are with us, or you are 
with the terrorists."362 Bush’s language began a significant policy change for the 
United States in that it identified anyone with sympathies towards terrorist 
movements to be grouped together with terrorists groups and at the same time began a 
policy of non-engagement with perceived terrorist organizations. Bush’s position was 
further exacerbated by the idea of the “axis of evil” in which he identified Libya, Iran, 
Iraq and North Korea as either terrorist or terrorist supporting states.  
 The policy of the US prior to Bush was often one of engagement with terrorist 
groups, even those who committed attacks against American targets. The Reagan 
administration’s response to the 1983 Hezbollah led suicide bombing that killed 241 
US marines was exceptionally muted, and despite public calls for remaining in 
Lebanon the US peace keeping force was withdrawn without significant retaliation.363 
Reagan made a calculation that the cost of US involvement within the Lebanese 
conflict was too high and not in America’s interest. A rational approach to terrorism 
is to determine which sort of attacks are significant and which ones can go without a 
direct response.  
 A second recommendation is to begin the process of engaging with 
fundamentalist groups and to actively seek out opportunities for communication in an 
effort to persuade fundamentalist groups to moderate their tone and embrace liberal 
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political institutions. Despite how naïve this sentiment may sound, Fatah, the Irish 
Republican Army and even Gaddafi’s Libya each espoused terrorism and transformed 
themselves into active members of their respective political institutions.364 Creating 
an “us against them” world leaves little room for compromise or negotiation and it 
makes the historically false assumption that groups who engage in martyrdom or 
terrorist operations cannot change. Yet as this dissertation argued martyrdom itself is 
a politically constructed concept and anything that is constructed can simultaneously 
be deconstructed. The discussion on Hamas in chapter three outlined the transition 
from demonizing the Oslo Accords and the Palestinian Authority to actually 
participating and winning office in 2006. And while Hamas has not completely 
abandoned terrorism or violence the sheer volume and magnitude of their attacks has 
dropped dramatically. Assuming a place in competitive, multiparty elections requires 
that movements actually do more than acts of violence; they have to govern and 
govern well if they wish to maintain power. 
 Finally, spectacles need an audience and while the focus of this dissertation 
has largely been about the dissemination of these spectacles to the group’s constituent 
masses, there is an overlooked secondary audience—the victims of these attacks and 
the larger world community. Every time images of the 9/11 attacks are shown on 
television, or episodes of Al Aqsa TV’s Farfour are streamed online the spectacle of 
the scaffold is present again and again. The victims of these crimes will have no 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




choice but to face its ugly wrath, but the world must be careful not to constantly have 
their eyes gazed upon its blade. The end of spectacle is surprisingly easy; it is the 
turning off of the TV and the avoidance of the parade. Each small step away from the 
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